netfilter: nfnetlink_queue: hold nfnl mutex in event notifier
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nfnetlink_queue: hold nfnl mutex in event notifier
We must serialize the release notifier and the config netlink function.
A concurrent thread can issue close() which can call the release function
while unrelated socket processes UNBIND request for same portid:
Oops: general protection fault, [..]
RIP: 0010:__instance_destroy+0x60/0x210 [nfnetlink_queue]
Call Trace:
nfqnl_recv_config+0x9b0/0xdc0 [nfnetlink_queue]
nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x7c2/0xeb0
? __pfx_nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10
After this, parallel UNBIND and URELEASE events are impossible.
This change isn'
drm/nouveau/clk: fix list cursor use after loop in nvkm_clk_ustate_update
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/nouveau/clk: fix list cursor use after loop in nvkm_clk_ustate_update
If list_for_each_entry() exits without hitting a break then "pstate" is
not a valid pstate pointer. Introduce a "found" variable instead.
The check is reachable from userspace: nvkm_clk_ustate_update() takes the
pstate id straight from the 'pstate' debugfs file, so requesting an id
that is not in clk->states - or any id at all when the perf tables are
broken and the list is empty - makes the pstate->pstate != req test
dereference the list head cast to a struct nvkm_pstate, which is an
out-of-bounds
net: usb: catc: bound the RX packet length in catc_rx_done()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: usb: catc: bound the RX packet length in catc_rx_done()
catc_rx_done() walks a multi-packet URB, reading a two-byte length from
each packet header. Its bound, pkt_len > urb->actual_length, ignores the
header offset and compares against the whole transfer rather than the
bytes left from pkt_start, so a crafted packet header makes
skb_copy_to_linear_data() read past the buffer.
A length below ETH_HLEN is also accepted, including zero, and
eth_type_trans() then reads a MAC header from the uninitialised tailroom
of a shorter skb. The is_f5u011 branch takes its length stra
net/sched: sch_hfsc: bound the classify inner-filter walk with a drift budget
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: sch_hfsc: bound the classify inner-filter walk with a drift budget
hfsc_classify() applies the "filter may only point downwards" level check
only when the filter result carries no bound class. A filter created with
a flowid gets res.class set once at bind time, so the check never runs for
it during classification. hfsc_adjust_levels() can later raise a class's
level without revalidating existing bindings, leaving two binds that were
each legal at bind time pointing at each other; the classify walk then
bounces between two interior classes forever with the qdisc l
Bluetooth: bnep: fix out-of-bounds reads on short RX/TX frames and control fallthrough
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: bnep: fix out-of-bounds reads on short RX/TX frames and control fallthrough
Fix multiple out-of-bounds reads in Bluetooth BNEP frame processing:
1. In bnep_rx_frame() and bnep_ctrl_frame() (net/bluetooth/bnep/core.c),
use pskb_may_pull() to verify the BNEP header, control type byte,
filter count, and extension headers exist before reading them, and
return 0 after handling BNEP_CONTROL instead of falling through to
Ethernet frame submission when no extension headers follow.
2. In bnep_net_xmit() (net/bluetooth/bnep/netdev.c), verify skb->len >=
ETH
net: usb: sr9700: include receive overhead in the length check
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: usb: sr9700: include receive overhead in the length check
The receive fixup subtracts the Ethernet CRC from the reported packet
length, but compares that payload length against the whole remaining
receive buffer. The following copy starts after the three-byte header,
and the cursor advance consumes both that header and the four-byte CRC.
Require the payload to fit after SR_RX_OVERHEAD before copying it or
advancing to the next packet. The loop already ensures that the
remaining buffer is larger than the overhead, so the subtraction is
safe.
The issue was found by our
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tg3: clean up PHYLIB resources on probe failure
tg3_get_invariants() can register an MDIO bus and connect a PHY for
USE_PHYLIB devices. If tg3_init_one() later fails, its common error path
releases the mappings and netdev without undoing those PHYLIB resources.
