phpMyFAQ - Stored XSS via Entity Decoding Depth Limit Bypass in SVG Sanitizer
phpMyFAQ before 4.1.2 contains a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in SvgSanitizer::decodeAllEntities() that limits recursive entity decoding to 5 iterations, allowing attackers to bypass sanitization. Authenticated users with FAQ_EDIT permission can upload malicious SVG files with deeply nested ampersand encoding around numeric HTML entities to reconstruct javascript: URLs, which execute arbitrary JavaScript when clicked by other users viewing the uploaded SVG.
phpMyFAQ - SQL Injection in CurrentUser::setTokenData via Unescaped OAuth Token Fields
phpMyFAQ before 4.1.2 contains a sql injection vulnerability in CurrentUser::setTokenData that allows authenticated attackers to execute arbitrary SQL by injecting malicious OAuth token claims. Attackers with Azure AD accounts containing SQL metacharacters in display names or JWT claims can break out of string literals and execute arbitrary database queries.
phpMyFAQ - Unauthenticated Two-Factor Authentication Brute-Force via /admin/check Endpoint
phpMyFAQ before 4.1.2 contains an improper restriction of excessive authentication attempts vulnerability in the /admin/check endpoint, which accepts arbitrary user-id parameters without session binding or rate limiting. Unauthenticated attackers can brute-force any user's six-digit TOTP code by submitting POST requests with sequential token values, bypassing two-factor authentication to gain full administrative access.
phpMyFAQ - Insufficient Authorization Check in Admin API Endpoints
phpMyFAQ before 4.1.2 contains an insufficient authorization vulnerability in admin-api routes that allows authenticated ordinary users to access administrative endpoints by only checking login status instead of verifying backend privileges. Attackers with valid frontend user accounts can access sensitive backend operational information including dashboard versions, LDAP configuration, Elasticsearch statistics, and health-check data.
phpMyFAQ - Path Traversal in Client::deleteClientFolder via URL Parameter
phpMyFAQ before 4.1.2 contains a path traversal vulnerability in Client::deleteClientFolder that allows admins with INSTANCE_DELETE permission to delete arbitrary directories. Attackers can submit traversal sequences like https://../../../<path> in the client URL parameter to recursively delete directories outside the intended clientFolder scope.
phpMyFAQ - Missing Permission Check on 12 Configuration API Endpoints Allows Information Disclosure
phpMyFAQ before 4.1.2 contains missing permission checks in ConfigurationTabController.php where 12 endpoints use userIsAuthenticated() instead of userHasPermission(CONFIGURATION_EDIT). Any authenticated user can enumerate system configuration metadata including permission model, cache backend, mail provider, and translation provider by querying /admin/api/configuration endpoints, violating least privilege access control.
phpMyFAQ: Stored XSS via Regex Bypass in Filter::removeAttributes()
phpMyFAQ is an open source FAQ web application. Prior to version 4.1.1, there is a stored XSS vulnerability via Regex Bypass in Filter::removeAttributes(). This issue has been patched in version 4.1.1.
phpMyFAQ: Path Traversal - Arbitrary File Deletion in MediaBrowserController
phpMyFAQ is an open source FAQ web application. Prior to version 4.1.1, the MediaBrowserController::index() method handles file deletion for the media browser. When the fileRemove action is triggered, the user-supplied name parameter is concatenated with the base upload directory path without any path traversal validation. The FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS filter only encodes HTML special characters (&, ', ", <, >) and characters with ASCII value < 32, and does not prevent directory traversal sequences like ../. Additionally, the endpoint does not validate CSRF tokens, making it exploitable via CSRF attacks. This issue has been patched in ver
phpMyFAQ: Stored XSS via Unsanitized Email Field in Admin FAQ Editor
phpMyFAQ is an open source FAQ web application. Prior to version 4.1.1, an unauthenticated attacker can submit a guest FAQ with an email address that is syntactically valid per RFC 5321 (quoted local part) yet contains raw HTML — for example "<script>alert(1)</script>"@evil.com. PHP's FILTER_VALIDATE_EMAIL accepts this email as valid. The email is stored in the database without HTML sanitization and later rendered in the admin FAQ editor template using Twig's |raw filter, which bypasses auto-escaping entirely. This issue has been patched in version 4.1.1.
