In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/iucv: fix locking in .getsockopt
Mirror iucv_sock_setsockopt() and wrap the whole switch in
lock_sock()/release_sock(). The pre-existing SO_MSGLIMIT-only lock
becomes redundant and is removed.
Any AF_IUCV HIPER user can potentially crash the kernel by racing
recvmsg() with getsockopt(SO_MSGSIZE): the SO_MSGSIZE arm dereferences
iucv->hs_dev->mtu after iucv_sock_close() (called from the racing
recvmsg()) has set hs_dev to NULL, producing a NULL pointer dereference
oops.
ipv4: free net->ipv4.sysctl_local_reserved_ports after unregister_net_sysctl_table()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv4: free net->ipv4.sysctl_local_reserved_ports after unregister_net_sysctl_table()
ipv4_sysctl_exit_net() is currently freeing net->ipv4.sysctl_local_reserved_ports
too soon.
Only after unregister_net_sysctl_table() we can be sure no threads can possibly
use the sysctls, including /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_local_reserved_ports.
ALSA: pcm: oss: Fix setup list UAF on proc write error
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: pcm: oss: Fix setup list UAF on proc write error
snd_pcm_oss_proc_write() links a newly allocated setup entry into the
OSS setup list before duplicating the task name. If the task-name
allocation fails, the error path frees the already linked entry and
leaves setup_list pointing at freed memory.
A later OSS device open can then walk the stale list entry in
snd_pcm_oss_look_for_setup() and dereference freed memory.
Allocate the task name and initialize the setup entry before publishing
the entry on setup_list. Also fetch the initial proc read iterator only
after taki
ethtool: rss: fix indir_table and hkey leak on get_rxfh failure
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ethtool: rss: fix indir_table and hkey leak on get_rxfh failure
rss_prepare_get() allocates the indirection table and hash key buffer
via rss_get_data_alloc(), then calls ops->get_rxfh() to populate them.
If get_rxfh() fails, the function returns an error without freeing
the allocation.
tunnels: load network headers after skb_cow() in iptunnel_pmtud_build_icmp[v6]()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tunnels: load network headers after skb_cow() in iptunnel_pmtud_build_icmp[v6]()
Sashiko found that iptunnel_pmtud_build_icmp() and
iptunnel_pmtud_build_icmpv6() were caching ip_hdr() and ipv6_hdr()
before an skb_cow() call which can reallocate skb->head.
Fix this possible UAF by initializing the local variables
after the skb_cow() call.
Remove skb_reset_network_header() calls which were not needed.
vxlan: do not reuse cached ip_hdr() value after skb_tunnel_check_pmtu()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vxlan: do not reuse cached ip_hdr() value after skb_tunnel_check_pmtu()
skb_tunnel_check_pmtu() can change skb->head.
Reusing old_iph afer skb_tunnel_check_pmtu() can cause an UAF.
Use instead ip_hdr(skb) as done in drivers/net/bareudp.c
and drivers/net/geneve.c.
Found by Sashiko.
tunnels: do not assume transport header in iptunnel_pmtud_check_icmp()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tunnels: do not assume transport header in iptunnel_pmtud_check_icmp()
In some cases, iptunnel_pmtud_check_icmp() can be called while
skb transport header is not set.
This triggers an out-of-bound access, because
(typeof(skb->transport_header))~0U is 65535.
Access the icmp header based on IPv4 network header,
after making sure icmp->type is present in skb linear part.
Note that iptunnel_pmtud_check_icmpv6()) is fine.
Bluetooth: 6lowpan: check skb_clone() return value in send_mcast_pkt()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: 6lowpan: check skb_clone() return value in send_mcast_pkt()
The skb_clone() function can return NULL if memory allocation fails.
send_mcast_pkt() calls skb_clone() without checking the return value, which
can lead to a NULL pointer dereference in send_pkt() when it dereferences
skb->data.
Add a NULL check after skb_clone() and skip the peer if the clone fails.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bonding: refuse to enslave CAN devices
syzbot reported a kernel paging request crash in
can_rx_unregister() inside net/can/af_can.c. The crash occurs
because a virtual CAN device (vxcan) is being enslaved to a
bonding master.
During the enslavement process, the bonding driver mutates
and modifies the network device states to fit an Ethernet-like
aggregation model. However, CAN devices operate on a completely
different Layer 2 architecture, relying on the CAN mid-layer
private data structure (can_ml_priv) instead of standard
Ethernet structures. Since bonding does not initi
ethtool: eeprom: add more safeties to EEPROM Netlink fallback
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ethtool: eeprom: add more safeties to EEPROM Netlink fallback
The Netlink fallback path for reading module EEPROM
(fallback_set_params()) validates that offset < eeprom_len,
but does not check that offset + length stays within eeprom_len.
The ioctl equivalent (ethtool_get_any_eeprom() in ioctl.c) has
always enforced both bounds:
if (eeprom.offset + eeprom.len > total_len)
return -EINVAL;
This could lead to surprises in both drivers and device FW.
Add the missing offset + length validation to fallback_set_params(),
mirroring the ioctl.
Similarly - ethtool core in
ipv6: rpl: fix hdrlen overflow in ipv6_rpl_srh_decompress()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: rpl: fix hdrlen overflow in ipv6_rpl_srh_decompress()
ipv6_rpl_srh_decompress() computes:
outhdr->hdrlen = (((n + 1) * sizeof(struct in6_addr)) >> 3);
hdrlen is __u8. For n >= 127 the result exceeds 255 and silently
truncates. With n=127 (cmpri=15, cmpre=15, pad=0, hdrlen=16):
(128 * 16) >> 3 = 256, truncated to 0 as __u8
The caller in ipv6_rpl_srh_rcv() then places the compressed header
at buf + ((ohdr->hdrlen + 1) << 3). With hdrlen=0 this is buf + 8,
but the decompressed region occupies buf[0..2055] (8-byte header
plus 128 full addresses). The compresse
net/sched: fix packet loop on netem when duplicate is on
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: fix packet loop on netem when duplicate is on
When netem duplicates a packet it re-enqueues the copy at the root qdisc.
