ksmbd: Fix acl.sd_buf memory leak and invalid sd_size error handling
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: Fix acl.sd_buf memory leak and invalid sd_size error handling
1. When ndr_decode_v4_ntacl() fails, the code jumped to free_n_data
which only freed n.data, skipping kfree(acl.sd_buf) and leaking
the buffer. Zero-initialize struct xattr_ntacl acl, reorder error
labels to out_free to release acl.sd_buf on all error paths.
2. if (acl.sd_size < sizeof(struct smb_ntsd)) is true, original code
returned success without freeing sd_buf and left stale *pntsd.
Set rc = -EINVAL before jumping to out_free to return error code and
free buffer.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cachefiles: Fix double fput
Fix a double fput() in error handling in cachefiles_create_tmpfile().
drm/amdgpu: flush pending RCU callbacks on module unload
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: flush pending RCU callbacks on module unload
Call rcu_barrier() in module exit to wait for outstanding call_rcu() callbacks
before freeing module text, preventing late callback execution in freed memory.
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffc1d59c40
PGD 6a12067 P4D 6a12067 PUD 6a14067 PMD 13698b067 PTE 0
Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP NOPTI
RIP: 0010:0xffffffffc1d59c40
Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0xffffffffc1d59c16.
RSP: 0018:ffffc900198c0f28 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: ffffffffc1d59c40 RBX: ffff897c7d6b61c0 RCX: ffff88826aff4590
RDX: ffff8884d8b
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: usb-audio: caiaq: validate EP1 reply lengths
usb_ep1_command_reply_dispatch() uses buf[0] as a command byte and then
reads command-specific fixed items from the same URB buffer. Several
paths use buf + 1, buf[1], buf[2], or buf + 3 without first proving that
urb->actual_length contains those bytes.
Add per-command length checks, use a payload length derived from the
bytes after the command byte for the control-state copy, and reject short
analog input payloads before the input helper reads fixed offsets from
the EP1 reply.
wifi: rsi: avoid reading TKIP MIC keys for non-TKIP ciphers
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rsi: avoid reading TKIP MIC keys for non-TKIP ciphers
rsi_hal_load_key() copies tx_mic_key and rx_mic_key from data[16] and
data[24] whenever key data is present. Those offsets are only part of
the 32-byte TKIP key layout. Shorter keys used by other ciphers, such as
CCMP, do not provide those bytes, so the unconditional copies can read
past the supplied key buffer.
Only copy the MIC keys for TKIP, and reject malformed TKIP keys that are
shorter than the expected 32-byte layout.
[drop useless length check]
wifi: cfg80211: validate assoc response length before status and IE access
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: cfg80211: validate assoc response length before status and IE access
cfg80211_rx_assoc_resp() initialises the status and response-IE fields
of cfg80211_connect_resp_params from the management frame before
proving that the frame is long enough for those offsets. S1G and
regular association responses also have different IE offsets, but the
S1G path only patched resp_ie after the unsafe initialiser had already
run.
Defer resp_ie, resp_ie_len, and status to after the link-iteration
loop. Use a bool to remember whether the frame is S1G, then validate
the appropriate minim
wifi: cfg80211: validate rx/tx MLME callback frame lengths before access
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: cfg80211: validate rx/tx MLME callback frame lengths before access
cfg80211_rx_mlme_mgmt() and cfg80211_tx_mlme_mgmt() call tracepoints
before rejecting frames shorter than the frame-control field. After
that, they only require len >= 2 before dispatching into subtype
handlers that assume their fixed fields are present.
The frames that trip this are not shorter than 2 bytes; they are short
relative to their subtype. mwifiex is a concrete in-tree example on the
length side: mwifiex_process_mgmt_packet() only requires a 4-address
ieee80211_hdr plus the 2-byte firmware
wifi: mac80211: ibss: wait for in-flight TX on disconnect
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: ibss: wait for in-flight TX on disconnect
While leaving an IBSS in ieee80211_ibss_disconnect() mac80211 flushes
stations, turns the carrier off and immediately tells the driver to
leave as well. While there may be synchronize_net() in station flush
and in this code later, packets can still be transmitted due to
cross-CPU race conditions after carrier off is set.
Therefore, it's possible for a race to happen where a TX to the
driver occurs while or after telling it to leave the IBSS. This can
be confusing to drivers, and in the case of iwlwifi leads to an
att
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: libipw: fix key index receive bound checks
libipw_rx() reads skb->data[hdrlen + 3] to extract the WEP key index in
both the software-decrypt key selection path and the hardware-decrypted
IV/ICV strip path. In both places the existing guard only checks
skb->len >= hdrlen + 3, which proves bytes up to hdrlen + 2 but not the
byte at hdrlen + 3.
