PatchFirst · Aktuelle Sicherheitslücken
In den letzten 30 Tagen veröffentlichte Sicherheitslücken für Node.js: 431. Davon im KEV-Katalog: 0.
Neue Schwachstellenmeldungen aus Herstellerankündigungen und Sicherheitsnachrichten. Diese Warnungen ändern die Sicherheitsbewertung nicht.
Laut GitHub Advisory Database wurde in Node.js eine Sicherheitslücke gefunden: Denial of Service (CVE-2026-109932). Die betroffenen Versionen sind nicht genau angegeben. Im Bericht wird keine Version mit Fehlerbehebung genannt.
Was jetzt zu tun ist: Prüfen Sie, ob ein Update für Node.js mit der Fehlerbehebung verfügbar ist, und installieren Sie es.
CVE-2026-109932
Laut OpenNet wurde in Node.js eine Sicherheitslücke gefunden: Remote-Codeausführung (CVE-2026-111497). Die betroffenen Versionen sind nicht genau angegeben. Im Bericht wird keine Version mit Fehlerbehebung genannt.
Was jetzt zu tun ist: Prüfen Sie, ob ein Update für Node.js mit der Fehlerbehebung verfügbar ist, und installieren Sie es.
CVE-2026-111497
Sicherheitslücken: 7795
AgenticMail gives AI agents real email addresses and phone numbers. In @agenticmail/api prior to version 0.9.64, a low-privileged authenticated AgenticMail agent can enumerate another agent's pending/claimed tasks by supplying the target agent name to `GET /api/agenticmail/tasks/pending?assignee=<name>`. The returned task objects include the task IDs and payloads. The same task IDs can then be used with the capability-style task mutation endpoints (`/tasks/:id/claim`, `/tasks/:id/result`, `/tasks/:id/complete`, `/tasks/:id/fail`) to claim, complete, or fail tasks assigned to a different agent. Because ordinary authenticated agents can discove
AgenticMail gives AI agents real email addresses and phone numbers. @agenticmail/api prior to version 0.9.32 and @agenticmail/core prior to version 0.9.10 had weakness related to validation and and binding of inactive-agent hour filtering; storage SQL identifier validation; metadata-backed ownership checks for raw storage SQL; blocking direct storage metadata access through raw SQL; fail-closed outbound worker secret handling; SMTP envelope/header control-character validation before command construction; and TLS certificate verification as the default for MailSender with an explicit opt-out for local development. @agenticmail/api prior to ver
Shamefile is a linter for undocumented linter warnings. Prior to version 0.1.7, a path traversal vulnerability in `shame next` allows an attacker-controlled `shamefile.yaml` to disclose contents of files outside the repository, one line at a time, to the terminal of a user who runs the command. See patch commit for technical details. The issue is fixed in 0.1.7. Upgrade to either 0.1.7 or later versions to incorporate the patch. As a workaround, do not run `shame next` against untrusted `shamefile.yaml`. Use `shame me --dry-run` for CI validation.
