mppx is a TypeScript interface for machine payments protocol. Prior to 0.8.2, the fee-payer cosigning path in src/tempo/internal/fee-payer.ts copied a client-supplied access_list from a 0x78 FeePayerEnvelope without validating its length or contents. Because EIP-2930 access-list entries consume intrinsic gas even when the listed addresses are never used, a client could add fabricated address-only entries and cause the server fee_payer wallet to pay unnecessary transaction fees. The demonstrated 180-entry list remained within the 500,000 gas policy cap, 16 KB header limit, and RPC simulation budget while increasing the fee by approximately 9.4
mppx is a TypeScript interface for machine payments protocol. Prior to 0.8.2, FeePayerPolicy in src/tempo/internal/fee-payer.ts used decodeFunctionData to validate fee-sponsored calldata but did not reject trailing bytes. A client could append nonzero padding that increased intrinsic calldata gas while gas_limit and max_fee_per_gas remained within policy caps, causing the server fee_payer wallet to pay substantially more than the decoded transaction required. The tested 16 KB header limit bounded the demonstrated padding to about 5,500 bytes and produced approximately five times the normal transaction fee. This issue is fixed in version 0.8.2
mppx: Tempo has a session close voucher bypass vulnerability due to settled amount equality
mppx is a TypeScript interface for machine payments protocol. Prior to version 0.4.11, the tempo/session cooperative close handler validated the close voucher amount using "<" instead of "<=" against the on-chain settled amount. An attacker could submit a close voucher exactly equal to the settled amount, which would be accepted without committing any new funds, effectively closing or griefing the channel for free. This issue has been patched in version 0.4.11.
mppx has Stripe charge credential replay via missing idempotency check
mppx is a TypeScript interface for machine payments protocol. Prior to version 0.4.11, the stripe/charge payment method did not check Stripe's Idempotent-Replayed response header when creating PaymentIntents. An attacker could replay a valid credential containing the same spt token against a new challenge, and the server would accept the replayed Stripe PaymentIntent as a new successful payment without actually charging the customer again. This allowed an attacker to pay once and consume unlimited resources by replaying the credential. This issue has been patched in version 0.4.11.
mppx has multiple payment bypass and griefing vulnerabilities
### Impact
Multiple vulnerabilities were discovered in `tempo/charge` and `tempo/session` which allowed for undesirable behaviors, including:
- Replaying `tempo/charge` transaction hashes across push/pull modes, across charge/session endpoints, and via concurrent requests
- Performing free `tempo/charge` requests due to missing transfer log verification in pull-mode
- Replaying `tempo/charge` credentials across routes via cross-route scope confusion (`memo`/`splits` not included in scope binding)
- Manipulating the fee payer of a `tempo/charge` handler into paying for requests (missing sender signature before co-signing)
- Bypassing `tempo/s