Disconnect the PHY and unregister the MDIO bus before the remaining
teardown. Guard PHY cleanup with USE_PHYLIB to match tg3_phy_init(), and
call tg3_mdio_fini() unconditionally to match tg3_mdio_init(). The existing
IS_CONNECTED and MDIOBUS_INITED flags make both helpers safe when
initialization only completed part
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Reject pkt arguments in mutating subprogs
The verifier tracks changes in how PTR_TO_PACKET registers'
bounds are modified across subprog boundaries. PTR_TO_PACKET
registers are actually passed as PTR_TO_MEM, which is assumed
valid for the entire call. This is not the case with packet memory,
where a pskb_* call may invalidate its memory region.
Reject BPF code that passes PTR_TO_PACKET pointers to subprogs that
may mutate a packet. We cannot pass the pointer as a true PTR_TO_PACKET
because we would also need to somehow pass the PTR_TO_PACKET_META
or PTR_TO_PACKET_END
sctp: hold asoc or transport before mod_timer() in timer handlers
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: hold asoc or transport before mod_timer() in timer handlers
Take the association or transport reference before rearming a timer in the
timer handlers.
The existing code calls mod_timer() before taking the reference needed by
the rearmed timer without holding the sock lock. This creates a race with
timer cleanup: if the timer is deleted after mod_timer() returns but before
the reference is taken, the cleanup path can drop the timer's reference and
destroy the transport or association. The timer handler then takes a
reference on the already freed object and eventually
nfc: llcp: Fix list corruption / refcount desync in nfc_llcp_recv_dm()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: llcp: Fix list corruption / refcount desync in nfc_llcp_recv_dm()
nfc_llcp_recv_dm() handles DM(NOBOUND)/DM(REJ) for a socket that is still
linked on local->connecting_sockets: it looks the socket up with
nfc_llcp_connecting_sock_get(), sets sk->sk_state = LLCP_CLOSED and
returns, without taking the socket lock and without unlinking the socket
from the connecting_sockets list.
llcp_sock_release() selects the list to unlink from by sk_state: a socket
in LLCP_CONNECTING is unlinked from connecting_sockets, otherwise from the
sockets list. Because recv_dm left the socke
nfc: llcp: Fix race condition in accept_queue lifecycle
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: llcp: Fix race condition in accept_queue lifecycle
In nfc_llcp_socket_release(), sockets and listener accept queues are
walked under the local sockets rwlock and bh_lock_sock(). However,
bh_lock_sock() does not synchronise against process-context lock_sock()
held by nfc_llcp_accept_dequeue() during accept(). Because
socket_release() does not check sock_owned_by_user(), both paths can
concurrently unlink and release the same child socket, resulting in
use-after-free or a NULL pointer dereference of child->parent in
nfc_llcp_accept_unlink().
Fix this synchronisation r
nfc: llcp: fix sdreq TLV list leak on parse/alloc/send failure
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: llcp: fix sdreq TLV list leak on parse/alloc/send failure
nfc_genl_llc_sdreq() builds a list of TLV nodes while walking nested
netlink attrs, but 3 error paths (nested-attr parse failure, TLV alloc
ENOMEM, nfc_llcp_send_snl_sdreq() failure) all skip freeing what was
already queued.
Route them through a new free_list label, mirroring the SDRES path in
the same file which already does this. Harmless on the success path
too -- send_snl_sdreq() drains the list as it moves nodes, so it's
already empty by the time free_list runs.
nfc: llcp: fix WKS SAP hijacking via prefix match in nfc_llcp_wks_sap()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: llcp: fix WKS SAP hijacking via prefix match in nfc_llcp_wks_sap()
nfc_llcp_wks_sap() compares only service_name_len bytes, so a short
service_name like "u" matches longer WKS strings like "urn:nfc:sn:snep".
Fix by requiring exact length match before strncmp().
nfc: llcp: fix slab-out-of-bounds reads when logging service names
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: llcp: fix slab-out-of-bounds reads when logging service names
nfc_llcp_wks_sap() and nfc_llcp_build_sdreq_tlv() pass non-null-
terminated strings to pr_debug() using the %s format specifier.
