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In den letzten 30 Tagen veröffentlichte Sicherheitslücken für alextselegidis/easyappointments: 0. Davon im KEV-Katalog: 0.
Sicherheitslücken: 20
Easy!Appointments is a self hosted appointment scheduler. In version 1.5.2, an Excessive Data Exposure vulnerability in the customers search endpoint allows an authenticated user to obtain appointment hashes belonging to other users. Using these hashes, an attacker can modify or delete appointments of other providers, resulting in an Appointments Takeover. Version 1.6.0 fixes the issue.
Easy!Appointments is a self hosted appointment scheduler. In versions prior to 1.6.0, `Google::oauth` at `application/controllers/Google.php:278` stores its URL-supplied `provider_id` in the session, and `oauth_callback` saves the issued Google OAuth token against that row without checking the caller owns the provider. Any logged-in backend user (admin, provider, or secretary) rebinds a peer provider's Google sync to a Google account they control. The peer's appointments then sync into the attacker's calendar with each customer's name and email attached as attendee data. Version 1.6.0 patches the issue.
Easy!Appointments is a self hosted appointment scheduler. In versions prior to 1.6.0, `Caldav::connect_to_server` at `application/controllers/Caldav.php:60` hands the request's `caldav_url` to a Guzzle `REPORT` call without scheme or host validation. A logged-in backend user (admin, provider, or secretary) reaches loopback, RFC1918, and link-local hosts on the deployment's network. The Guzzle exception path returns the upstream status code plus ~120 bytes of response body in the JSON `message` field (`Caldav.php:74-78`), so the SSRF is semi-blind. Version 1.6.0 contains a patch.
Easy!Appointments is a self hosted appointment scheduler. Versions prior to 1.6.0 correctly filter provider-scoped appointments in the `appointments/search` response, proving that provider isolation is an intended security boundary. However, the direct mutation endpoints `appointments/store` and `appointments/update` only check generic appointment privileges and never verify that the submitted `id_users_provider` belongs to the current session. A normal authenticated provider can inject new appointments into another provider's schedule via `store`, or reassign existing appointments into a foreign provider's calendar via `update`. The `store`
Easy!Appointments is a self hosted appointment scheduler. Versions prior to 1.6.0 allow administrators to define a custom "booking disabled" message through the booking settings page. That value is stored in the `disable_booking_message` setting via a rich-text editor and later passed directly to the public `booking_message` view without escaping or sanitization. An authenticated administrator can store HTML or JavaScript in this field, enable disabled-booking mode, and trigger stored XSS in every unauthenticated visitor who opens the public booking page. Version 1.6.0 fixes the issue.
Easy!Appointments is a self hosted appointment scheduler. In versions up to and including 1.5.2, the booking reschedule view at `/index.php/booking/reschedule/{appointment_hash}` (handled by `Booking::index()`) embeds the entire customer record as inline JavaScript (`const vars = {... "customer_data": {...}, ...}`) without authentication and without field whitelisting. Anyone in possession of the 12-character `appointment_hash` — which appears in plain text in reschedule emails, confirmation page URLs, and operator-side calendar links — can read every column of that customer's row in the `ea_users` table. Version 1.6.0 contains a patch.
Easy!Appointments is a self hosted appointment scheduler. In 1.5.2 and earlier, application/core/EA_Security.php::csrf_verify() only enforces CSRF for POST requests and returns early for non-POST methods. Several application endpoints perform state-changing operations while accepting parameters from GET (or $_REQUEST), so an attacker can perform CSRF by forcing a victim's browser to issue a crafted GET request. Impact: creation of admin accounts, modification of admin email/password, and full admin account takeover.
alextselegidis Easy!Appointments v1.5.1 was discovered to contain a SQL injection vulnerability via the order_by parameter.
Booking logic flaw in Easy!Appointments v1.5.1 allows unauthenticated attackers to create appointments with excessively long durations, causing a denial of service by blocking all future booking availability.
An issue in Alex Tselegidis EasyAppointments v.1.5.0 allows a remote attacker to escalate privileges via the index.php file.
Cross Site Scripting vulnerability in Alex Tselegidis EasyAppointments v.1.5.0 allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via the legal_settings parameter.
Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key in GitHub repository alextselegidis/easyappointments prior to 1.5.0.
Session Fixation in GitHub repository alextselegidis/easyappointments prior to 1.5.0.
Improper Access Control in GitHub repository alextselegidis/easyappointments prior to 1.5.0.
Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored in GitHub repository alextselegidis/easyappointments prior to 1.5.0.
Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored in GitHub repository alextselegidis/easyappointments prior to 1.5.0.
Code Injection in GitHub repository alextselegidis/easyappointments prior to 1.5.0.
Use of Hard-coded Credentials in GitHub repository alextselegidis/easyappointments prior to 1.5.0.
API Privilege Escalation in GitHub repository alextselegidis/easyappointments prior to 1.5.0. Full system takeover.
Exposure of Private Personal Information to an Unauthorized Actor in GitHub repository alextselegidis/easyappointments prior to 1.4.3.
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