Pimcore: ClassDefinition UID regex missing end anchor allows SQL injection via Block.php unquoted table name
Pimcore is an Open Source Data & Experience Management Platform. Prior to 2026.1.5, an authenticated user with the objects permission can submit a malicious ClassDefinition UID because the name and ID validation expressions in models/DataObject/ClassDefinition.php validate only the beginning of each value. When a data object of that class containing a Block field is loaded, Block::load in models/DataObject/ClassDefinition/Data/Block.php incorporates the stored class ID into an unquoted object table identifier, allowing the UID to supply SQL syntax. The resulting query can read or modify arbitrary Pimcore database tables, including disclosure
Pimcore: Remote Code Execution via DataObject Class-Definition Field Name
Pimcore is an Open Source Data & Experience Management Platform. Prior to 11.5.19, 12.3.10, and 2026.1.6, the class-definition import endpoint /pimcore-studio/api/class/definition/configuration-view/detail/{id}/import accepts a DataObject field name that is emitted without an identifier allowlist by lib/DataObject/ClassBuilder/FieldDefinitionPropertiesBuilder.php into generated PHP properties and by models/DataObject/ClassDefinition/Helper/Dao.php into ALTER TABLE identifiers. An authenticated user with the objects permission can inject PHP syntax into the generated DataObject class, causing attacker-controlled code in generated var/classes/D
Pimcore Hotspotimage getDataFromResource() unrestricted Serialize::unserialize over object-store column
Pimcore is an Open Source Data & Experience Management Platform. Prior to 11.5.19, 12.3.10, and 2026.1.6, Pimcore\Model\DataObject\ClassDefinition\Data\Hotspotimage::getDataFromResource() in models/DataObject/ClassDefinition/Data/Hotspotimage.php passes the field __hotspots object-store column to Pimcore\Tool\Serialize::unserialize() without an allowed-classes restriction after JSON decoding fails. An attacker with a separate capability to write crafted PHP serialized bytes into that column can instantiate available classes and trigger magic methods when an affected DataObject is loaded, which can produce arbitrary file writes or code executi