The buffers are allocated via kmemdup() or come from netlink
attributes and are not guaranteed to be null-terminated, causing
__dynamic_pr_debug() to read beyond the allocated region:
KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Read in __dynamic_pr_debug
Fix both call sites by using %.*s with the explicit length to limit
the output to the actual length of the string.
net: skbuff: fix pull-bound underflow in skb_checksum_setup_ipv6()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: skbuff: fix pull-bound underflow in skb_checksum_setup_ipv6()
skb_maybe_pull_tail() subtracts skb_headlen(skb) from the unsigned max
argument and passes the result to __pskb_pull_tail() as a signed int. The
function does not ensure that max is at least skb_headlen(skb).
This can happen while parsing IPv6 extension headers when an skb already
has a linear area larger than MAX_IPV6_HDR_LEN. Once the parser needs data
beyond the linear area, max - skb_headlen(skb) wraps and is converted to a
negative delta. __pskb_pull_tail() then passes that negative length to
skb_co
vxlan: use one headroom snapshot for neighbour replies
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vxlan: use one headroom snapshot for neighbour replies
vxlan_na_create() samples LL_RESERVED_SPACE() to size the reply skb and then
samples it again to reserve headroom. A concurrent vxlan_changelink() can
update needed_headroom between the two reads, creating a TOCTOU race. The
second value can exceed the allocation and make the Ethernet header write out
of bounds.
The race is reproducible on the unpatched kernel. It occurred when
vxlan_na_create() generated a neighbour reply while vxlan_changelink() changed
the link headroom. KASAN caught a four-byte write two bytes beyo
llc: fix skb UAF and leaks on llc_mac_hdr_init() failure
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
llc: fix skb UAF and leaks on llc_mac_hdr_init() failure
In llc_conn_ac_resend_i_xxx_x_set_0_or_send_rr(), if llc_mac_hdr_init()
fails, kfree_skb(skb) is called instead of kfree_skb(nskb). This leaks
the newly allocated nskb, reads from the freed skb via LLC_I_GET_NR(pdu),
and double-frees skb when llc_conn_state_process() drops its reference.
In llc_sap_action_send_xid_r() and llc_sap_action_send_test_r(), nskb is
leaked if llc_mac_hdr_init() returns an error.
Free nskb in all three error paths.
vlan: ensure sufficient headroom in vlan_dev_hard_header()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vlan: ensure sufficient headroom in vlan_dev_hard_header()
Callers that only reserve ETH_HLEN or less (such as llc_alloc_frame()),
or skbs allocated before dynamic device/headroom changes (e.g. toggling
VLAN_FLAG_REORDER_HDR or bonding/team switching slaves), can reach
vlan_dev_hard_header() with insufficient headroom and trigger
skb_under_panic().
Use skb_cow_head() in vlan_dev_hard_header() when VLAN_FLAG_REORDER_HDR
is not set to ensure sufficient headroom for the VLAN header(s) and the
underlying device hard header.
Use READ_ONCE() to read dev->hard_header_len and dev
sctp: discard the rest of the packet on a stale-cookie error
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: discard the rest of the packet on a stale-cookie error
When an association is in COOKIE-ECHOED state and the peer sends a
bundled [ERROR(Stale Cookie)][DATA] packet from one of its non-primary
addresses, processing the ERROR chunk takes the non-fatal stale-cookie
retry path sctp_sf_do_5_2_6_stale(), which queues
SCTP_CMD_DEL_NON_PRIMARY while keeping the association alive.
sctp_cmd_del_non_primary() removes every non-primary transport -
including the very transport this packet arrived on, which is still
referenced by the receive lookup and shared by all chunks of the
af_packet: fix integer overflow in prb_calc_retire_blk_tmo()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
af_packet: fix integer overflow in prb_calc_retire_blk_tmo()
prb_calc_retire_blk_tmo() computes in 32-bit int arithmetic:
mbits = (blk_size_in_bytes * 8) / (1024 * 1024);
If I'm reading the validation right, tp_block_size is user
controlled and packet_set_ring() only rejects values that are <= 0
as int or not page aligned, so a 256MiB block goes right through
(and alloc_one_pg_vec_page() even has a vzalloc fallback for it).
0x10000000 * 8 wraps to INT_MIN, and on a NIC reporting 1 Gbps
(div == 1) the function ends up returning -2047.
The condition is actually (8