Arbitrary file read via workspace confinement bypass in local-operator /v1/chat/agents/{id}/edit
The `/v1/chat/agents/{agent_id}/edit` endpoint in local-operator versions before 0.47.5 resolves the caller-supplied `file_path` with `expanduser().resolve()` and reads it without checking that it lies inside the agent's workspace. An unauthenticated client with network access to the API can supply an absolute path or a path containing traversal sequences and obtain the contents of any file readable by the server process, which are placed in the model prompt and returned in the response.
Version 0.47.5 resolves server-side reads within the agent's configured workspace and rejects canonical paths outside it (including symlink and junction esc
Path traversal and arbitrary directory deletion/overwrite via agent profile import in local-operator
The `/v1/agents/import` endpoint and `AgentRegistry.import_agent()` in local-operator versions before 0.47.5 trust the `id` field inside `agent.yml` of an uploaded agent profile archive when constructing the destination directory. A crafted `id` containing directory traversal sequences makes `shutil.rmtree` and `shutil.copy2` operate outside the agent registry, allowing an unauthenticated client with network access to the API to recursively delete arbitrary directories and write files with the privileges of the server process. Even without traversal, an imported archive could overwrite or delete existing local agent profiles.
Version 0.47.5