ses's global contour bindings leak into Compartment lexical scope
SES safely executes third-party JavaScript 'strict' mode programs in compartments that have no excess authority in their global scope. Prior to version 1.12.0, web pages and web extensions using `ses` and the Compartment API to evaluate third-party code in an isolated execution environment that have also elsewhere used `const`, `let`, and `class` bindings in the top-level scope of a `<script>` tag will have inadvertently revealed these bindings in the lexical scope of third-party code. This issue has been patched in version 1.12.0. Workarounds for this issue involve either avoiding top-level `let`, `const`, or `class` bindings in `<script>` t
SES's dynamic import and spread operator provides possible path to arbitrary exfiltration and execution
SES is a JavaScript environment that allows safe execution of arbitrary programs in Compartments. In version 0.18.0 prior to 0.18.7, 0.17.0 prior to 0.17.1, 0.16.0 prior to 0.16.1, 0.15.0 prior to 0.15.24, 0.14.0 prior to 0.14.5, an 0.13.0 prior to 0.13.5, there is a hole in the confinement of guest applications under SES that may manifest as either the ability to exfiltrate information or execute arbitrary code depending on the configuration and implementation of the surrounding host.
Guest program running inside a Compartment with as few as no endowments can gain access to the surrounding host’s dynamic import by using dynamic import after
Hardening of TypedArrays with non-canonical numeric property names in SES
### Impact
_What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_
In Hardened JavaScript, programs can `harden` objects to safely share objects with co-tenant programs without risk of these other programs tampering with their API surface. Hardening does not guarantee that objects are pure or immutable, so a hardened `Map`, for example is superficially tamper-proof, but any party holding a reference to the object can both read and write its contents. Based on this precedent, and because `TypedArray` instances cannot be frozen with `Object.isFrozen`, `harden` does not `freeze` `TypedArrays` and instead makes them non-extensible and makes all non
Versions of `realms-shim` prior to 1.2.0 are vulnerable to a Sandbox Breakout. `Reflect.construct` can be used on the sandboxed Function constructor to reach the prototypes of the primal Realm, which may allow an attacker to escape the sandbox and execute arbitrary code.
## Recommendation
Upgrade to version 1.2.0 or later.