Input: iforce - bound the device-reported force-feedback effect index
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: iforce - bound the device-reported force-feedback effect index
iforce_process_packet() handles a status report (packet id 0x02) by
taking a force-feedback effect index straight from the device wire and
using it to address the per-effect state array:
i = data[1] & 0x7f;
if (data[1] & 0x80) {
if (!test_and_set_bit(FF_CORE_IS_PLAYED,
iforce->core_effects[i].flags))
...
} else if (test_and_clear_bit(FF_CORE_IS_PLAYED,
iforce->core_effects[i].flags)) {
...
}
The index is masked only with 0x7f, so it ranges 0..127, but
core_effects[] holds
Input: mms114 - fix touch indexing for MMS134S and MMS136
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: mms114 - fix touch indexing for MMS134S and MMS136
The MMS134S and MMS136 touch controllers have an event size of 6 bytes
rather than 8 bytes. When __mms114_read_reg() reads the touch data
packet from the device into the touch buffer, the events are packed
tightly at 6-byte intervals. However, the driver iterates through the
events using standard C array indexing (touch[index]), where each
element is sizeof(struct mms114_touch) (8 bytes) apart. As a result, any
touch events beyond the first one are read from incorrect offsets and
parsed improperly.
Fix this by expli
Input: touchwin - reset the packet index on every complete packet
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: touchwin - reset the packet index on every complete packet
tw_interrupt() accumulates each non-zero serial byte into a fixed
three-byte buffer with a running index that is only reset once a full
packet has been received *and* the device's two Y bytes agree:
tw->data[tw->idx++] = data;
if (tw->idx == TW_LENGTH && tw->data[1] == tw->data[2]) {
...
tw->idx = 0;
}
The reset is gated on tw->data[1] == tw->data[2], a value the device
controls. A malicious, malfunctioning or counterfeit Touchwindow
peripheral can stream non-zero bytes whose 2nd and 3rd bytes diffe
Input: mms114 - reject an oversized device packet size
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: mms114 - reject an oversized device packet size
mms114_interrupt() reads a packet of touch data from the device into a
fixed-size on-stack buffer
struct mms114_touch touch[MMS114_MAX_TOUCH];
which holds MMS114_MAX_TOUCH (10) events of MMS114_EVENT_SIZE (8) bytes,
i.e. 80 bytes. The length of the I2C read into it is taken verbatim from
the device:
packet_size = mms114_read_reg(data, MMS114_PACKET_SIZE);
if (packet_size <= 0)
goto out;
...
error = __mms114_read_reg(data, MMS114_INFORMATION, packet_size,
(u8 *)touch);
packet_size is a single device registe
RDMA/rtrs-srv: Bound RDMA-Write length to chunk size in rdma_write_sg
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/rtrs-srv: Bound RDMA-Write length to chunk size in rdma_write_sg
When the server answers an RTRS READ, rdma_write_sg() builds the source
scatter/gather entry for the IB_WR_RDMA_WRITE that returns data to the
peer. Its length is taken directly from the wire descriptor:
plist->length = le32_to_cpu(id->rd_msg->desc[0].len);
rd_msg points into the chunk buffer that the remote peer filled via
RDMA-WRITE-WITH-IMM (rtrs_srv_rdma_done() -> process_io_req() ->
process_read()), so desc[0].len is attacker-controlled and, before this
change, was only rejected when zero. The so
RDMA/siw: bound Read Response placement to the RREAD length
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/siw: bound Read Response placement to the RREAD length
In drivers/infiniband/sw/siw/siw_qp_rx.c, siw_proc_rresp() places each
inbound Read Response DDP segment at sge->laddr + wqe->processed and then
accumulates wqe->processed, but it never checks the running total against
the sink buffer length on continuation segments. siw_check_sge() resolves
and validates the sink memory only on the first fragment (the if (!*mem)
branch), and siw_rresp_check_ntoh() compares the cumulative length against
wqe->bytes only on the final segment (the !frx->more_ddp_segs guard).
A connec
fuse: re-lock request before returning from fuse_ref_folio()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fuse: re-lock request before returning from fuse_ref_folio()
fuse_ref_folio() unlocks the request but does not re-lock it before
returning. fuse_chan_abort() can end the request and the async end
callback (eg fuse_writepage_free()) can free the args while the
subsequent copy chain logic after fuse_ref_folio() accesses them,
leading to use-after-free issues.
Fix this by locking the request in fuse_ref_folio() before returning.
smb: client: reject overlapping data areas in SMB2 responses
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: reject overlapping data areas in SMB2 responses
Commit 53b7c271f06b ("smb: client: restrict implied bcc[0] exemption to
responses without data area") restricted the implied bcc[0] length
exception to responses without a data area. However, the overlap
handling in __smb2_calc_size() clears data_length, which can make an
invalid response appear to have no data area and so qualify for the
exception.
Track data area overlap separately and reject such responses before
applying the length compatibility exceptions.
fpga: region: fix use-after-free in child_regions_with_firmware()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fpga: region: fix use-after-free in child_regions_with_firmware()
Move of_node_put(child_region) after the error print to avoid accessing
freed memory when pr_err() references child_region.
