Check all ancestor namespace transitions when rendering raw text in html in golang.org/x/net
In childTextNodesAreLiteral, walking up the tree previously stopped at the nearest foreign ancestor once an HTML integration point was found. However, that integration point may itself be a descendant of an element that was foster-parented into a foreign namespace (such as <mglyph> or <malignmark> fostered under <mtext>), causing a parser to resolve the subtree in a different foreign namespace upon re-parsing the rendered output. Continue walking the full ancestor chain and verify that every transition from a non-empty namespace occurs at an HTML integration point before emitting literal text.
Avoid quadratic complexity when coalescing text nodes in html in golang.org/x/net
When coalescing adjacent text nodes in addText and fosterParent, appending to an existing TextNode's Data via string concatenation (n.Data += text) reallocated and copied the accumulated string on every token. Inputs containing many short text runs separated by ignored end tags (such as "a</x>") caused O(n^2) allocations and byte copies. Accumulate coalesced text in per-node byte slices during parsing and materialize Data strings once at the end of parse.
HTTP/2 server crash due to HPACK encoder race in net/http
HTTP/2 servers could end up crashing due to inadvertently modifying its HPACK encoder concurrently. This happens because the server modifies the HPACK encoder from two goroutines without synchronization: one uses the encoder to encode a HEADERS frame as part of a response sent to a client and the other modifies the encoder's table size when handling a SETTINGS frame containing SETTINGS_HEADER_TABLE_SIZE that a client sends. A malicious client can repeatedly send a request while changing the header table size to crash the server.
HTTP/1 server connection desynchronization after 2xx CONNECT response in net/http
When an HTTP server handler sends a 2xx response to an HTTP/1 CONNECT request and returns without hijacking the connection, the server improperly continues to read and serve requests from the connection. Since a 2xx response to an HTTP/1 CONNECT converts the connection into a tunnel, the server should not treat the connection as continuing to contain HTTP. The impact of this misbehavior is mostly limited to potential request smuggling, where an intermediate proxy considers the data on the connection to be tunneled and the server considers it to be HTTP.
Double flow control refund on HTTP/2 server streams in net/http
The HTTP/2 server can refund connection-level flow control twice for the same data: Once when a client resets a stream (refunding data for any sent-but-unread portion of the stream), and again when a request handler reads the buffered data. A malicious client can exploit this to bypass the configured connection-level flow control limit (MaxReceiveBufferPerConnection). Total buffered data is still limited by the concurrent stream limit and stream-level flow control.
Excessive CPU consumption from repeated initial window changes in net/http
A malicious HTTP/2 peer can cause excessive CPU consumption in the client or server by opening a large number of streams and then sending many small SETTINGS frames containing SETTINGS_INITIAL_WINDOW_SIZE values.
HTTP/2 transport accepts malformed framing-related headers in net/http
Historically, we have been rather lax about malformed framing-related headers in our HTTP/2 implementation, as they cannot interfere with HTTP/2 framing. However, this makes it possible for our HTTP/2 implementation to forward responses containing such headers to an HTTP/1 client when acting as a reverse proxy. If the HTTP/1 client also does not behave strictly enough, this can result in response smuggling.
Lack of limit on size of parsed Range headers in net/http
When parsing a Range header containing a large number of small ranges, FileServer(FS), ServeContent, and ServeFile(FS) can consume an excessive amount of CPU.
Memory limit bypass when parsing MIME headers in net/textproto, mime/multipart
Parsing a multipart form can bypass memory limits and read an arbitrarily long line into memory when the remaining limit at the start of a part is less than 400 bytes.
Reject malformed ECH outer extension references in crypto/tls
Multiple ECH outer extension references are not permitted under RFC 9849; previously, a client could send a well-crafted packet that could trigger memory exhaustion in the server process by specifying multiple references. We now reject these as malformed and curb the memory amplification vector as a result.
HTTP/1 client connection desynchronization after CONNECT rejection in net/http
When http.Transport sends an HTTP/1 CONNECT request with a non-empty Request.Body, it writes the body directly to the connection without framing after the request headers. If the server rejects the CONNECT request with a non-2xx keep-alive response, Transport returns the connection to the idle pool. Because CONNECT requests do not have a request body, the server may interpret the trailing body bytes as a subsequent pipelined HTTP/1.1 request on the connection, leaving the pooled connection desynchronized and causing the next caller that reuses it to read the response to the injected request. In reverse proxies (including httputil.ReverseProxy
Root.Mkdir(All) can follow junctions out of the root on Windows in os
On Windows, when the target of Root.Mkdir or Root.MkdirAll is a junction pointing to an empty location, the operation can create a directory at the junction target even when that target is located outside the root. This only applies to operations where the last path component is a junction (path/to/junction, but not path/junction/target).
HTTP/2 server memory exhaustion due to Trailer headers in net/http
When "Trailer" headers are sent by a client, the HTTP server internally uses the header values to populate the Request.Trailer map passed to the server handler. Because Request.Trailer is a map, each entry incurs memory overhead. For HTTP/2 servers, a malicious client can exploit this by sending a "Trailer" header that declares a large number of fields, causing the server to allocate a disproportionate amount of memory while bypassing Server.MaxHeaderValueCount and Server.MaxHeaderBytes limits. This exploit is not applicable for HTTP/1 servers, which do not support multiplexing a large number of requests over one TCP connection, and whose Ser
Checksum database bypass for golang.org/toolchain in cmd/go
Previously, a user operating inside of a malicious Go project that defines a bogus golang.org/toolchain go.sum entry and operates a malicious GOMODPROXY the user chooses to use can bypass the intended checksum. We now ensure that golang.org/toolchain always goes to the network for the canonical checksum.
Previously, a user operating inside of a malicious Go project that defines a bogus golang.org/fips140 and operates a malicious GOMODPROXY the user chooses to connect to can serve an arbitrary module in its place. We now unpack the trusted ziphash for the bundled golang.org/fips140 module and construct its entry in the GOMODCACHE such that it can be verified by the toolchain.
Recognize yield as regexp preceder keyword in html/template
A trusted template author may have previously written a valid template wherein the use of the 'yield' keyword would not be correctly escaped. We now ensure that valid keyword uses are escaped and non-keyword uses are not escaped.
Reset context tracking on consecutive template expressions in html/template
When a JavaScript template literal contains consecutive expressions, the context tracking state was not properly reset upon entering a new expression. We now ensure that template-literal expression entries correctly reset context variables so all subsequent regular expression literals are accurately recognized and escaped.
Prevent DoS on deadlocked established channel in golang.org/x/crypto/ssh
Previously, after a channel has been established, a malicious peer could send crafted messages that would deadlock the entire connection. Now, we handle all RFC 4254 channel messages; global requests are handled explicitly. Then, treat all other messages as a protocol error and tear the connection down instead of buffering and blocking.
Prevent DoS on deadlocked undecided channel in golang.org/x/crypto/ssh
Previously, a channel registered in the mux's chanList is not usable until it is established. A malicious peer was able flood the channel's incomingRequests, deadlocking the entire connection. Now, we add an atomic established state, set when a channel becomes usable. Until such a time, handlePacket drops every packet other than the open confirmation/failure, without blocking and without tearing down the connection.
Avoid quadratic complexity in resolvePath in net/url
Previously, resolving relative paths containing parent directory ('..') segments performed string conversions and buffer rewrites on each step, resulting in quadratic time complexity and high memory allocation overhead. Now, path resolution operates on a byte buffer using index-based backtracking for '..' segments, eliminating the quadratic time complexity and significantly reducing memory allocations.