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Vulnerabilities published for bind9 in the last 30 days: 4. Listed in the KEV catalogue: 0.
Vulnerabilities: 159
Querying for records within a specially crafted zone containing certain malformed DNSKEY records can lead to CPU exhaustion. This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.18.0 through 9.18.39, 9.20.0 through 9.20.13, 9.21.0 through 9.21.12, 9.18.11-S1 through 9.18.39-S1, and 9.20.9-S1 through 9.20.13-S1.
If a `named` caching resolver is configured with `serve-stale-enable` `yes`, and with `stale-answer-client-timeout` set to `0` (the only allowable value other than `disabled`), and if the resolver, in the process of resolving a query, encounters a CNAME chain involving a specific combination of cached or authoritative records, the daemon will abort with an assertion failure. This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.20.0 through 9.20.10, 9.21.0 through 9.21.9, and 9.20.9-S1 through 9.20.10-S1.
When an incoming DNS protocol message includes a Transaction Signature (TSIG), BIND always checks it. If the TSIG contains an invalid value in the algorithm field, BIND immediately aborts with an assertion failure. This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.20.0 through 9.20.8 and 9.21.0 through 9.21.7.
Clients using DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) can exhaust a DNS resolver's CPU and/or memory by flooding it with crafted valid or invalid HTTP/2 traffic. This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.18.0 through 9.18.32, 9.20.0 through 9.20.4, 9.21.0 through 9.21.3, and 9.18.11-S1 through 9.18.32-S1.
It is possible to construct a zone such that some queries to it will generate responses containing numerous records in the Additional section. An attacker sending many such queries can cause either the authoritative server itself or an independent resolver to use disproportionate resources processing the queries. Zones will usually need to have been deliberately crafted to attack this exposure. This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.11.0 through 9.11.37, 9.16.0 through 9.16.50, 9.18.0 through 9.18.32, 9.20.0 through 9.20.4, 9.21.0 through 9.21.3, 9.11.3-S1 through 9.11.37-S1, 9.16.8-S1 through 9.16.50-S1, and 9.18.11-S1 through 9.18.32-S1.
Client queries that trigger serving stale data and that also require lookups in local authoritative zone data may result in an assertion failure. This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.16.13 through 9.16.50, 9.18.0 through 9.18.27, 9.19.0 through 9.19.24, 9.11.33-S1 through 9.11.37-S1, 9.16.13-S1 through 9.16.50-S1, and 9.18.11-S1 through 9.18.27-S1.
If a server hosts a zone containing a "KEY" Resource Record, or a resolver DNSSEC-validates a "KEY" Resource Record from a DNSSEC-signed domain in cache, a client can exhaust resolver CPU resources by sending a stream of SIG(0) signed requests. This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.0.0 through 9.11.37, 9.16.0 through 9.16.50, 9.18.0 through 9.18.27, 9.19.0 through 9.19.24, 9.9.3-S1 through 9.11.37-S1, 9.16.8-S1 through 9.16.49-S1, and 9.18.11-S1 through 9.18.27-S1.
Resolver caches and authoritative zone databases that hold significant numbers of RRs for the same hostname (of any RTYPE) can suffer from degraded performance as content is being added or updated, and also when handling client queries for this name. This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.11.0 through 9.11.37, 9.16.0 through 9.16.50, 9.18.0 through 9.18.27, 9.19.0 through 9.19.24, 9.11.4-S1 through 9.11.37-S1, 9.16.8-S1 through 9.16.50-S1, and 9.18.11-S1 through 9.18.27-S1.
A malicious client can send many DNS messages over TCP, potentially causing the server to become unstable while the attack is in progress. The server may recover after the attack ceases. Use of ACLs will not mitigate the attack. This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.18.1 through 9.18.27, 9.19.0 through 9.19.24, and 9.18.11-S1 through 9.18.27-S1.
The Closest Encloser Proof aspect of the DNS protocol (in RFC 5155 when RFC 9276 guidance is skipped) allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption for SHA-1 computations) via DNSSEC responses in a random subdomain attack, aka the "NSEC3" issue. The RFC 5155 specification implies that an algorithm must perform thousands of iterations of a hash function in certain situations.
