psd-tools: Uncontrolled memory allocation in psd-tools composite/numpy via crafted PSD geometry
psd-tools is a Python package for working with Adobe Photoshop PSD files. Prior to 1.17.4, PSDImage.composite() and PSDImage.numpy() allocated output buffers from attacker-controlled PSD header geometry, including width, height, channels, depth, and per-layer rectangles, before validating those values against the available file data. A tiny crafted PSD could therefore cause multi-gigabyte memory allocation, and PSDImage.composite() could return a black image with only a warning instead of raising an exception. Services that composite untrusted PSD files could be terminated by out-of-memory handling. This issue is fixed in version 1.17.4.
psd-tools: arbitrary file write via smart-object filename
psd-tools is a Python package for working with Adobe Photoshop PSD files. Prior to version 1.17.1, `SmartObject.save()` writes an embedded smart object to a path taken verbatim from the PSD file. Because that name is attacker-controlled and unsanitised, a tool that extracts embedded objects from an untrusted `.psd` can be made to write attacker-chosen bytes to an attacker-chosen path (absolute or `../`-traversing), outside its intended output directory. A secondary issue in `SmartObject.open()` for external-kind smart objects allows the attacker-controlled `fullPath` descriptor to be used as an arbitrary file read path, enabling exfiltration
psd-tools: Compression module has unguarded zlib decompression, missing dimension validation, and hardening gaps
psd-tools is a Python package for working with Adobe Photoshop PSD files. Prior to version 1.12.2, when a PSD file contains malformed RLE-compressed image data (e.g. a literal run that extends past the expected row size), decode_rle() raises ValueError which propagated all the way to the user, crashing psd.composite() and psd-tools export. decompress() already had a fallback that replaces failed channels with black pixels when result is None, but it never triggered because the ValueError from decode_rle() was not caught. The fix in version 1.12.2 wraps the decode_rle() call in a try/except so the existing fallback handles the error gracefully