CVE-2026-111997
ip-address before 10.7.4 allows a denial of service (CPU consumption from quadratic complexity, and application stall) via many % characters in input reaching a function call that uses the Address6 constructor.
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PatchFirst · Latest vulnerabilities
node-ip-address vulnerabilities
Vulnerabilities published for node-ip-address in the last 30 days: 5. Listed in the KEV catalogue: 0.
Vulnerabilities: 9
ip-address: Address6.isLinkLocal() recognizes fe80::/64 rather than fe80::/10, allowing SSRF and trust-boundary bypass to on-link hosts
ip-address is a library for parsing and manipulating IPv4 and IPv6 addresses in JavaScript. Prior to 10.5.1, the Address6 isLinkLocal method in src/ipv6.ts recognizes only fe80::/64 instead of the complete fe80::/10 IPv6 link-local range. An attacker-controlled address elsewhere in fe80::/10 can therefore pass a trust-boundary check that relies on isLinkLocal. The same address is identified as link-local by getType and getScope, exposing the inconsistent classification. A successful bypass can reach an on-link host outside the intended trust boundary. This issue is fixed in version 10.5.1.
Published Updatedip-address: isInSubnet() and isHostInSubnet() compare addresses of different families as if they shared an address space, allowing an allowlist check to admit an address outside its range
ip-address is a library for parsing and manipulating IPv4 and IPv6 addresses in JavaScript. Prior to 10.7.1, the isInSubnet and isHostInSubnet methods in src/common.ts compare masked binary strings without validating that both operands use the same IP family. A cross-family containment check whose leading address bits match makes the masked strings compare equal even though IPv4 and IPv6 do not share an address space. An allowlist or denylist decision can therefore classify an address outside the intended range as contained. This issue is fixed in version 10.7.1.
Published Updatedip-address: Address6 builds a parse diagnostic proportional to the input with no length bound, allowing a single long string to stall or crash the process
ip-address is a library for parsing and manipulating IPv4 and IPv6 addresses in JavaScript. Prior to 10.7.1, the Address6 constructor, Address6.isValid, and parse code in src/ipv6.ts accept unbounded strings and expand invalid characters through RE_BAD_CHARACTERS into large diagnostics. Material impact occurs only when an application accepts a very large attacker-controlled field and passes it to Address6 parsing without an earlier length bound. Common URL and header limits, and common body-parser defaults, generally constrain the effect; common defaults typically exclude 32 MiB fields. Megabyte-scale fields can cause a synchronous stall and
Published Updatedip-address: no classifier recognizes the NAT64 local-use range 64:ff9b:1::/48, allowing SSRF and trust-boundary bypass
ip-address is a library for parsing and manipulating IPv4 and IPv6 addresses in JavaScript. From 10.2.0 until 10.5.1, the Address6 isPrivate classifier in src/ipv6.ts does not recognize the NAT64 local-use range 64:ff9b:1::/48. Applications that combine isPrivate, isLoopback, and isLinkLocal for a trust-boundary decision can treat an internal IPv4 destination encoded through that range as external. Exploitation depends on a server network using an operator-selected NAT64 prefix within the local-use range. A successful bypass can cross the intended network trust boundary. This issue is fixed in version 10.5.1.
Published Updatedip-address: a CIDR suffix on the parsed address suppresses special-use classification and can bypass SSRF and trust-boundary checks
ip-address is a library for parsing and manipulating IPv4 and IPv6 addresses in JavaScript. From 10.1.1 until 10.2.2, every special-use classification method is built on isInSubnet, which short-circuits to false whenever the address's own subnet mask is shorter than the reference range's mask. That mask comes verbatim from the CIDR suffix on the parsed input, so appending a suffix such as /0 suppresses classification entirely: isLoopback(), isPrivate(), isLinkLocal(), isCGNAT(), isMulticast(), isUnspecified(), isBroadcast(), isULA(), and getType() all report an internal address as unremarkable, while correctForm() and address still return the
Published Updatedip-address: Address4 decodes leading-zero octets as decimal while resolvers decode them as octal, allowing SSRF and trust-boundary bypass
ip-address is a library for parsing and manipulating IPv4 and IPv6 addresses in JavaScript. Prior to 10.3.1, Address4 accepts an octet written with a leading zero and decodes it as decimal, while the WHATWG URL host parser, inet_aton, and getaddrinfo all decode a leading zero as octal. The library and the network stack therefore disagree about which host a string names. new Address4('012.0.0.1') reports correctForm() of 12.0.0.1 and isPrivate() of false, but fetch('http://012.0.0.1/') connects to 10.0.0.1. An application that builds a network trust-boundary decision on these checks, for example a filter intended to block Server-Side Request F
Published Updatedip-address: Misclassification of IPv4-mapped/NAT64 IPv6 addresses can bypass SSRF and trust-boundary checks
ip-address is a library for parsing and manipulating IPv4 and IPv6 addresses in JavaScript. Versions 10.1.1 through 10.2.0 are vulnerable to SSRF through misclassification of IPv4-mapped/NAT64 IPv6 addresses. Address6.getType() classifies an address by matching it against a table of known IPv6 special-use prefixes, returning Global unicast when nothing matches. That table had no entry for the IPv4-mapped range (::ffff:0:0/96), so every mapped address fell through to Global unicast; NAT64 addresses matched their own NAT64 … labels. The boolean checks isLoopback, isUnspecified, and isMulticast compared getType() against a fixed label and so ret
Published Updatedip-address: XSS in Address6 HTML-emitting methods
ip-address is a library for parsing and manipulating IPv4 and IPv6 addresses in JavaScript. Prior to 10.1.1, Address6.group() and Address6.link() do not HTML-escape attacker-controlled content before embedding it in the HTML strings they return, and AddressError.parseMessage (emitted by the Address6 constructor for invalid input) can contain unescaped attacker-controlled content in one branch. An application that (1) passes untrusted input to Address6 and (2) renders the output of these methods, or the thrown error's parseMessage, as HTML (e.g. via innerHTML) is vulnerable to cross-site scripting. This vulnerability is fixed in 10.1.1.
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