Require hdrlen + 4 bytes before reading that item in both paths. This is
a local source-boundary check only; it does not change the key index
semantics.
wifi: rsi: validate beacon length before fixed buffer copy
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rsi: validate beacon length before fixed buffer copy
rsi_prepare_beacon() copies the mac80211 beacon frame after
FRAME_DESC_SZ into a management skb whose usable tailroom may be smaller
than MAX_MGMT_PKT_SIZE after alignment.
Validate the beacon length against the actual tailroom before the copy
and skb_put(). Leave ownership of the management skb with the caller on
error, matching the existing rsi_send_beacon() cleanup path.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb/client: zero-initialize stack-allocated cifs_open_info_data
Stack-allocated cifs_open_info_data may contain random data.
This can make some fields have wrong value if they are not set later.
btrfs: fix use-after-free on reloc root after error in insert_dirty_subvol()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: fix use-after-free on reloc root after error in insert_dirty_subvol()
If during relocation we fail in insert_dirty_subvol() because
btrfs_update_reloc_root() returned an error, we will leave a root's
reloc_root field pointing to a reloc root that was freed instead of NULL,
resulting later in a use-after-free, or double free attempt during
unmount.
The sequence of steps is this:
1) During relocation the call to btrfs_update_reloc_root() in
insert_dirty_subvol() fails, so insert_dirty_subvol() returns the
error to merge_reloc_root() without adding the root to t
wifi: iwlwifi: mvm: validate sta_id in BA window status notif
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: iwlwifi: mvm: validate sta_id in BA window status notif
BA_WINDOW_STATUS_NOTIFICATION_ID extracts a 5-bit sta_id from the
firmware notification and uses it to index fw_id_to_mac_id[] without
bounds checking. Validate sta_id before array access to prevent
out-of-bounds indexing.
btrfs: fix reloc root cleanup in merge_reloc_roots()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: fix reloc root cleanup in merge_reloc_roots()
If the root we got has zero root refs in its root item, we are resetting
the root's ->reloc_root without using barriers like we do everywhere else.
Sashiko complained about this while reviewing another patch, and it's
correct (see the Link tag below).
Also, we should not clear BTRFS_ROOT_DEAD_RELOC_TREE from the root unless
the root points to the reloc root we have.
Fix this by using clear_reloc_root(), which issues the memory barrier
after setting the root's ->reloc_root to NULL and before clearing the bit
BTRFS_ROOT_D
wifi: iwlwifi: mvm: fix an off-by-1 boundary check
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: iwlwifi: mvm: fix an off-by-1 boundary check
Before looking at the 11th byte, check the length is big enough.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: iwlwifi: pcie: null RX pointers after free
When iwl_pcie_tx_init() fails after RX init, nic init unwinds via
iwl_pcie_rx_free().
The freed RX members stayed non-NULL on the live transport object,
so later teardown or retry could touch stale RX state.
Set rx_pool, global_table, rxq, and alloc_page to NULL after free
to make repeated cleanup and retry paths safe.
blk-cgroup: fix leaks and online flag on radix_tree_insert failure
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
blk-cgroup: fix leaks and online flag on radix_tree_insert failure
When radix_tree_insert() fails in blkg_create(), the error path has two
issues:
1. blkg->online is set to true unconditionally, even when the blkg was
never fully inserted. Move the assignment inside the success block.
2. The error path calls blkg_put() without first calling
percpu_ref_kill(). Because the refcount is still in percpu mode,
percpu_ref_put() only does this_cpu_sub() without checking for zero,
so blkg_release() is never triggered. This permanently leaks the
blkg memory, its p
smb/client: flush dirty data before punching a hole
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb/client: flush dirty data before punching a hole
Punching a hole after a large buffered write may leave the range
reported as data. Reproduce it with:
xfs_io -f \
-c "pwrite -b 3m -S 0x61 0 3m" \
-c "fpunch 1m 1m" \
-c "seek -h 0" \
-c "seek -d 1m" \
/mnt/test/repro
Punching 1 MiB at offset 1 MiB should produce:
0 1 MiB 2 MiB 3 MiB
| DATA | HOLE | DATA | EOF
Instead, the entire file is reported as data. SEEK_HOLE(0) returns EOF,
and SEEK_DATA(1M) returns 1M.
This happens because a dirty folio spanning the
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: iwlwifi: mvm: validate TX_CMD response layout
TX_CMD parsing uses frame_count to walk status entries and then
read the trailing SCD SSN. Make the minimum-length check follow
that exact runtime layout calculation before parsing the payload.
For new TX API, reject TX_CMD responses with frame_count != 1 and
warn/return in the aggregation handler to document that aggregated
accounting is expected via BA notifications.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: iwlwifi: mvm: fix a possible underflow
We shouldn't trust the firmware about the length of the wowlan packet.