GHSA-f66q-9rf6-8795

GHSA-f66q-9rf6-8795 · Flask-Security-Too: WebAuthn reauthentication freshness bypass via cross-user assertion

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This page shows selected source facts. See the linked advisories for the complete description and affected versions.

### Summary Flask-Security-Too 5.8.0 and 5.8.1 mark a session as reauthentication-fresh after processing a WebAuthn assertion whose proven credential belongs to a different user than the currently authenticated session user. The check that `GHSA-97r5-pg8x-p63p` added on the OAuth reauthentication path (`user.email == current_user.email`) is missing on the WebAuthn reauthentication path. An attacker who owns any WebAuthn credential registered to any account on the deployment can satisfy a victim session's freshness gate by submitting their own WebAuthn proof into the victim session. ### Affected versions `Flask-Security-Too` `>= 5.8.0, <= 5.8.1` (current `main` commit `5c44c76e33a20b67d02115e26d2da4bab18c094e`). `GHSA-97r5-pg8x-p63p` (published 2026-05-22) shipped its fix in 5.8.1 only on `oauth_glue.py`; `webauthn.py` was not touched and remains exploitable in 5.8.1. ### Privilege required Authenticated attacker on the same Flask-Security deployment, owning at least one WebAuthn credential of any usage (`first` / `secondary` / verify) that is registered to their own account. The attacker also needs the ability to drive HTTP requests against the WebAuthn endpoints inside the victim session (e.g. a separate gadget such as CSRF + cookie-based auth, an XSS that doesn't reach the cookie itself but can move the session through endpoints, or an existing session-fixation gadget; or the rarer but easier case of an attacker who has direct access to the victim's not-yet-fresh session via a shared browser). The point of the freshness gate is to defend exactly that "I have the session but it isn't fresh enough to do sensitive things" position, so any context in which freshness would have protected the victim is also the context in which this bypass matters. ### Vulnerable code [`flask_security/webauthn.py:846-889`](https://github.com/pallets-eco/flask-security/blob/5c44c76e33a20b67d02115e26d2da4bab18c094e/flask_security/webauthn.py#L846-L889) (commit `5c44c76e33a20b67d02115e26d2da4bab18c094e`): ```python @auth_required(lambda: cv("API_ENABLED_METHODS")) def webauthn_verify_response(token: str) -> ResponseValue: form = t.cast( WebAuthnSigninResponseForm, build_form_from_request("wan_signin_response_form") ) expired, invalid, state = check_and_get_token_status( token, "wan", get_within_delta("WAN_SIGNIN_WITHIN") ) ... form.challenge = state["challenge"] form.user_verification = state["user_verification"] form.is_secondary = False form.is_verify = True if form.validate_on_submit(): # update last use and sign count after_this_request(view_commit) assert form.cred assert form.user form.cred.lastuse_datetime = _security.datetime_factory() form.cred.sign_count = form.authentication_verification.new_sign_count _datastore.put(form.cred) # verified - so set freshness time. session["fs_paa"] = time.time() ... ``` [`flask_security/webauthn.py:276-308`](https://github.com/pallets-eco/flask-security/blob/5c44c76e33a20b67d02115e26d2da4bab18c094e/flask_security/webauthn.py#L276-L308) (the form's `validate()`): ```python def validate(self, **kwargs: t.Any) -> bool: if not super().validate(**kwargs): return False # pragma: no cover ... try: auth_cred = parse_authentication_credential_json(self.credential.data) except (...): ... return False # Look up credential Id (raw_id) and user. 7.2.6/7 self.cred = _datastore.find_webauthn(credential_id=auth_cred.raw_id) ... # This shouldn't be able to happen if datastore properly cascades delete self.user = _datastore.find_user_from_webauthn(self.cred) ``` `self.user` is resolved from the attacker-controlled `credential_id` and is never compared to `current_user`. The state token issued by `_signin_common` ([`webauthn.py:589-622`](https://github.com/pallets-eco/flask-security/blob/5c44c76e33a20b67d02115e26d2da4bab18c094e/webauthn.py#L589-L622)) carries only `{challenge, user_verification}`, so state tokens are not bound to any user and replay portably across sessions: ```python def _signin_common(user: UserMixin | None, usage: list[str]) -> tuple[t.Any, str]: ... state = { "challenge": challenge, "user_verification": uv, } ... state_token = t.cast(str, _security.wan_serializer.dumps(state)) return o_json, state_token ``` Contrast with the patch in [`oauth_glue.py:211`](https://github.com/pallets-eco/flask-security/blob/5c44c76e33a20b67d02115e26d2da4bab18c094e/oauth_glue.py#L211) that `GHSA-97r5-pg8x-p63p` shipped: ```python next_loc = session.pop("fs_oauth_next", None) if user and user.email == current_user.email: # verified - so set freshness time. session["fs_paa"] = time.time() ``` That `user.email == current_user.email` clamp is the missing check on the WebAuthn side. ### How input reaches the sink 1. Attacker logs in to their own account and registers their own WebAuthn credential (call it `cred_attacker`). They retain a copy of any valid `navigator.credentials.get()` assertion JSON produced by their authenticator (one signature is enough; can also be produced fresh on demand per request). 2. Attacker holds, or gets, a victim session in a state where `fs_paa` is past `FRESHNESS`. The victim is authenticated as themselves; the gate stops them from invoking freshness-protected business endpoints (`/change`, `/change-username`, `/wf-add`, `/us-setup`, anything decorated with `@auth_required(within=...)`). 3. The victim session calls `POST /wan-verify` and receives a `wan_state` token. The state token has no user binding. 4. Attacker submits an assertion that proves possession of `cred_attacker`, inside the victim session, to `POST /wan-verify/<wan_state>`. 5. `WebAuthnSigninResponseForm.validate` resolves `form.user` to the attacker account from `find_user_from_webauthn(self.cred)`, signs/verifies the assertion against the (attacker-controlled) public key it stored at registration time, and returns `True`. The user-handle check on `auth_cred.response.user_handle` (if present) compares against `self.user.fs_webauthn_user_handle`, i.e. it compares attacker user-handle to attacker user, so it passes trivially. 6. `webauthn_verify_response` then writes `session["fs_paa"] = time.time()`. The session user is unchanged (still the victim) but the freshness clock is reset by a cryptographic proof of the attacker's authenticator. 7. Any subsequent `@auth_required(within=...)` endpoint now succeeds inside the victim session. ### End-to-end reproduction Reproduction is an in-process Flask test client driving the published wheel (`pip install Flask-Security-Too==5.8.0`, also re-run against 5.8.1 since `GHSA-97r5-pg8x-p63p`'s fix shipped with that release only touched `oauth_glue.py`). The full transcript is in the Proof of concept section below; here is the boot recipe: ```bash python3.12 -m venv venv source venv/bin/activate pip install --quiet 'Flask-Security-Too==5.8.0' Flask-SQLAlchemy webauthn email-validator argon2_cffi python poc.py ``` Captured run-time output (5.8.0 path): ``` === Submit BOB's WebAuthn assertion to Alice's /wan-verify-response === cross-user assertion status: 200 alice fs_uniquifier in session AFTER: '408245d132bc4213a55606c46f40e038' # still Alice fs_paa BEFORE: 1779582282.550872 fs_paa AFTER : 1779585882.615287 # advanced === Demonstrate impact: /sensitive (freshness-protected) accepted === /sensitive after cross-user verify status: 200 ``` Re-run against 5.8.1 produces the same `200` on the cross-user assertion and the same `200` on the freshness-gated endpoint, confirming that the patch for `GHSA-97r5-pg8x-p63p` did not extend to the WebAuthn path. ### Proof of concept Mocked WebAuthn fixtures (`REG_DATA_UV`, `SIGNIN_DATA_UV`, `REG_DATA1`

CVSS 5.3 · Medium

Published

2026-07-07T23:43:12Z

Updated

2026-09-10T03:50:51.960981732Z

Stack: python

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