RDMA/rxe: Fix null deref on srq->rq.queue after resize failure
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/rxe: Fix null deref on srq->rq.queue after resize failure
A NULL pointer dereference can occur in rxe_srq_chk_attr() when
ibv_modify_srq() is invoked twice in succession under certain error
conditions. The first call may fail in rxe_queue_resize(), which leads
rxe_srq_from_attr() to set srq->rq.queue = NULL. The second call then
triggers a crash (null deref) when accessing
srq->rq.queue->buf->index_mask.
Call Trace:
<TASK>
rxe_modify_srq+0x170/0x480 [rdma_rxe]
? __pfx_rxe_modify_srq+0x10/0x10 [rdma_rxe]
? uverbs_try_lock_object+0x4f/0xa0 [ib_uverbs]
? rdma_lookup_get_
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nbd: defer config put in recv_work
There is one uaf issue in recv_work when running NBD_CLEAR_SOCK and
NBD_CMD_RECONFIGURE:
nbd_genl_connect // conf_ref=2 (connect and recv_work A)
nbd_open // conf_ref=3
recv_work A done // conf_ref=2
NBD_CLEAR_SOCK // conf_ref=1
nbd_genl_reconfigure // conf_ref=2 (trigger recv_work B)
close nbd // conf_ref=1
recv_work B
config_put // conf_ref=0
atomic_dec(&config->recv_threads); -> UAF
Or only running NBD_CLEAR_SOCK:
nbd_genl_connect // conf_ref=2
nbd_open // conf_ref=3
macintosh/mac_hid: fix race condition in mac_hid_toggle_emumouse
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
macintosh/mac_hid: fix race condition in mac_hid_toggle_emumouse
The following warning appears when running syzkaller, and this issue also
exists in the mainline code.
------------[ cut here ]------------
list_add double add: new=ffffffffa57eee28, prev=ffffffffa57eee28, next=ffffffffa5e63100.
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1491 at lib/list_debug.c:35 __list_add_valid_or_report+0xf7/0x130
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 1491 Comm: syz.1.28 Not tainted 6.6.0+ #3
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RI
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nbd: defer config unlock in nbd_genl_connect
There is one use-after-free warning when running NBD_CMD_CONNECT and
NBD_CLEAR_SOCK:
nbd_genl_connect
nbd_alloc_and_init_config // config_refs=1
nbd_start_device // config_refs=2
set NBD_RT_HAS_CONFIG_REF open nbd // config_refs=3
recv_work done // config_refs=2
NBD_CLEAR_SOCK // config_refs=1
close nbd // config_refs=0
refcount_inc -> uaf
------------[ cut here ]------------
refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
WARNING: CPU: 24 PID: 1014 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0x12e/0x290
nbd
ocfs2: relax BUG() to ocfs2_error() in __ocfs2_move_extent()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: relax BUG() to ocfs2_error() in __ocfs2_move_extent()
In '__ocfs2_move_extent()', relax 'BUG()' to 'ocfs2_error()' just
to avoid crashing the whole kernel due to a filesystem corruption.
wifi: rtl818x: rtl8187: Fix potential buffer underflow in rtl8187_rx_cb()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rtl818x: rtl8187: Fix potential buffer underflow in rtl8187_rx_cb()
The rtl8187_rx_cb() calculates the rx descriptor header address
by subtracting its size from the skb tail pointer.
However, it does not validate if the received packet
(skb->len from urb->actual_length) is large enough to contain this
header.
If a truncated packet is received, this will lead to a buffer
underflow, reading memory before the start of the skb data area,
and causing a kernel panic.
Add length checks for both rtl8187 and rtl8187b descriptor headers
before attempting to access them, dropp
btrfs: fix racy bitfield write in btrfs_clear_space_info_full()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: fix racy bitfield write in btrfs_clear_space_info_full()
From the memory-barriers.txt document regarding memory barrier ordering
guarantees:
(*) These guarantees do not apply to bitfields, because compilers often
generate code to modify these using non-atomic read-modify-write
sequences. Do not attempt to use bitfields to synchronize parallel
algorithms.