Certain DNSSEC aspects of the DNS protocol (in RFC 4033, 4034, 4035, 6840, and related RFCs) allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption) via one or more DNSSEC responses, aka the "KeyTrap" issue. One of the concerns is that, when there is a zone with many DNSKEY and RRSIG records, the protocol specification implies that an algorithm must evaluate all combinations of DNSKEY and RRSIG records.
To keep its cache database efficient, `named` running as a recursive resolver occasionally attempts to clean up the database. It uses several methods, including some that are asynchronous: a small chunk of memory pointing to the cache element that can be cleaned up is first allocated and then queued for later processing. It was discovered that if the resolver is continuously processing query patterns triggering this type of cache-database maintenance, `named` may not be able to handle the cleanup events in a timely manner. This in turn enables the list of queued cleanup events to grow infinitely large over time, allowing the configured `max-c
A bad interaction between DNS64 and serve-stale may cause `named` to crash with an assertion failure during recursive resolution, when both of these features are enabled. This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.16.12 through 9.16.45, 9.18.0 through 9.18.21, 9.19.0 through 9.19.19, 9.16.12-S1 through 9.16.45-S1, and 9.18.11-S1 through 9.18.21-S1.
A flaw in query-handling code can cause `named` to exit prematurely with an assertion failure when: - `nxdomain-redirect <domain>;` is configured, and - the resolver receives a PTR query for an RFC 1918 address that would normally result in an authoritative NXDOMAIN response. This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.12.0 through 9.16.45, 9.18.0 through 9.18.21, 9.19.0 through 9.19.19, 9.16.8-S1 through 9.16.45-S1, and 9.18.11-S1 through 9.18.21-S1.
The DNS message parsing code in `named` includes a section whose computational complexity is overly high. It does not cause problems for typical DNS traffic, but crafted queries and responses may cause excessive CPU load on the affected `named` instance by exploiting this flaw. This issue affects both authoritative servers and recursive resolvers. This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.0.0 through 9.16.45, 9.18.0 through 9.18.21, 9.19.0 through 9.19.19, 9.9.3-S1 through 9.11.37-S1, 9.16.8-S1 through 9.16.45-S1, and 9.18.11-S1 through 9.18.21-S1.
A flaw in the networking code handling DNS-over-TLS queries may cause `named` to terminate unexpectedly due to an assertion failure. This happens when internal data structures are incorrectly reused under significant DNS-over-TLS query load. This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.18.0 through 9.18.18 and 9.18.11-S1 through 9.18.18-S1.
The code that processes control channel messages sent to `named` calls certain functions recursively during packet parsing. Recursion depth is only limited by the maximum accepted packet size; depending on the environment, this may cause the packet-parsing code to run out of available stack memory, causing `named` to terminate unexpectedly. Since each incoming control channel message is fully parsed before its contents are authenticated, exploiting this flaw does not require the attacker to hold a valid RNDC key; only network access to the control channel's configured TCP port is necessary. This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.2.0 through 9.1
If the `recursive-clients` quota is reached on a BIND 9 resolver configured with both `stale-answer-enable yes;` and `stale-answer-client-timeout 0;`, a sequence of serve-stale-related lookups could cause `named` to loop and terminate unexpectedly due to a stack overflow. This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.16.33 through 9.16.41, 9.18.7 through 9.18.15, 9.16.33-S1 through 9.16.41-S1, and 9.18.11-S1 through 9.18.15-S1.
Every `named` instance configured to run as a recursive resolver maintains a cache database holding the responses to the queries it has recently sent to authoritative servers. The size limit for that cache database can be configured using the `max-cache-size` statement in the configuration file; it defaults to 90% of the total amount of memory available on the host. When the size of the cache reaches 7/8 of the configured limit, a cache-cleaning algorithm starts to remove expired and/or least-recently used RRsets from the cache, to keep memory use below the configured limit. It has been discovered that the effectiveness of the cache-cleaning
This issue can affect BIND 9 resolvers with `stale-answer-enable yes;` that also make use of the option `stale-answer-client-timeout`, configured with a value greater than zero. If the resolver receives many queries that require recursion, there will be a corresponding increase in the number of clients that are waiting for recursion to complete. If there are sufficient clients already waiting when a new client query is received so that it is necessary to SERVFAIL the longest waiting client (see BIND 9 ARM `recursive-clients` limit and soft quota), then it is possible for a race to occur between providing a stale answer to this older client a
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