A SAML library not dependent on any frameworks that runs in Node. In version 5.0.1, Node-SAML loads the assertion from the (unsigned) original response document. This is different than the parts that are verified when checking signature. This allows an attacker to modify authentication details within a valid SAML assertion. For example, in one attack it is possible to remove any character from the SAML assertion username. To conduct the attack an attacker would need a validly signed document from the identity provider (IdP). This is fixed in version 5.1.0.
Signature bypass via multiple root elements in Passport-SAML
Passport-SAML is a SAML 2.0 authentication provider for Passport, the Node.js authentication library. A remote attacker may be able to bypass SAML authentication on a website using passport-saml. A successful attack requires that the attacker is in possession of an arbitrary IDP signed XML element. Depending on the IDP used, fully unauthenticated attacks (e.g without access to a valid user) might also be feasible if generation of a signed message can be triggered. Users should upgrade to passport-saml version 3.2.2 or newer. The issue was also present in the beta releases of `node-saml` before version 4.0.0-beta.5. If you cannot upgrade, disa
Passport-SAML is a SAML 2.0 authentication provider for Passport, the Node.js authentication library. Prior to version 3.1.0, a malicious SAML payload can require transforms that consume significant system resources to process, thereby resulting in reduced or denied service. This would be an effective way to perform a denial-of-service attack. This has been resolved in version 3.1.0. The resolution is to limit the number of allowable transforms to 2.