(*) Even in cases where bitfields are protected by locks, all fields
in a given bitfield must be protected by one lock. If two fields
in a given bitfield are protected by different lock
regulator: core: Protect regulator_supply_alias_list with regulator_list_mutex
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
regulator: core: Protect regulator_supply_alias_list with regulator_list_mutex
regulator_supply_alias_list was accessed without any locking in
regulator_supply_alias(), regulator_register_supply_alias(), and
regulator_unregister_supply_alias(). Concurrent registration,
unregistration and lookups can race, leading to:
1 use-after-free if an alias entry is removed while being read,
2 duplicate entries when two threads register the same alias,
3 inconsistent alias mappings observed by consumers.
Protect all traversals, insertions and deletions on
regulator_supply_alias_list
NFSv4/pNFS: Clear NFS_INO_LAYOUTCOMMIT in pnfs_mark_layout_stateid_invalid
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFSv4/pNFS: Clear NFS_INO_LAYOUTCOMMIT in pnfs_mark_layout_stateid_invalid
Fixes a crash when layout is null during this call stack:
write_inode
-> nfs4_write_inode
-> pnfs_layoutcommit_inode
pnfs_set_layoutcommit relies on the lseg refcount to keep the layout
around. Need to clear NFS_INO_LAYOUTCOMMIT otherwise we might attempt
to reference a null layout.
ALSA: wavefront: Fix integer overflow in sample size validation
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: wavefront: Fix integer overflow in sample size validation
The wavefront_send_sample() function has an integer overflow issue
when validating sample size. The header->size field is u32 but gets
cast to int for comparison with dev->freemem
Fix by using unsigned comparison to avoid integer overflow.
can: gs_usb: gs_usb_receive_bulk_callback(): check actual_length before accessing header
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: gs_usb: gs_usb_receive_bulk_callback(): check actual_length before accessing header
The driver expects to receive a struct gs_host_frame in
gs_usb_receive_bulk_callback().
Use struct_group to describe the header of the struct gs_host_frame and
check that we have at least received the header before accessing any
members of it.
To resubmit the URB, do not dereference the pointer chain
"dev->parent->hf_size_rx" but use "parent->hf_size_rx" instead. Since
"urb->context" contains "parent", it is always defined, while "dev" is not
defined if the URB it too short.
can: gs_usb: gs_usb_receive_bulk_callback(): check actual_length before accessing data
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: gs_usb: gs_usb_receive_bulk_callback(): check actual_length before accessing data
The URB received in gs_usb_receive_bulk_callback() contains a struct
gs_host_frame. The length of the data after the header depends on the
gs_host_frame hf::flags and the active device features (e.g. time
stamping).
Introduce a new function gs_usb_get_minimum_length() and check that we have
at least received the required amount of data before accessing it. Only
copy the data to that skb that has actually been received.
[mkl: rename gs_usb_get_minimum_length() -> +gs_usb_get_minimum_rx_l
team: Move team device type change at the end of team_port_add
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
team: Move team device type change at the end of team_port_add
Attempting to add a port device that is already up will expectedly fail,
but not before modifying the team device header_ops.
In the case of the syzbot reproducer the gre0 device is
already in state UP when it attempts to add it as a
port device of team0, this fails but before that
header_ops->create of team0 is changed from eth_header to ipgre_header
in the call to team_dev_type_check_change.
Later when we end up in ipgre_header() struct ip_tunnel* points to nonsense
as the private data of the device still ho
atm/fore200e: Fix possible data race in fore200e_open()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
atm/fore200e: Fix possible data race in fore200e_open()
Protect access to fore200e->available_cell_rate with rate_mtx lock in the
error handling path of fore200e_open() to prevent a data race.
The field fore200e->available_cell_rate is a shared resource used to track
available bandwidth. It is concurrently accessed by fore200e_open(),
fore200e_close(), and fore200e_change_qos().
In fore200e_open(), the lock rate_mtx is correctly held when subtracting
vcc->qos.txtp.max_pcr from available_cell_rate to reserve bandwidth.