phpMyFAQ: Public API endpoints expose emails and invisible questions
phpMyFAQ is an open source FAQ web application. In versions 4.0.16 and below, multiple public API endpoints improperly expose sensitive user information due to insufficient access controls. The OpenQuestionController::list() endpoint calls Question::getAll() with showAll=true by default, returning records marked as non-public (isVisible=false) along with user email addresses, with similar exposures present in comment, news, and FAQ APIs. This information disclosure vulnerability could enable attackers to harvest email addresses for phishing campaigns or access content that was explicitly marked as private. This issue has been fixed in version
phpMyFAQ: Attachment download allowed without dlattachment right (broken access control)
phpMyFAQ is an open source FAQ web application. Versions 4.0.16 and below allow an authenticated user without the dlattachment permission to download FAQ attachments due to a incomprehensive permissions check. The presence of a right key is improperly validated as proof of authorization in attachment.php. Additionally, the group and user permission logic contains a flawed conditional expression that may allow unauthorized access. This issue has been fixed in version
phpMyFAQ missing authorization exposes /api/setup/backup to any authenticated user
phpMyFAQ is an open source FAQ web application. Versions 4.0.16 and below have flawed authorization logic which exposes the /api/setup/backup endpoint to any authenticated user despite their permissions. SetupController.php uses userIsAuthenticated() but does not verify that the requester has configuration/admin permissions. Non-admin users can trigger a configuration backup and retrieve its path. The endpoint only checks authentication, not authorization, and returns a link to the generated ZIP. This issue is fixed in version 4.0.17.
phpMyFAQ 3.1.12 CSV Injection via User Profile Export
phpMyFAQ 3.1.12 contains a CSV injection vulnerability that allows authenticated users to inject malicious formulas into their profile names. Attackers can modify their user profile name with a payload like 'calc|a!z|' to trigger code execution when an administrator exports user data as a CSV file.
phpMyFAQ has Authenticated SQL Injection in Configuration Update Functionality
phpMyFAQ is an open source FAQ web application. Prior to version 4.0.14, an authenticated SQL injection vulnerability in the main configuration update functionality of phpMyFAQ allows a privileged user with 'Configuration Edit' permissions to execute arbitrary SQL commands. Successful exploitation can lead to a full compromise of the database, including reading, modifying, or deleting all data, as well as potential remote code execution depending on the database configuration. This issue has been patched in version 4.0.14.
phpMyFAQ Vulnerable to Stored HTML Injection at FAQ
phpMyFAQ is an open source FAQ web application. Starting no later than version 3.2.10 and prior to version 4.0.2, an attacker can inject malicious HTML content into the FAQ editor at `http[:]//localhost/admin/index[.]php?action=editentry`, resulting in a complete disruption of the FAQ page's user interface. By injecting malformed HTML elements styled to cover the entire screen, an attacker can render the page unusable. This injection manipulates the page structure by introducing overlapping buttons, images, and iframes, breaking the intended layout and functionality. Exploiting this issue can lead to Denial of Service for legitimate users, da
phpMyFAQ is an open source FAQ web application for PHP 8.1+ and MySQL, PostgreSQL and other databases. There is a Path Traversal vulnerability in Attachments that allows attackers with admin rights to upload malicious files to other locations of the web root. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.2.6.
phpMyFAQ Stored Cross-site Scripting at File Attachments
phpMyFAQ is an open source FAQ web application for PHP 8.1+ and MySQL, PostgreSQL and other databases. An attacker with admin privileges can upload an attachment containing JS code without extension and the application will render it as HTML which allows for XSS attacks.
phpMyFAQ is an open source FAQ web application for PHP 8.1+ and MySQL, PostgreSQL and other databases. Due to insufficient validation on the `contentLink` parameter, it is possible for unauthenticated users to inject HTML code to the page which might affect other users. _Also, requires that adding new FAQs is allowed for guests and that the admin doesn't check the content of a newly added FAQ._ This vulnerability is fixed in 3.2.6.
phpMyFAQ SQL injections at insertentry & saveentry
phpMyFAQ is an open source FAQ web application for PHP 8.1+ and MySQL, PostgreSQL and other databases. A SQL injection vulnerability has been discovered in the `insertentry` & `saveentry` when modifying records due to improper escaping of the email address. This allows any authenticated user with the rights to add/edit FAQ news to exploit this vulnerability to exfiltrate data, take over accounts and in some cases, even achieve RCE. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.2.6.
phpMyFAQ is an open source FAQ web application for PHP 8.1+ and MySQL, PostgreSQL and other databases. By manipulating the news parameter in a POST request, an attacker can inject malicious JavaScript code. Upon browsing to the compromised news page, the XSS payload triggers. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.2.6.