Starlette: request.form() limits silently ignored for application/x-www-form-urlencoded enable DoS
Starlette is a lightweight ASGI framework/toolkit. From 0.4.1 until 1.3.1, request.form() accepts max_fields and max_part_size to bound resource consumption while parsing form data. These limits are enforced for multipart/form-data, but silently ignored for application/x-www-form-urlencoded. An unauthenticated attacker can therefore send a urlencoded body with an arbitrarily large number of fields or an arbitrarily large field, even when the application configured limits it believed would apply. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.3.1.
Starlette: Unvalidated request path concatenated into authority poisons request.url.hostname
Starlette is a lightweight ASGI framework/toolkit. Prior to 1.3.0, the HTTP request path is not validated before being used to reconstruct request.url. Because request.url is rebuilt by concatenating {scheme}://{host}{path} and re-parsing the result, a path that does not begin with / (for example @google.com) moves the authority boundary during re-parsing, so request.url.hostname and request.url.netloc become attacker-controlled. Code that reads request.url.hostname (rather than the Host header or scope) can therefore be misled into trusting an attacker-supplied host. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.3.0.
Starlette: Arbitrary HTTP method dispatched to `HTTPEndpoint` attributes via `getattr`
Starlette is a lightweight ASGI framework/toolkit. In versions 1.0.1 and below, when dispatching a request, HTTPEndpoint selects the handler by lowercasing the HTTP method and looking it up as an attribute with getattr, without restricting the lookup to a known set of HTTP verbs. When an HTTPEndpoint subclass is registered through Route(...) without an explicit methods= argument, the route does not constrain the method and every method reaches the endpoint. If a non-standard HTTP method whose lowercased name matches an attribute on the endpoint subclass reaches the endpoint, that attribute is invoked as if it were a request handler. An attack
Starlette: SSRF and NTLM credential theft via UNC paths in StaticFiles on Windows
Starlette is a lightweight ASGI framework/toolkit. In versions 1.0.1 and earlier, StaticFiles on Windows is vulnerable to SSRF. An UNC path such as \\attacker.com\share can cause os.path.realpath to initiate an outbound SMB connection before the path is rejected, exposing the service account’s NTLMv2 credentials for offline cracking or relay even though the HTTP response is only a 404. The issue affects default follow_symlink=False deployments, including frameworks built on Starlette such as FastAPI; POSIX systems and follow_symlink=True are unaffected. The issue is fixed in 1.1.0.
Medium · CVSS 6.5EPSS 70.29%In KEVPublic exploitNo fix published
Starlette has missing Host header validation that poisons request.url.path, bypassing path-based security checks
Starlette is a lightweight ASGI framework/toolkit. Prior to version 1.0.1, the HTTP `Host` request header was not validated before being used to reconstruct `request.url`. Because the routing algorithm relies on the raw HTTP path while `request.url` is rebuilt from the `Host` header, a malformed header could make `request.url.path` differ from the path that was actually requested. Middleware and endpoints that apply security restrictions based on `request.url` (rather than the raw `scope` path) could therefore be bypassed. Users should upgrade to a version greater than or equal to version 1.0.1, which validates the `Host` header against the g
Starlette vulnerable to O(n^2) DoS via Range header merging in starlette.responses.FileResponse
Starlette is a lightweight ASGI framework/toolkit. Starting in version 0.39.0 and prior to version 0.49.1 , an unauthenticated attacker can send a crafted HTTP Range header that triggers quadratic-time processing in Starlette's FileResponse Range parsing/merging logic. This enables CPU exhaustion per request, causing denial‑of‑service for endpoints serving files (e.g., StaticFiles or any use of FileResponse). This vulnerability is fixed in 0.49.1.
Starlette has possible denial-of-service vector when parsing large files in multipart forms
Starlette is a lightweight ASGI (Asynchronous Server Gateway Interface) framework/toolkit, designed for building async web services in Python. In versions 0.47.1 and below, when parsing a multi-part form with large files (greater than the default max spool size) starlette will block the main thread to roll the file over to disk. This blocks the event thread which means the application can't accept new connections. The UploadFile code has a minor bug where instead of just checking for self._in_memory, the logic should also check if the additional bytes will cause a rollover. The vulnerability is fixed in version 0.47.2.
Starlette Denial of service (DoS) via multipart/form-data
Starlette is an Asynchronous Server Gateway Interface (ASGI) framework/toolkit. Prior to version 0.40.0, Starlette treats `multipart/form-data` parts without a `filename` as text form fields and buffers those in byte strings with no size limit. This allows an attacker to upload arbitrary large form fields and cause Starlette to both slow down significantly due to excessive memory allocations and copy operations, and also consume more and more memory until the server starts swapping and grinds to a halt, or the OS terminates the server process with an OOM error. Uploading multiple such requests in parallel may be enough to render a service pra