Network-AI is a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator. Prior to version 5.12.2, `EnvironmentManager.listBackups()` reads each backup's `_manifest.json` and trusts the manifest's `path` field. `EnvironmentManager.pruneBackups()` later passes that trusted `entry.path` directly to `rmSync(entry.path, { recursive: true, force: true })`. An attacker who can place or modify a manifest inside `data/<env>/.backups/<name>/_manifest.json` can cause `network-ai env backup prune --env <env> --keep <n>` or any code path invoking `pruneBackups()` to recursively delete an arbitrary path accessible to the Network-AI process user. This is fixed in v5.12
Network-AI, a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator, has a shipped, exported, documented feature called `ApprovalInbox` (`lib/approval-inbox.ts`). It is the network surface of the human-in-the-loop Approval Gate, which `ApprovalGate` uses to require explicit human approval for high-risk operations. The HTTP server it exposes has no authentication of any kind and sets `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` on every route, including the state-changing `POST /approvals/:id/approve` and `/deny`. As a result, in versions 5.0.0 through 5.12.1, any party who can send an HTTP request to the inbox port — a co-located process, a container/SSRF on the s
Network-AI is a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator. Prior to version 5.4.5, the MCP SSE server defaults to an empty secret (`process.env['NETWORK_AI_MCP_SECRET'] ?? ''` at `bin/mcp-server.ts:89`), which causes `_isAuthorized` (`lib/mcp-transport-sse.ts:254`) to return `true` unconditionally for every request — no `Authorization` header is required. Simultaneously, `_handleRequest` sets `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` (`lib/mcp-transport-sse.ts:272`) on every response, so a cross-origin browser fetch can read the result without restriction. An unauthenticated attacker who can lure a user to a malicious web page can invoke all 22 expo
Network-AI is a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator. Prior to version 5.12.2, `AgentRuntime` promises scoped file access under a configured sandbox `basePath`, but its path containment checks use raw string prefix tests. A sandbox base such as `/tmp/network-ai-sandbox` also matches a sibling path such as `/tmp/network-ai-sandbox_evil/secret.txt`. An agent/user that can call `AgentRuntime.readFile()` or `AgentRuntime.listDir()` can read or list files outside the intended sandbox when the target path is in a sibling directory sharing the base path prefix. This breaks the documented sandbox boundary. The issue is fixed in v5.12.2. `Sandb
Network-AI is a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator. Prior to version 5.12.2, `EnvironmentManager.backup()` recursively collects files using `_collectBackupFiles()`. `_collectBackupFiles()` uses `statSync(full)`, which follows symlinks. If `data/<env>` contains a symlink to a directory outside the environment root, backup recursion follows the symlink and copies external files into `data/<env>/.backups/<backupId>/`. An attacker who can place a symlink under the environment data directory can cause backup operations to disclose files outside the environment root into backup artifacts. The issue is fixed in v5.12.2. `_collectBackupFiles
Network-AI is a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator. Prior to version 5.12.2, `EnvironmentManager.restore(env, backupId)` computes the backup path with `join(envDir, '.backups', backupId)` and only checks that this path exists. It does not resolve the result or verify that it remains under `data/<env>/.backups`. A caller can pass a traversal backup ID such as `../../../outside/source-dir` to restore files from an arbitrary directory into the target environment data directory. The issue is fixed in v5.12.2. `restore()` now validates `backupId` against `/^[\w\-]+$/` and asserts `dirname(resolve(join(backupsDir, backupId))) === resolve(b
Network-AI is a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator. Prior to version 5.9.1, the agent sandbox gates shell commands behind an allowlist (`SandboxPolicy.isCommandAllowed`), which THREAT_MODEL.md calls the main control against a compromised agent (Adversary 3.2). The allowlist glob-matches the whole command string, but `ShellExecutor` runs that string through `/bin/sh -c`. So any wildcard allow such as `git *`, `npm *` or `node *` also matches `git status; <anything>`, and a scoped command becomes arbitrary execution. The issue is fixed in v5.9.1. `ShellExecutor` now executes via `spawn(file, args, { shell: false })` using a quote-aware
@beproduct/nestjs-auth is a NestJS authentication module for BeProduct IDS (Identity Server) with OpenID Connect support. Between 2026-05-11 20:19 UTC and 22:56 UTC, an attacker used a compromised npm publish token to publish 18 malicious versions of `@beproduct/nestjs-auth` (0.1.2 through 0.1.19). The postinstall payload attempted to harvest npm tokens (from `~/.npmrc`); GitHub personal access tokens, OAuth tokens (`gho_*`), and Actions OIDC tokens; AWS credentials (from environment variables and `~/.aws/credentials`); HashiCorp Vault tokens; and other secrets present in environment variables. Version `0.1.20` is a clean republish from the
Impact: fast-uri versions from 2.3.1 through 4.1.0 (including the 3.x line up to 3.1.3 and the 2.x line up to 2.4.2) do not treat a literal backslash character (U+005C) as an authority delimiter. Node's native WHATWG URL parser, used by fetch, undici, and Node's http and https clients, normalizes the backslash to a forward slash for special schemes such as http, https, ws, wss, ftp, and file. As a result, the two parsers extract different hosts from the same input string. Applications that use fast-uri to enforce host-based policy such as allowlists, denylists, loopback or SSRF filtering, redirect validation, or outbound proxy routing before
@hapi/inert provides static file and directory handlers for hapi.js. From 4.0.0 to 7.1.0, @hapi/inert serves static files from a directory configured with path in the directory or file handlers or relativeTo for h.file(), with confinement enforced by the confine option, but the confinement check compared the resolved absolute path against the confine directory using a raw string-prefix test, so a sibling directory such as /app/static-secret next to /app/static was incorrectly accepted and could allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to read files via /..%2fstatic-secret/secret.txt. This issue is fixed in version 7.1.1.