[ Yilun: Fix the Fixes tag ]
power: reset: linkstation-poweroff: fix use-after-free in the linkstation_poweroff_init()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
power: reset: linkstation-poweroff: fix use-after-free in the linkstation_poweroff_init()
Move of_node_put(dn) after the of_match_node() call, which still needs
the node pointer. The node reference is correctly released after use.
ASoC: codecs: simple-mux: Fix enum control bounds check
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: codecs: simple-mux: Fix enum control bounds check
simple_mux_control_put() rejects values greater than e->items, but
enum control values are zero based. For the two-entry mux used by this
driver, valid values are 0 and 1, so value 2 must be rejected as well.
Accepting e->items can store an invalid mux state, pass it to the GPIO
setter, and pass it on to the DAPM mux update path where it is used as
an index into the enum text array.
Use the same >= e->items check used by the ASoC enum helpers.
usb: gadget: net2280: Fix double free in probe error path
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: net2280: Fix double free in probe error path
usb_initialize_gadget() installs gadget_release() as the release
callback for the embedded gadget device. The struct net2280 instance is
therefore released through gadget_release() when the gadget device's last
reference is dropped.
The probe error path calls net2280_remove(), which tears down the
partially initialized device and drops the gadget reference with
usb_put_gadget(). Calling kfree(dev) afterwards can free the same object
again.
Drop the explicit kfree() and let the gadget device release callback
handl
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gpio: rockchip: teardown bugs and resource leaks
Address several teardown issues and resource leaks in the driver's remove
path and error handling:
1. Debounce clock reference leak: The debounce clock (bank->db_clk) is
obtained using of_clk_get() which increments the clock's reference
count, but clk_put() is never called. Register a devm action to
cleanly release it on unbind. Note that of_clk_get(..., 1) remains
necessary over devm_clk_get() because the DT binding does not define
clock-names, precluding name-based lookup.
2. Unregistered chained IRQ handle
Input: elan_i2c - validate firmware size before use
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: elan_i2c - validate firmware size before use
Ensure that the firmware file is large enough to contain the expected
number of pages and the signature (which resides at the end of the
firmware blob) before accessing them to prevent potential out-of-bounds
reads.
tty: serial: pch_uart: add check for dma_alloc_coherent()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tty: serial: pch_uart: add check for dma_alloc_coherent()
Add a check for dma_alloc_coherent() failure to prevent a potential
NULL pointer dereference in dma_handle_rx(). Properly release DMA
channels and the PCI device reference using a goto ladder if the
allocation fails.
drm/msm/dsi: don't dump registers past the mapped region
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/msm/dsi: don't dump registers past the mapped region
On DSI 6G platforms the IO address space is internally adjusted by
io_offset. Later this adjusted address might be used for memory dumping.
However the size that is used for memory dumping isn't adjusted to
account for the io_offset, leading to the potential access to the
unmapped region. Lower ctrl_size by the io_offset value to prevent
access past the mapped area.
msm_disp_snapshot_add_block+0x1d4/0x3c8 [msm] (P)
msm_dsi_host_snapshot+0x4c/0x78 [msm]
msm_dsi_snapshot+0x28/0x50 [msm]
msm_disp_snapshot_capture_st
octeontx2-af: CGX: add bounds check to cgx_speed_mbps index
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
octeontx2-af: CGX: add bounds check to cgx_speed_mbps index
cgx_speed_mbps has 13 elements but RESP_LINKSTAT_SPEED can yield values
0-15. If it returns a value >= 13, this causes an out-of-bounds array
access. Add a bounds check and default to speed 0 if the index is out of
range.
octeontx2-pf: avoid double free of pool->stack on AQ init failure
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
octeontx2-pf: avoid double free of pool->stack on AQ init failure
otx2_pool_aq_init() frees pool->stack when mailbox sync or retry
allocation fails, but leaves the pointer unchanged. Later,
otx2_sq_aura_pool_init() unwinds the partial setup through
otx2_aura_pool_free(), which frees pool->stack again. The CN20K-specific
cn20k_pool_aq_init() implementation has the same bug in
its corresponding error path.
Set pool->stack to NULL immediately after the local free so the shared
cleanup path does not free the same stack again while cleaning up
partially initialized pool state.
spi: ti-qspi: fix use-after-free after DMA setup failure
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
spi: ti-qspi: fix use-after-free after DMA setup failure
The driver falls back to PIO mode if DMA setup fails during probe.
Make sure to clear the DMA channel pointer also if buffer allocation
fails to avoid passing a pointer to the released channel to the DMA
engine (or trying to free the channel a second time on late probe errors
or driver unbind).
This issue was flagged by Sashiko when reviewing a devres allocation
conversion patch.
device property: set fwnode->secondary to NULL in fwnode_init()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
device property: set fwnode->secondary to NULL in fwnode_init()
If a firmware node is allocated on the stack (for instance: temporary
software node whose life-time we control) or on the heap - but using a
non-zeroing allocation function - and initialized using fwnode_init(),
its secondary pointer will contain uninitalized memory which likely will
be neither NULL nor IS_ERR() and so may end up being dereferenced (for
example: in dev_to_swnode()). Set fwnode->secondary to NULL on
initialization.