If another netem sits in the tree the copy can be duplicated
again, recursing until the stack or memory is exhausted.
The original duplication guard temporarily zeroed q->duplicate around
the re-enqueue, but that does not cover all cases because it is
per-qdisc state shared across all concurrent enqueue paths
and is not safe without additional locking.
Use the skb tc_depth field introduced in an earlier patch:
- increment it on the duplicate
Bluetooth: l2cap: clear chan->ident on ECRED reconfiguration success
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: l2cap: clear chan->ident on ECRED reconfiguration success
l2cap_ecred_reconf_rsp() returns early on success without clearing
chan->ident. Every other L2CAP response handler (l2cap_ecred_conn_rsp,
l2cap_le_connect_rsp, l2cap_config_rsp) clears chan->ident after a
successful transaction to prevent the channel from matching subsequent
responses with the recycled ident value.
A remote attacker that completed a reconfiguration as the peer can
replay a failure response with the stale ident, causing the kernel to
match and destroy the already-established channel via
l2
Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix possible crash on l2cap_ecred_conn_rsp
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix possible crash on l2cap_ecred_conn_rsp
If dcid is received for an already-assigned destination CID the spec
requires that both channels to be discarded, but calling l2cap_chan_del
may invalidate the tmp cursor created by list_for_each_entry_safe and
in fact it is the wrong procedure as the chan->dcid may be assigned
previously it really needs to be disconnected.
Calling l2cap_chan_clone directly may still lead to l2cap_chan_del so
instead schedule l2cap_chan_timeout with delay 0 to close the channel
asynchronously.
net: mana: Add NULL guards in teardown path to prevent panic on attach failure
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: mana: Add NULL guards in teardown path to prevent panic on attach failure
When queue allocation fails partway through, the error cleanup frees
and NULLs apc->tx_qp and apc->rxqs. Multiple teardown paths such as
mana_remove(), mana_change_mtu() recovery, and internal error handling
in mana_alloc_queues() can subsequently call into functions that
dereference these pointers without NULL checks:
- mana_chn_setxdp() dereferences apc->rxqs[0], causing a NULL pointer
dereference panic (CR2: 0000000000000000 at mana_chn_setxdp+0x26).
- mana_destroy_vport() iterates apc->rxq
sctp: fix race between sctp_wait_for_connect and peeloff
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: fix race between sctp_wait_for_connect and peeloff
sctp_wait_for_connect() drops and re-acquires the socket lock while
waiting for the association to reach ESTABLISHED state. During this
window, another thread can peeloff the association to a new socket via
getsockopt(SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF), changing asoc->base.sk. After
re-acquiring the old socket lock, sctp_wait_for_connect() returns
success without noticing the migration — the caller then accesses
the association under the wrong lock in sctp_datamsg_from_user().
Add the same sk != asoc->base.sk check that sctp_wait
iio: imu: st_lsm6dsx: fix stack leak in tagged FIFO buffer
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: imu: st_lsm6dsx: fix stack leak in tagged FIFO buffer
The tagged FIFO path declares iio_buff on the stack with __aligned(8)
but no initializer, but there is a hole in the structure, which will
then leak to userspace as ST_LSM6DSX_SAMPLE_SIZE bytes (6) will be
copied, but the space between that and the timestamp are not
initialized.
Commit c14edb4d0bdc ("iio:imu:st_lsm6dsx Fix alignment and data leak
issues") moved the untagged FIFO path to a kzalloc'd buffer in hw->scan,
but for the tagged path it only added the alignment qualifier and not
the initializer :(
Fix this
usb: typec: ucsi: ccg: reject firmware images without a ':' record header
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: typec: ucsi: ccg: reject firmware images without a ':' record header
do_flash() locates the first .cyacd record with
p = strnchr(fw->data, fw->size, ':');
while (p < eof) {
s = strnchr(p + 1, eof - p - 1, ':');
...
}
If the firmware image contains no ':' byte, strnchr() returns NULL.
NULL compares less than the valid kernel pointer eof, so the loop body
runs and strnchr() is called with p + 1 == (void *)1 and a length of
roughly (unsigned long)eof, causing a wonderful crash.
The not_signed_fw fallthrough earlier in do_flash() and the chip-state
branches in c
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: typec: tcpm: validate VDO count in Discover Identity ACK handlers
Properly validate the count passed from a device when calling
svdm_consume_identity() or svdm_consume_identity_sop_prime() as the
device-controlled value could index off of the static arrays, which
could leak data.
usb: typec: tcpm: bound altmode_desc[] per iteration in svdm_consume_modes()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: typec: tcpm: bound altmode_desc[] per iteration in svdm_consume_modes()
svdm_consume_modes() checks pmdata->altmodes against the array size once
before the loop over the count, but forgot to check the bound at every
point in the loop.
In the well-behaved SVDM discovery flow this is harmless because each of
at most SVID_DISCOVERY_MAX SVIDs contributes at most MODE_DISCOVERY_MAX
modes, exactly filling altmode_desc[ALTMODE_DISCOVERY_MAX]. But the
CMDT_RSP_ACK handler in tcpm_pd_svdm() does not correlate an incoming
ACK with any request the port actually sent. Once port