linux vulnerabilities · Page 107

ceph: bound num_export_targets array for mds info v2/v3

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ceph: bound num_export_targets array for mds info v2/v3 ceph_mdsmap_decode() in fs/ceph/mdsmap.c reads num_export_targets from each per-mds info record and advances the decode cursor by num_export_targets * sizeof(u32) without first checking that many bytes remain. The only upper-bound check that catches a runaway cursor (*p > info_end) is gated on info_v >= 4, because info_end is left NULL for info_v 2 and 3. When the monitor sends an MDS map whose per-mds info version is 2 or 3 with an oversized num_export_targets, the cursor moves past the message front buffer and the la

• Update to 6.12.111-1

ceph: bound xattr value length in __build_xattrs()

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ceph: bound xattr value length in __build_xattrs() __build_xattrs() decodes the MDS-supplied xattr blob one attribute at a time. For each attribute it reads a 32-bit name length, advances past the name bytes, reads a 32-bit value length, records the value pointer, and advances past the value bytes. The two length fields are read with ceph_decode_32_safe(), but the value bytes themselves are advanced over with a bare "p += len" and no ceph_decode_need() check that "len" bytes remain in the blob. For every attribute except the last, the next iteration's ceph_decode_32_safe()

• Update to 6.12.111-1

ceph: cap delegated inode count in ceph_parse_deleg_inos()

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ceph: cap delegated inode count in ceph_parse_deleg_inos() ceph_parse_deleg_inos() decodes interval sets of delegated inode numbers from an MDS create-with-delegation reply. For each set it reads a 64-bit start and a 64-bit len with ceph_decode_64_safe(), which only validates that the eight bytes are present in the message, not the value, and then loops over len while inserting entries into s_delegated_inos. len is fully attacker controlled. A malicious or compromised MDS can send one huge interval, many intervals in one reply, duplicate intervals, or repeated replies that

ceph: do not repeat ceph_trim_dentries() if no progress possible

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ceph: do not repeat ceph_trim_dentries() if no progress possible ceph_cap_reclaim_work() re-queues itself for as long as ceph_trim_dentries() returns -EAGAIN, which happens whenever a lease walk exhausts its `nr_to_scan` budget. This creates a busy loop that consumes CPU without making any progress when there is nothing to reclaim: with no cap pressure (`count==0`) and every scanned lease still valid, each pass runs the full scan budget down to zero and returns `-EAGAIN`, only to be queued again immediately. The dir-lease walk made this worse. When `expire_dir_lease` is

• Update to 6.12.111-1

btrfs: drop recovered reloc root refs on recovery failure

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: drop recovered reloc root refs on recovery failure During relocation recovery, each fs root gets a reference to its relocation root. If loading or adding a later root fails, or if the first transaction commit fails, btrfs_recover_relocation() jumps to out_unset before merge_reloc_roots() and clean_dirty_subvols(). put_reloc_control() drops the list-owned relocation root references, but it does not clear fs_root->reloc_root or drop the references owned by those pointers. Mount cleanup only drops them when BTRFS_FS_ERROR is set, so an error such as -ENOMEM while proce

• Update to 6.12.111-1

btrfs: fix extent map leak in NOCOW direct I/O write

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: fix extent map leak in NOCOW direct I/O write btrfs_dio_iomap_begin() calls btrfs_get_extent(), which returns an extent map reference that must be dropped on all exit paths. For direct writes into a NOCOW range, btrfs_get_blocks_direct_write() keeps using that extent map and asks btrfs_create_dio_extent() to allocate the ordered extent. If that fails, for example because btrfs_alloc_ordered_extent() fails, the function returns the error without dropping the input extent map. The PREALLOC path avoided this by dropping the input extent map before replacing it with the

• Update to 6.12.111-1

audit: avoid dropping live tree ref on fsnotify rule autoremove

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: audit: avoid dropping live tree ref on fsnotify rule autoremove audit_del_rule() is used for both netlink deletion templates and internal fsnotify autoremove. The former passes a parsed template which owns a temporary tree reference; the latter passes the installed entry itself. The unconditional audit_put_tree() at the end of audit_del_rule() assumes the template case. For mixed AUDIT_DIR plus AUDIT_EXE rules, an fsnotify autoremove event therefore drops the installed rule's live tree reference. Repeating this across rules sharing the same tree can free the tree while a