However, if the subsequent call to fore200e_activate_v
jbd2: avoid bug_on in jbd2_journal_get_create_access() when file system corrupted
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
jbd2: avoid bug_on in jbd2_journal_get_create_access() when file system corrupted
There's issue when file system corrupted:
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at fs/jbd2/transaction.c:1289!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 2031 Comm: mkdir Not tainted 6.18.0-rc1-next
RIP: 0010:jbd2_journal_get_create_access+0x3b6/0x4d0
RSP: 0018:ffff888117aafa30 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88811a86b000 RCX: ffffffff89a63534
RDX: 1ffff110200ec602 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffff888100763010
RBP: ffff888100763000 R08: 00000000000
locking/spinlock/debug: Fix data-race in do_raw_write_lock
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
locking/spinlock/debug: Fix data-race in do_raw_write_lock
KCSAN reports:
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in do_raw_write_lock / do_raw_write_lock
write (marked) to 0xffff800009cf504c of 4 bytes by task 1102 on cpu 1:
do_raw_write_lock+0x120/0x204
_raw_write_lock_irq
do_exit
call_usermodehelper_exec_async
ret_from_fork
read to 0xffff800009cf504c of 4 bytes by task 1103 on cpu 0:
do_raw_write_lock+0x88/0x204
_raw_write_lock_irq
do_exit
call_usermodehelper_exec_async
ret_from_fork
value changed: 0xffffffff -> 0x00000001
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 0
comedi: pcl818: fix null-ptr-deref in pcl818_ai_cancel()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
comedi: pcl818: fix null-ptr-deref in pcl818_ai_cancel()
Syzbot identified an issue [1] in pcl818_ai_cancel(), which stems from
the fact that in case of early device detach via pcl818_detach(),
subdevice dev->read_subdev may not have initialized its pointer to
&struct comedi_async as intended. Thus, any such dereferencing of
&s->async->cmd will lead to general protection fault and kernel crash.
Mitigate this problem by removing a call to pcl818_ai_cancel() from
pcl818_detach() altogether. This way, if the subdevice setups its
support for async commands, everything async-re
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
comedi: c6xdigio: Fix invalid PNP driver unregistration
The Comedi low-level driver "c6xdigio" seems to be for a parallel port
connected device. When the Comedi core calls the driver's Comedi
"attach" handler `c6xdigio_attach()` to configure a Comedi to use this
driver, it tries to enable the parallel port PNP resources by
registering a PNP driver with `pnp_register_driver()`, but ignores the
return value. (The `struct pnp_driver` it uses has only the `name` and
`id_table` members filled in.) The driver's Comedi "detach" handler
`c6xdigio_detach()` unconditionally unregi
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: accel: bmc150: Fix irq assumption regression
The code in bmc150-accel-core.c unconditionally calls
bmc150_accel_set_interrupt() in the iio_buffer_setup_ops,
such as on the runtime PM resume path giving a kernel
splat like this if the device has no interrupts:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual
address 00000001 when read
PC is at bmc150_accel_set_interrupt+0x98/0x194
LR is at __pm_runtime_resume+0x5c/0x64
(...)
Call trace:
bmc150_accel_set_interrupt from bmc150_accel_buffer_postenable+0x40/0x108
bmc150_accel_buffer_postenable from __iio_upda
usb: renesas_usbhs: Fix synchronous external abort on unbind
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: renesas_usbhs: Fix synchronous external abort on unbind
A synchronous external abort occurs on the Renesas RZ/G3S SoC if unbind is
executed after the configuration sequence described above:
modprobe usb_f_ecm
modprobe libcomposite
modprobe configfs
cd /sys/kernel/config/usb_gadget
mkdir -p g1
cd g1
echo "0x1d6b" > idVendor
echo "0x0104" > idProduct
mkdir -p strings/0x409
echo "0123456789" > strings/0x409/serialnumber
echo "Renesas." > strings/0x409/manufacturer
echo "Ethernet Gadget" > strings/0x409/product
mkdir -p functions/ecm.usb0
mkdir -p configs/c.1
mkdir -p con