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Vulnerabilities published for Node.js in the last 30 days: 387. Listed in the KEV catalogue: 0.
Fresh vulnerability reports from vendor announcements and security news. These warnings do not change the security rating.
According to OpenNet, Node.js has a remote code execution vulnerability (CVE-2026-111497). The exact affected versions are unspecified. The report does not name a fixed version.
What to do now: Check whether a Node.js update with the fix is available and install it.
CVE-2026-111497
According to GitHub Advisory Database, Node.js has a denial of service vulnerability (CVE-2026-109932). The exact affected versions are unspecified. The report does not name a fixed version.
What to do now: Check whether a Node.js update with the fix is available and install it.
CVE-2026-109932
Vulnerabilities: 7797
OpenClaw before 2026.4.2 contains an improper trust boundary vulnerability allowing untrusted workspace channel shadows to execute during built-in channel setup and login. Attackers can clone a workspace with a malicious plugin claiming a bundled channel id to achieve unintended in-process code execution before the plugin is explicitly trusted.
OpenClaw before 2026.3.28 loads the current working directory .env file before trusted state-dir configuration, allowing environment variable injection. Attackers can place a malicious .env file in a repository or workspace to override runtime configuration and security-sensitive environment settings during OpenClaw startup.
OpenClaw before 2026.4.2 accepts non-loopback cleartext ws:// gateway endpoints and transmits stored gateway credentials over unencrypted connections. Attackers can forge discovery results or craft setup codes to redirect clients to malicious endpoints, disclosing plaintext gateway credentials.
OpenClaw versions 2026.4.7 before 2026.4.15 fail to enforce local-root containment on tool-result media paths, allowing arbitrary local and UNC file access. Attackers can craft malicious tool-result media references to trigger host-side file reads or Windows network path access, potentially disclosing sensitive files or exposing credentials.
A vulnerability was determined in brikcss merge up to 1.3.0. This affects an unknown part. Executing a manipulation of the argument __proto__/constructor.prototype/prototype can lead to improperly controlled modification of object prototype attributes. The attack may be performed from remote. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
protobufjs compiles protobuf definitions into JavaScript (JS) functions. In versions prior to 8.0.1 and 7.5.5, attackers can inject arbitrary code in the "type" fields of protobuf definitions, which will then execute during object decoding using that definition. Versions 8.0.1 and 7.5.5 patch the issue.
NocoBase is an AI-powered no-code/low-code platform for building business applications and enterprise solutions. Prior to version 2.0.37, NocoBase's workflow HTTP request plugin and custom request action plugin make server-side HTTP requests to user-provided URLs without any SSRF protection. An authenticated user can access internal network services, cloud metadata endpoints, and localhost. Version 2.0.37 contains a patch.
The Auth0 Next.js SDK is a library for implementing user authentication in Next.js applications. In versions 4.12.0 through 4.17.1, simultaneous requests that trigger a nonce retry may cause the proxy cache fetcher to perform improper lookups for the token request results. Users are affected if their project uses both the vulnerable versions and the proxy handler /me/* and /my-org/* with DPoP enabled. This issue has been fixed in version 4.18.0.
next-intl provides internationalization for Next.js. Applications using the `next-intl` middleware prior to version 4.9.1with `localePrefix: 'as-needed'` could construct URLs where path handling and the WHATWG URL parser resolved a relative redirect target to another host (e.g. scheme-relative `//` or control characters stripped by the URL parser), so the middleware could redirect the browser off-site while the user still started from a trusted app URL. The problem has been patchedin `[email protected]`.
