DIRAC: Pilot code downloaded over unverified HTTPS connection
DIRAC is an interware, meaning a software framework for distributed computing. Prior to versions 8.0.79, 9.0.22, and 9.1.10, WorkloadManagementSystem/Utilities/PilotWrapper.py pilotWrapperScript uses ssl._create_unverified_context to download the second-stage pilot.tar archive without TLS certificate verification and downloads the reference checksum through the same unvalidated channel. An attacker able to redirect or intercept a grid site's network traffic through DNS or routing manipulation can substitute both the executable pilot code and its checksum, causing arbitrary code to run in the pilot context with access to pilot proxy credential
DIRAC: RCE in FileCatalog DatasetManager via SQL injection + eval
DIRAC is an interware, meaning a software framework for distributed computing. Prior to versions 8.0.79, 9.0.22, and 9.1.10, DataManagementSystem/Service/FileCatalogHandler.py checkDataset forwards an authenticated caller-controlled datasets value to DatasetManager.py __checkDataset, where datasetName is interpolated into an FC_MetaDatasets SQL query without parameterization. The injected query can control the returned MetaQuery value, which is passed to Python eval and permits command execution as the account running the DIRAC services. Successful exploitation can expose dirac.cfg, database passwords, stored proxies, and tokens, fully compro
DIRAC: RCE in RequestManager due to eval on untrusted input
DIRAC is an interware, meaning a software framework for distributed computing. Prior to versions 8.0.79, 9.0.22, and 9.1.10, the RequestManagementSystem/Service/ReqManagerHandler.py export_getRequestCountersWeb function passes an authenticated caller-controlled groupingAttribute to RequestManagementSystem/DB/RequestDB.py getRequestCountersWeb. An unrecognized value is resolved against the Request object and evaluated as Python code, allowing a crafted dunder attribute expression to reach operating-system functions and execute commands as the account running the DIRAC services. Successful exploitation can expose dirac.cfg, database passwords,
DIRAC: SQL injection and lack of access control in PilotManager service
### Details
A number of the functions in PilotManager pass parameters directly through to the database layer, which then does not do any escaping on the parameters. For example setPilotStatus:
https://github.com/DIRACGrid/DIRAC/blob/1738e7c6d2f31d26f1364255d9d2e87b4896c922/src/DIRAC/WorkloadManagementSystem/Service/PilotManagerHandler.py#L343-L349
https://github.com/DIRACGrid/DIRAC/blob/1738e7c6d2f31d26f1364255d9d2e87b4896c922/src/DIRAC/WorkloadManagementSystem/DB/PilotAgentsDB.py#L117
This won't accept multiple statements separated by a semicolon, but a carefully crafted set of parameters containing SQL escapes would likely be able to chan
DIRAC: Unauthorized users can read proxy contents during generation
DIRAC is an interware, meaning a software framework for distributed computing. Prior to version 8.0.41, during the proxy generation process (e.g., when using `dirac-proxy-init`), it is possible for unauthorized users on the same machine to gain read access to the proxy. This allows the user to then perform any action that is possible with the original proxy. This vulnerability only exists for a short period of time (sub-millsecond) during the generation process. Version 8.0.41 contains a patch for the issue. As a workaround, setting the `X509_USER_PROXY` environment variable to a path that is inside a directory that is only readable to the cu
TokenManager not checking permissions on cached tokens in DIRAC
DIRAC is a distributed resource framework. In affected versions any user could get a token that has been requested by another user/agent. This may expose resources to unintended parties. This issue has been addressed in release version 8.0.37. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.