HID: wacom: Fix OOB write in wacom_hid_set_device_mode()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: wacom: Fix OOB write in wacom_hid_set_device_mode()
wacom_hid_set_device_mode() currently assumes that the HID_DG_INPUTMODE
usage is always located in the first field (field[0]) of the feature report.
However, a device can specify HID_DG_INPUTMODE in a different field.
If HID_DG_INPUTMODE is in a field other than the first one and the first
field has a report_count smaller than the usage_index of HID_DG_INPUTMODE,
this leads to an out-of-bounds write to r->field[0]->value.
Fix this by storing the field index of HID_DG_INPUTMODE in 'struct
hid_data' during feature map
nfc: hci: fix out-of-bounds read in HCP header parsing
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: hci: fix out-of-bounds read in HCP header parsing
Both nfc_hci_recv_from_llc() and nci_hci_data_received_cb() read
packet->header from skb->data at function entry without first checking
that the buffer holds at least one byte. A malicious NFC peer can send
a 0-byte HCP frame that passes through the SHDLC layer and reaches
these functions, causing an out-of-bounds heap read of packet->header.
The same 0-byte frame, if queued as a non-final fragment, also causes
the reassembly loop to underflow msg_len to UINT_MAX, triggering
skb_over_panic() when the reassembled skb is
xfrm: route MIGRATE notifications to caller's netns
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: route MIGRATE notifications to caller's netns
xfrm_send_migrate() in net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c and pfkey_send_migrate()
in net/key/af_key.c both hardcode &init_net for the multicast that
announces a successful XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE / SADB_X_MIGRATE.
XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE arrives on a per-netns NETLINK_XFRM socket, and the
rest of the xfrm/af_key netlink path was made netns-aware in 2008.
The other 14 multicast paths in xfrm_user.c route their event using
xs_net(x), xp_net(xp) or sock_net(skb->sk); only the migrate path
was missed.
Two consequences of the init_net hardcoding:
1.
netfilter: conntrack: tcp: do not force CLOSE on invalid-seq RST without direction check
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: conntrack: tcp: do not force CLOSE on invalid-seq RST without direction check
An unintended behavior in the TCP conntrack state machine allows a
connection to be forced into the CLOSE state using an RST packet with an
invalid sequence number.
Specifically, after a SYN packet is observed, an RST with an invalid SEQ
can transition the conntrack entry to TCP_CONNTRACK_CLOSE, regardless of
whether the RST corresponds to the expected reply direction. The relevant
code path assumes the RST is a response to an outgoing SYN, but does not
validate packet direction or ens
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: esp: restore combined single-frag length gate
The ESP out-of-place fast path appends the trailer in esp_output_head()
before esp_output_tail() allocates the destination page frag. The
head-side gate currently checks skb->data_len and tailen separately, but
the tail code allocates a single destination frag from the combined
post-trailer skb->data_len.
Reject the page-frag fast path when the combined aligned length exceeds a
page. Otherwise skb_page_frag_refill() may fall back to a single page while
the destination sg still spans the combined skb->data_len.
Restore th
Input: atmel_mxt_ts - fix boundary check in mxt_prepare_cfg_mem
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: atmel_mxt_ts - fix boundary check in mxt_prepare_cfg_mem
When a configuration file provides an object size that is larger than the
driver's known mxt_obj_size(object), the driver intends to discard the
extra bytes.
The loop iterates using for (i = 0; i < size; i++). Inside the loop, the
condition to skip processing extra bytes is:
if (i > mxt_obj_size(object))
continue;
Since i is a 0-based index, the valid indices for the object are 0 through
mxt_obj_size(object) - 1.
When i == mxt_obj_size(object), the condition evaluates to false, and the
code proc
usbip: vudc: Fix use after free bug in vudc_remove due to race condition
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usbip: vudc: Fix use after free bug in vudc_remove due to race condition
This patch follows up Zheng Wang's 2023 report of a use-after-free in
vudc_remove(). The original thread stalled on Shuah Khan's request for
runtime testing of the unplug/unbind path. This patch supplies that
testing and keeps Zheng's original fix shape.
In vudc_probe(), v_init_timer() binds udc->tr_timer.timer to v_timer().
usbip_sockfd_store() starts the timer via v_start_timer()/v_kick_timer().
vudc_remove() can then free the containing struct vudc while the timer is
still pending or executing.
KA
usb: usbtmc: check URB actual_length for interrupt-IN notifications
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: usbtmc: check URB actual_length for interrupt-IN notifications
USBTMC devices can use an optional interrupt endpoint for notification
messages. These typically contain two-byte headers indicating the
payload format, but the driver does not check if these headers are
present before accessing the data buffers. In cases where the URB
actual_length is not enough to fit these headers, the driver will either
cause an out-of-bounds read, or consume stale leftover data from a
previous notification.
Fix by checking if actual_data contains enough bytes for the headers,
otherwis
USB: serial: belkin_sa: validate interrupt status length
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: serial: belkin_sa: validate interrupt status length
The Belkin interrupt callback treats interrupt data as a four-byte
status report and reads LSR/MSR fields at offsets 2 and 3. The
interrupt-in buffer length is derived from endpoint wMaxPacketSize, and
short interrupt transfers may complete successfully with a smaller
actual_length.
Check the completed interrupt packet length before parsing status
fields so short interrupt endpoints and short successful packets are
ignored instead of causing out-of-bounds or stale status-byte reads.
