MantisBT: SOAP API Authentication Bypass with Privilege Escalation to Administrator
MantisBT is an open source bug tracker. Versions 2.28.3 and earlier contain a critical authentication bypass in the SOAP API's mci_check_login() function. Any user knowing any valid cookie_string can authenticate as any other user (knowing their username), including the administrator, without knowing the target's password. The vulnerability is exploitable with zero prior access on default MantisBT installations because self-registration is enabled by default ($g_allow_signup = ON). A self-registered user can use their own cookie_string (readable from their browser's MANTIS_STRING_COOKIE cookie after login) to impersonate the administrator via
MantisBT: Stored XSS in print_all_bug_page_word.php
A missing output encoding call in print_all_bug_page_word.php allows any authenticated user to inject arbitrary HTML into an IMG tag's *alt* attribute via an image attachment with a crafted filename such as `probe." onload="alert(1)`.
When any user views the HTML export page (print_all_bug_page_word.php?type_page=html&export=1), the rendered IMG tag becomes `<img src="..." alt="" onload="alert(1)" />`, breaking out of the alt attribute.
### Impact
Cross-site scripting.
Impact is limited by MantisBT's Content Security Policy.
### Patches
- https://github.com/mantisbt/mantisbt/commit/bdd0e364f62759de272dfd4c89b4f51d27be9daa
### Workaroun
MantisBT: Injection of TIME_TRACKING and REMINDER Notes via REST and SOAP APIs
Unvalidated note_type Parameter in mc_issue_update SOAP Endpoint Allows creation of TIME_TRACKING and REMINDER Notes. The SOAP path passes the user-supplied note_type integer directly to bugnote_add() without validating that the user is authorized to create that type of note. If the user's access level is higher than *$g_time_tracking_view_threshold*, they can also inject arbitrary hours into billing reports.
REST API also allows injection of TIME_TRACKING notes (but not REMINDER) through the same mc_issue_update() function.
### Impact
An attacker with UPDATER access could:
- Inject fake billable hours via TIME_TRACKING notes (note_type=2),
MantisBT: Reflected XSS in admin/install.php via unescaped printf
MantisBT 2.28.3 and earlier contains six reflected XSS injection points in `/admin/install.php`. User-supplied parameters are echoed into HTML without escaping via an unescaped printf format string. No authentication is required.
A Content Security Policy (script-src 'self') prevents inline JavaScript execution, but the CSP is missing a form-action directive, allowing exploitation via credential-phishing form injection and <meta> open redirects.
### Impact
- Credential phishing: Attacker crafts a URL that renders a fake login form on the real MantisBT admin page. Admin credentials are submitted to an attacker-controlled server.
- Open redir
MantisBT 2.28.3 and earlier contains six reflected XSS injection points in `/admin/install.php`. User-supplied parameters are echoed into HTML without escaping via print_test_result(). No authentication is required.
A Content Security Policy (script-src 'self') prevents inline JavaScript execution, but the CSP is missing a form-action directive, allowing exploitation via credential-phishing form injection and <meta> open redirects.
### Impact
- Credential phishing: Attacker crafts a URL that renders a fake login form on the real MantisBT admin page. Admin credentials are submitted to an attacker-controlled server.
- Open redirect: Victim is
MantisBT: REST API unauthorized Issue status change
A MantisBT user having *$g_update_bug_threshold* (UPDATER by default) can change an Issue's Status via REST and SOAP API, even if the *$g_set_status_threshold* config is set to a higher level (DEVELOPER by default).
### Impact
Unauthorized change in Issue workflow.
### Patches
https://github.com/mantisbt/mantisbt/releases/tag/release-2.28.4
### Workarounds
None
### Resources
- https://mantisbt.org/bugs/view.php?id=37181
### Credits
Mamdouh Mahfouz (@mamdouhmahfouz)
MantisBT: Remote Code Execution via eval() Class Hoisting in adm_config_set.php
MantisBT 2.28.3 and earlier contains a remote code execution vulnerability in the admin "Manage Configuration" feature (adm_config_set.php). When setting a configuration value with a non-string type (integer, float, complex), the value is passed through ConfigParser -> Tokenizer, which calls *eval()* with a `return;` prefix intended to prevent code execution.
However, PHP hoists function and class declarations at compile time, even past a *return* statement. An attacker can define a class in the eval()'d code that hijacks a class loaded later via PHP's autoloader, achieving arbitrary code execution.
This vulnerability requires administrator
MantisBT: SQL Injection via history_order Configuration Value
MantisBT 2.28.3 and earlier versions contains a SQL injection vulnerability in core/history_api.php. The history_order configuration value is concatenated directly into a SQL ORDER BY clause without any sanitisation, parameterization, or validation against a whitelist.
An administrator can set this configuration value via the web UI (adm_config_set.php) or the REST API (PATCH /api/rest/config). The injected SQL then executes whenever any user views a bug with history entries.
### Impact
- Sensitive data extraction from the entire bugtracker database including user credentials (cookie_string, password hashes), API tokens, and private issue d