@hapi/wreck is an HTTP client utility. Prior to 18.1.2, Wreck strips credential headers including Authorization, Cookie, and Proxy-Authorization before following a cross-origin redirect, but the origin check compares hostnames only and ignores scheme and port, so credentials are forwarded intact across same-host port changes and HTTPS-to-HTTP downgrades, allowing a co-tenant on an adjacent port or a network-position attacker capable of forging a redirect to capture bearer tokens, session cookies, and proxy credentials and impersonate the victim against the upstream service. This issue is fixed in version 18.1.2.
@hapi/wreck is an HTTP client utility. Prior to 18.1.1, when @hapi/wreck follows a 3xx redirect to a different hostname, only the Authorization and Cookie headers are stripped, and the standard credential header Proxy-Authorization is forwarded intact to the redirect target, potentially exposing forward-proxy credentials to a host outside the original trust boundary when redirects are enabled through the redirects option or Wreck.defaults({ redirects: ... }). This issue is fixed in version 18.1.1.
Feathersjs is a framework for creating web APIs and real-time applications with TypeScript or JavaScript. In 5.0.44 and earlier, the _.merge(target, source) utility exported by @feathersjs/commons recursively merges source into target by iterating Object.keys(source). When source was produced by JSON.parse and contains a __proto__, constructor, or prototype key, that key is returned as an own-enumerable property; the recursive merge then resolves target['__proto__'] to Object.prototype and writes attacker-supplied properties onto it, polluting the prototype for all plain objects in the process for the lifetime of the Node process. This issue
websocket-driver is a WebSocket protocol handler with pluggable I/O. Prior to 0.7.5, if this library is used with the permessage-deflate extension, a WebSocket server or client can be made to accept messages that are larger than the configured maximum message size because the limit is checked against the message frames' length headers, which give the size of the compressed data, not the size after decompression in lib/websocket/driver/hybi.js. This can lead to applications accepting larger messages than expected and exceeding their intended resource usage. This issue is fixed in version 0.7.5.
websocket-driver is a WebSocket protocol handler with pluggable I/O. Prior to 0.7.5, the frame format in draft versions of the WebSocket protocol includes a length header that allows an arbitrarily large integer to be encoded as a sequence of bytes with the high bit set. By sending an indefinite sequence of bytes with values 0x80 or above, a client can make the server parse these bytes into an ever-growing integer in lib/websocket/driver/draft75.js; because JavaScript numbers are 64-bit floating point values, this number will eventually lose precision and lead to the subsequent payload being parsed incorrectly. This issue is fixed in version
dd-trace is the Datadog APM client for Node.js. Prior to 5.100.0, W3C baggage propagation in packages/dd-trace/src/baggage.js and packages/dd-trace/src/opentracing/propagation/text_map.js parsed incoming baggage HTTP headers without enforcing DD_TRACE_BAGGAGE_MAX_ITEMS or DD_TRACE_BAGGAGE_MAX_BYTES on extraction. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can send a request whose baggage header contains an arbitrarily large number of comma-separated key-value pairs, or a single very large value, causing unbounded CPU and memory consumption and enabling a remote denial of service against any HTTP service with baggage propagation enabled. This issue is
tarteaucitron.js is a compliant and accessible cookie banner. Prior to 1.33.0, tarteaucitron.cookie.purge() is called on any element with the purgeBtn class and does not check whether the element is a legitimate tarteaucitron button or whether the cookie corresponds to a service handled by tarteaucitron. If an attacker can write HTML with data attributes, an element with data-cookie can silently delete a non-HttpOnly cookie with a known name when clicked by a user. This issue is fixed in version 1.33.0.
Gleichen Sie Ihren installierten Stack und seine Versionen mit den aktuellen Sicherheitsmeldungen ab.