PatchFirst · Latest vulnerabilities
Vulnerabilities published for silverstripe/framework in the last 30 days: 0. Listed in the KEV catalogue: 0.
Vulnerabilities: 93
Default Administrator accounts were not subject to the same brute force protection afforded to other Member accounts. Failed login counts were not logged for default admins resulting in unlimited attempts on the default admin username and password.
Due to a lack of parameter sanitisation a carefully crafted URL could be used to inject arbitrary HTML into the CMS Edit page. An attacker could create a URL and share it with a site administrator to perform an attack.
In it's default configuration, SilverStripe trusts all originating IPs to include HTTP headers for Hostname, IP and Protocol. This enables reverse proxies to forward requests while still retaining the original request information. Trusted IPs can be limited via the SS_TRUSTED_PROXY_IPS constant. Even with this restriction in place, SilverStripe trusts a variety of HTTP headers due to different proxy notations (e.g. X-Forwarded-For vs. Client-IP). Unless a proxy explicitly unsets invalid HTTP headers from connecting clients, this can lead to spoofing requests being passed through trusted proxies. The impact of spoofed headers can include Dire
GridField does not have sufficient CSRF protection, meaning that in some cases users with CMS access can be tricked into posting unspecified data into the CMS from external websites. Amongst other default CMS interfaces, GridField is used for management of groups, users and permissions in the CMS. The resolution for this issue is to ensure that all gridFieldAlterAction submissions are checked for the SecurityID token during submission.
The buildDefaults method on DevelopmentAdmin is missing a permission check. In live mode, if you access /dev/build, you are requested to login first. However, if you access /dev/build/defaults, then the action is performed without any login check. This should be protected in the same way that /dev/build is. The buildDefaults view is requireDefaultRecords() on each DataObject class, and hence has the potential to modify database state. It also lists all modified tables, allowing attackers more insight into which modules are used, and how the database tables are structured.
"Add from URL" doesn't clearly sanitise URL server side HtmlEditorField_Toolbar has an action HtmlEditorField_Toolbar#viewfile, which gets called by the CMS when adding a media "from a URL" (i.e. via oembed). This action gets the URL to add in the GET parameter FileURL. However it doesn't do any URL sanitising server side. The current logic will pass this through to Oembed, which will probably reject most dangerous URLs, but it's possible future changes would break this.
A high level XSS risk has been identified in the encoding of validation messages in certain FormField classes. Certain fields such as the NumericField and DropdownField have been identified, but any form field which presents any invalid content as a part of its validation response will be at risk.
During installation, certain parameters (admin_username and admin_password) are not escaped in the setup form. This issue is resolved in 3.1.14 stable, although existing users are advised to remove this file prior to deploying to a production server.
When a secure token parameter is provided to a SilverStripe site (such as isDev or flush) an empty token parameter can be provided in order to bypass normal authentication parameters. For instance, http://www.mysite.com/?isDev=1&isDevtoken will force a site to dev mode. Alternatively, "flush" could also be used in succession to cause excessive load on a victim site and risk denial of service. The fix in this case is to ensure that empty tokens fail the validation check.
A XSS risk exists in the returnURL parameter passed to dev/build. An unvalidated url could cause the user to redirect to an unverified third party url outside of the site. This issue is resolved in framework 3.1.14 stable release.
A vulnerability has been found in the SilverStripe framework where a login url can be potentially redirected to an external site. For example, the url http://www.my-silverstripe-site.com/Security/login?BackURL=/\attacker-site.com will redirect successful logins to the page http://attacker-site.com. If that website were set up to look identical to the first with "login failed" then the user will likely just enter their user/pass again.
A potential hostname injection vulnerability has been found which could allow attackers to alter url resolution. If a request contains the X-Forwarded-Host HTTP header a website would then use its value in place of the actual HTTP hostname. In cases where caching is enabled, this could allow an attacker to potentially embed a remote url as the base_url for any site. This would then cause other visitors to the site to be redirected unknowingly. This header is necessary for servers running behind a reverse proxy (such as nginx). Such servers are likely not vulnerable to this risk. A fix has been merged into the default installer, although ex
A low level XSS vulnerability has been found in the Framework affecting http redirection via the Director::force_redirect method. Attempts to redirect to a url may generate HTML which is not safely escaped, and may pose a risk of XSS in some environments. This vulnerability is marked low as it is difficult to exploit, as any injected HTML will only be returned from the server if the Location HTTP header is also sent, meaning that any user browsing the site would not be exposed to the body of the response before their browser redirects them.
A cross-site scripting vulnerability has been discovered in the FormAction field where a user-specified title may be specified.
A high level XSS vulnerability has been discovered in the SilverStripe framework which causes links containing hash anchors (E.g. href="#anchor") to be rewritten in an unsafe way. The rewriteHashlinks option on SSViewer will rewrite these to contain the current url, although without adequate escaping, meaning that HTML could be injected via injecting unsafe values to any page via the querystring. Due to the nature of this issue it is likely that a large number of SilverStripe sites are affected.
A cross-site scripting vulnerability has been discovered in the print view of GridField. This vulnerability can only be exploited if a user with CMS access has posted malicious or unescaped HTML into any field of an object in a GridField, and the print feature is used. This has been resolved by ensuring that the print feature safely escapes all fields.
A cross-site scripting vulnerability has been discovered in the TreeDropdownField and TreeMultiSelectField. This vulnerability can only be exploited if a user with CMS access has posted malicious or unescaped HTML into any of the dataobjects used as a data source for either of these fields. This has been resolved by ensuring that all dataobjects used as a data source have their content safely encoded.
A low level vulnerability has been found in the SilverStripe framework, where the Quadratic Blowup Attack could potentially be exploited to affect the performance of a site. See http://mashable.com/2014/08/06/wordpress-xml-blowup-dos/ for a writeup.
Non IE browsers don’t appear to be affected, but I haven’t tested a wide range of browsers to be sure Requests that come through from IE do NOT appear to encode all entities in the URL string, meaning they are inserted into output content directly by SSViewer::process() when rewriting hashlinks, as it directly outputs $_SERVER[‘REQUEST_URI’] **Example IE8 request** 127.0.0.1 - - [18/Jun/2014:14:13:42 +1000] “GET /site/cars/brands/toyota?one=1\”onmouseover=\”alert(‘things’);\” HTTP/1.1” 200 **Example FF request** 127.0.0.1 - - [18/Jun/2014:14:14:22 +1000] “GET /site/cars/brands/toyota?one=1\%22onmouseover=\%22alert(%27things%27);\%22 HTTP/
Silverstripe Framework is the framework that forms the base of the Silverstripe content management system. Prior to versions 4.13.39 and 5.1.11, if a user should not be able to see a record, but that record can be added to a `GridField` using the `GridFieldAddExistingAutocompleter` component, the record's title can be accessed by that user. Versions 4.13.39 and 5.1.11 contain a fix for this issue.
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