• Update to 6.12.111-1

cifs: call pagecache_isize_extended() in cifs_setsize() when extending

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cifs: call pagecache_isize_extended() in cifs_setsize() when extending cifs_setsize() calls truncate_pagecache() but skips pagecache_isize_extended() on extension. truncate_setsize() shows the correct pattern: i_size_write(inode, newsize); if (newsize > oldsize) pagecache_isize_extended(inode, oldsize, newsize); truncate_pagecache(inode, newsize); pagecache_isize_extended() zeroes the tail of the page straddling old EOF. Without it, dirty bytes in that region can be written back to the server, exposing stale data in the newly extended range.

cifs: fix loff_t underflow in cifs_remap_file_range() when len == 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cifs: fix loff_t underflow in cifs_remap_file_range() when len == 0 With len == 0 (clone to EOF), the effective length is computed as: len = src_inode->i_size - off; If off > i_size, this is a negative loff_t, corrupting the ByteCount in the FSCTL_DUPLICATE_EXTENTS_TO_FILE request and inverting the range in filemap_write_and_wait_range(). The existing off >= i_size check fires only after the ioctl has already been sent. Snapshot i_size_read() once for both the bounds check and the length calculation, eliminating the TOCTOU and 32-bit torn-read risk. Reject off > sr

• Update to 6.12.111-1

cifs: use cifs_invalidate_cache() in cifs_do_truncate() for O_TRUNC

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cifs: use cifs_invalidate_cache() in cifs_do_truncate() for O_TRUNC cifs_do_truncate() is invoked from cifs_open() without i_rwsem, so it cannot use cifs_resize_file_locked() to perform a proper fscache cookie resize. Instead, add cifs_invalidate_cache() after cifs_setsize(). cifs_invalidate_cache() calls fscache_invalidate(), which works without holding i_rwsem: it unconditionally increments inval_counter and sets FSCACHE_COOKIE_NO_DATA_TO_READ, ensuring that stale cached data is not served once the cookie is later activated by fscache_use_cookie(). Truncation to zero le

smb: client: clear setuid/setgid bit on write with cifsacl/modefromsid/posix extensions

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: clear setuid/setgid bit on write with cifsacl/modefromsid/posix extensions When a file has the setuid or setgid bit set and is written to, the VFS strips those bits and issues a setattr with ATTR_KILL_SUID/ATTR_KILL_SGID together with an ATTR_MODE carrying the already-cleared mode. Both cifs_setattr_unix() and cifs_setattr_nounix() unconditionally dropped ATTR_MODE in that case: /* skip mode change if it's just for clearing setuid/setgid */ if (attrs->ia_valid & (ATTR_KILL_SUID|ATTR_KILL_SGID)) attrs->ia_valid &= ~ATTR_MODE; This is fine for the default

• Update to 6.12.113-1

smb: client: fix UAF and buffer leak in cifs_check_trans2() for malformed secondary T2

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix UAF and buffer leak in cifs_check_trans2() for malformed secondary T2 When a valid primary TRANSACT2 response has been received (mid->resp_buf set, mid->multiRsp true) and a subsequent secondary response causes cifs_check_trans2() to return false -- either because the SMB header is invalid (malformed != 0) or because check2ndT2() rejects the PDU -- handle_mid() overwrites mid->resp_buf with the new buffer (leaking the primary buffer) and, because mid->multiRsp is set, skips the server->smallbuf/bigbuf NULL-out. When the user thread frees mid->resp_buf, ser

smb: client: clear ce->tgthint in free_tgts()

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: clear ce->tgthint in free_tgts() When free_tgts() frees all structures in ce->tlist, ce->tgthint is left pointing to one of the freed cache_dfs_tgt structures. If ce->tgthint is not reset before it is used later, it results in a use-after-free. Set ce->tgthint to NULL in free_tgts() after the elements are freed to reflect that no elements remain.