Claude Code is an agentic coding tool. In versions prior to 2.1.75 on Windows, Claude Code loaded the system-wide default configuration from C:\ProgramData\ClaudeCode\managed-settings.json without validating directory ownership or access permissions. Because the ProgramData directory is writable by non-administrative users by default and the ClaudeCode subdirectory was not pre-created or access-restricted, a low-privileged local user could create this directory and place a malicious configuration file that would be automatically loaded for any user launching Claude Code on the same machine. Exploiting this would have required a shared multi-u
## Summary The `GET`, `POST`, and `DELETE` handlers under `/agents/:id/keys` in the Paperclip control-plane API only call `assertBoard(req)`, which verifies that the caller has a board-type session but does not verify that the caller has access to the company owning the target agent. A board user whose membership is limited to Company A can therefore list, create, or revoke agent API keys for any agent in Company B by supplying the victim agent's UUID in the URL path. The `POST` handler returns the newly-minted token in cleartext, which authenticates subsequent requests as `{type:"agent", companyId:<CompanyB>}`, giving the attacker full agen
## Summary `MarkdownBody`, the shared component used to render every Markdown surface in the Paperclip UI (issue documents, issue comments, chat threads, approvals, agent details, export previews, etc.), passes `urlTransform={(url) => url}` to `react-markdown`. That override replaces `react-markdown`'s built-in `defaultUrlTransform` — the library's only defense against `javascript:`/`vbscript:`/`data:` URL injection — with a no-op, and the custom `a` component then renders the unsanitized href directly. Any authenticated company member can plant `[text](javascript:...)` in an issue document or comment; when another member clicks the link, th
## Summary The approval-resolution endpoints (`POST /approvals/:id/approve`, `/reject`, `/request-revision`) accept a client-supplied `decidedByUserId` field in the request body and write it verbatim into the authoritative `approvals.decidedByUserId` column — without cross-checking it against the authenticated actor. Any board user who can access an approval's company can record the decision as having been made by another user (e.g. the CEO), forging the governance audit trail. For `hire_agent` approvals with a monthly budget, the same attacker-controlled string is also stamped onto the resulting `budget_policies` row as `createdByUserId`/`u
<img width="7007" height="950" alt="01-setup" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/1596b8d1-8de5-4c21-b1d2-2db41b568d7e" /> > Isolated paperclip instance running in authenticated mode (default config) > on a clean Docker image matching commit b649bd4 (2026.411.0-canary.8, post > the 2026.410.0 patch). This advisory was verified on an unmodified build. ### Summary `POST /api/agents/:id/keys`, `GET /api/agents/:id/keys`, and `DELETE /api/agents/:id/keys/:keyId` (`server/src/routes/agents.ts` lines 2050-2087) only call `assertBoard` to authorize the caller. They never call `assertCompanyAccess` and never verify that the caller is a
### Summary A Paperclip-managed `codex_local` runtime was able to access and use a Gmail connector that I had connected in the ChatGPT/OpenAI apps UI, even though I had not explicitly connected Gmail inside Paperclip or separately inside Codex. In my environment this enabled mailbox access and a real outbound email to be sent from my Gmail account. After I manually intervened to stop the workflow, follow-up retraction messages were also sent, confirming repeated outward write/send capability. This appears to be a trust-boundary failure between Paperclip-managed Codex execution and inherited OpenAI app connectors, amplified by dangerous-by-
## Summary Several API endpoints in `authenticated` mode have no authentication at all. They respond to completely unauthenticated requests with sensitive data or allow state-changing operations. No account, no session, no API key needed. Verified against the latest version. Discord: sagi03581 ## Steps to Reproduce ### 1. Unauthenticated issue data access `GET /api/heartbeat-runs/:runId/issues` returns issue data for a heartbeat run with zero authentication. Every other endpoint in `server/src/routes/activity.ts` calls `assertCompanyAccess`, but this one was missed. ```bash curl -s http://<target>:3100/api/heartbeat-runs/00000000-0000-
### Summary An arbitrary code execution vulnerability in the workspace runtime service allows any agent to execute shell commands on the server, exposing all environment variables including API keys, JWT secrets, and database credentials. ### Details A malicious skill can instruct the agent to exploit the **workspace runtime service** feature, which allows arbitrary shell command execution on the server. ### Vulnerable Code Path 1. Agent calls `PATCH /api/projects/{projectId}/workspaces/{workspaceId}` to set a malicious `runtimeConfig` 2. Agent calls `POST /api/projects/{projectId}/workspaces/{workspaceId}/runtime-services/start` 3. Server
### Summary Paperclip contains an arbitrary file read vulnerability that allows an attacker with an Agent API key to read files from the Paperclip server host filesystem. The vulnerability occurs because agents are allowed to modify their own adapterConfig through the /agents/:id API endpoint. The configuration field adapterConfig.instructionsFilePath is later read directly by the server runtime using fs.readFile(). Because no validation or path restriction is applied, an attacker can supply an arbitrary filesystem path. The Paperclip server then attempts to read that path from the host filesystem during agent execution. This breaks the inten
AdonisJS HTTP Server is a package for handling HTTP requests in the AdonisJS framework. In @adonisjs/http-server versions prior to 7.8.1 and 8.0.0-next.0 through 8.1.3, and @adonisjs/core versions prior to 7.4.0, the response.redirect().back() method reads the Referer header from the incoming HTTP request and redirects to that URL without validating the host.An attacker who can influence the Referer header can cause the application to redirect users to a malicious external site. This affects all AdonisJS applications that use response.redirect().back() or response.redirect('back'). This issue has been fixed in versions 7.8.1 and 8.2.0 and 7.4
mcp-framework is a framework for building Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers. In versions 0.2.21 and below, the readRequestBody() function in the HTTP transport concatenates request body chunks into a string with no size limit. Although a maxMessageSize configuration value exists, it is never enforced in readRequestBody(). A remote unauthenticated attacker can crash any mcp-framework HTTP server by sending a single large POST request to /mcp, causing memory exhaustion and denial of service. This issue has been fixed in version 0.2.22.
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