KASAN report as below:
BUG: KASA
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: serial: cypress_m8: validate interrupt packet headers
cypress_read_int_callback() parses the interrupt-in buffer according to
the selected Cypress packet format. Format 1 has a two-byte status/count
header and format 2 has a one-byte combined status/count header. The
usb-serial core sizes the interrupt-in buffer from the endpoint
descriptor's wMaxPacketSize, and successful interrupt transfers can
complete short when URB_SHORT_NOT_OK is not set.
Check that the completed packet contains the selected header before
reading it. Malformed short reports are ignored and the i
USB: serial: digi_acceleport: fix memory corruption with small endpoints
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: serial: digi_acceleport: fix memory corruption with small endpoints
Add the missing bulk-out buffer size sanity checks to avoid
out-of-bounds memory accesses or slab corruption should a malicious
device report smaller buffers than expected.
USB: serial: keyspan: fix missing indat transfer sanity check
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: serial: keyspan: fix missing indat transfer sanity check
Add the missing sanity check on the size of usa49wg indat transfers to
avoid parsing stale or uninitialised slab data.
USB: serial: mxuport: fix memory corruption with small endpoint
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: serial: mxuport: fix memory corruption with small endpoint
Make sure that the bulk-out endpoint max packet size is at least eight
bytes to avoid user-controlled slab corruption should a malicious device
report a smaller size.
USB: serial: mct_u232: fix memory corruption with small endpoint
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: serial: mct_u232: fix memory corruption with small endpoint
The driver overrides the maximum transfer size for a specific device
which only accepts 16 byte packets for its 32 byte bulk-out endpoint.
Make sure to never increase the maximum transfer size to prevent slab
corruption should a malicious device report a smaller endpoint max
packet size than expected.
USB: serial: mct_u232: fix missing interrupt-in transfer sanity check
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: serial: mct_u232: fix missing interrupt-in transfer sanity check
Add the missing sanity check on the size of interrupt-in transfers to
avoid parsing stale or uninitialised slab data (and leaking it to user
space).
usb: gadget: f_fs: copy only received bytes on short ep0 read
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: f_fs: copy only received bytes on short ep0 read
ffs_ep0_read() allocates its control-OUT data buffer with
kmalloc() (not kzalloc) at the Length value from the Setup
packet, then copies that full len to userspace regardless of
how many bytes were actually received:
data = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
...
ret = __ffs_ep0_queue_wait(ffs, data, len);
if ((ret > 0) && (copy_to_user(buf, data, len)))
ret = -EFAULT;
__ffs_ep0_queue_wait() returns req->actual, which on a short
control OUT transfer is strictly less than len. The
copy_to_user
thunderbolt: property: Reject u32 wrap in tb_property_entry_valid()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
thunderbolt: property: Reject u32 wrap in tb_property_entry_valid()
entry->value is u32 and entry->length is u16; the sum is performed in
u32 and wraps. A malicious XDomain peer can pick
value = 0xffffff00, length = 0x100 so the sum 0x100000000 wraps to 0
and passes the > block_len check. tb_property_parse() then passes
entry->value to parse_dwdata() as a dword offset into the property
block, reading attacker-directed memory far past the allocation.
For TEXT-typed entries with the "deviceid" or "vendorid" keys this
lands in xd->device_name / xd->vendor_name and is readab
thunderbolt: property: Reject dir_len < 4 to prevent size_t underflow
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
thunderbolt: property: Reject dir_len < 4 to prevent size_t underflow
On the non-root path, __tb_property_parse_dir() takes dir_len from
entry->length (u16 widened to size_t). Two distinct OOB conditions
follow when entry->length < 4:
1. The non-root path begins with kmemdup(&block[dir_offset],
sizeof(*dir->uuid), ...) which always reads 4 dwords from
dir_offset. tb_property_entry_valid() only enforces
dir_offset + entry->length <= block_len, so a crafted entry
with dir_offset close to the end of the property block and
entry->length in 0..3 passes that gat
thunderbolt: property: Cap recursion depth in __tb_property_parse_dir()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
thunderbolt: property: Cap recursion depth in __tb_property_parse_dir()
A DIRECTORY entry's value field is used as the dir_offset for a
recursive call into __tb_property_parse_dir() with no depth counter.
A crafted peer that chains DIRECTORY entries into a back-reference
loop drives the parser until the kernel stack is exhausted and the
guard page fires. Any untrusted XDomain peer (cable, dock, in-line
inspector, adjacent host) that reaches the PROPERTIES_REQUEST
control-plane exchange can trigger this without authentication.
Thread a depth counter through tb_property_par
scsi: fcoe: Reject FIP descriptors with zero fip_dlen in CVL walker
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: fcoe: Reject FIP descriptors with zero fip_dlen in CVL walker
drivers/scsi/fcoe/fcoe_ctlr.c::fcoe_ctlr_recv_clr_vlink() advanced the
descriptor cursor by an attacker-supplied fip_dlen without ever
requiring dlen >= sizeof(struct fip_desc) in the default branch. The
named descriptor cases (FIP_DT_MAC, FIP_DT_NAME, FIP_DT_VN_ID) checked
their per-type minimum lengths, but a FIP_DT_NON_CRITICAL descriptor
(fip_dtype >= 128, which the standard requires receivers to silently
ignore) skipped that check entirely.
An unauthenticated L2 peer on the FCoE control VLAN could ha