• Update to 6.12.111-1

smb: client: fix ALIGN() overflow in symlink_data() error context loop

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix ALIGN() overflow in symlink_data() error context loop The check added by commit 7d9a7f1f96cd ("smb/client: fix possible infinite loop and oob read in symlink_data()") compared the post-ALIGN length against the remaining buffer, but ALIGN() itself can overflow: for ErrorDataLength near UINT32_MAX (e.g. 0xFFFFFFF9), ALIGN(x, 8) wraps to 0, so the subsequent bounds check passes, and the loop advances by zero bytes leaving 'p' pointing into stale data. Fix by checking the raw ErrorDataLength against the remaining space before applying ALIGN(), then checking ag

• Update to 6.12.111-1

smb: client: fix OOB read/write from unvalidated DataOffset in coalesce_t2()

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix OOB read/write from unvalidated DataOffset in coalesce_t2() coalesce_t2() computes data pointers directly from server-supplied DataOffset fields with no validation against buffer bounds: data_area_of_tgt = (char *)&pSMBt->hdr.Protocol + get_unaligned_le16(&pSMBt->t2_rsp.DataOffset); data_area_of_src = (char *)&pSMBs->hdr.Protocol + get_unaligned_le16(&pSMBs->t2_rsp.DataOffset); data_area_of_tgt += total_in_tgt; ... memcpy(data_area_of_tgt, data_area_of_src, total_in_src); A small DataOffset can push a po

• Update to 6.12.113-1

smb: client: fix use-before-check of ReparseDataLength in reparse_buf_ptr()

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix use-before-check of ReparseDataLength in reparse_buf_ptr() reparse_buf_ptr() reads buf->ReparseDataLength before checking that count covers the full fixed header: buf = (struct reparse_data_buffer *)((u8 *)io + off); len = sizeof(*buf); /* 8 bytes */ rdlen = le16_to_cpu(buf->ReparseDataLength); /* offset 4, 2 bytes */ if (count < len || count < rdlen + len) /* check comes after */ struct reparse_data_buffer has ReparseDataLength at offset 4. If a server returns OutputCount < 6, the read at offset 4-5 reaches

smb: client: reject a tree connect response whose byte count is too small

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: reject a tree connect response whose byte count is too small CIFSTCon() bounds its strnlen() over the byte area with the server's ByteCount minus two, which for ByteCount 0 or 1 goes negative as an int and converts to a huge size_t. The later subtraction wraps the __u16 bytes_left, and that is what bounds cifs_strndup_from_utf16(): a bound of up to 65535 against a ~16 KB cifs_req_poolp object runs off the end of the slab object, and the bytes reach userspace through tcon->nativeFileSystem in /proc/fs/cifs/DebugData. Reject a byte area too small for what the p

HID: picolcd: clamp eeprom debugfs read to bytes actually received

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: picolcd: clamp eeprom debugfs read to bytes actually received picolcd_debug_eeprom_read() trusts resp->raw_data[2] -- a length byte supplied by the device in its REPORT_EE_DATA reply -- clamped only to the caller's read() count: ret = resp->raw_data[2]; if (ret > s) ret = s; if (copy_to_user(u, resp->raw_data+3, ret)) It never checks resp->raw_size, the number of bytes picolcd_raw_event() actually copied into the 64-byte raw_data[] of the kmalloc'd struct picolcd_pending. A device (or a spoofed picoLCD) returning a length byte of 0xff, read with a count >= 255,

• Update to 6.12.111-1

HID: roccat: free buffered reports when destroying device

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: roccat: free buffered reports when destroying device roccat_report_event() duplicates each report with kmemdup() and stores the allocation in a circular-buffer slot. The allocation is released only when that slot is reused. The device destruction paths free struct roccat_device without releasing reports still stored in cbuf[]. This makes those allocations unreachable and leaks up to ROCCAT_CBUF_SIZE report buffers per device. Add a small destructor that frees every buffered report before freeing the device, and use it in both paths that can destroy a registered devic

• Update to 6.12.111-1

HID: sensor: custom: Fix field sysfs group cleanup on failure

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: sensor: custom: Fix field sysfs group cleanup on failure hid_sensor_custom_add_attributes() creates one sysfs group for each custom sensor field. If sysfs_create_group() fails after some groups have already been created, the function returns the error without removing the previously created groups. Add a local unwind path to remove the groups that were already created. With enable_sensor exposed only after the field attributes are ready, this path can free sensor_inst->fields without leaving enable_sensor able to access pointers into that array.

• Update to 6.12.111-1