JupyterLab: Command link trust prompt in JupyterLab can trust a document other than the one clicked
JupyterLab is an extensible environment for interactive and reproducible computing, based on the Jupyter Notebook Architecture. From 4.5.7 until 4.5.11 and 4.6.4, the markdownviewer:trust and notebook:trust command-link handlers use tracker.currentWidget to resolve the current Markdown viewer or notebook when the user answers rather than retaining the document whose command button was clicked. If another document becomes current while the prompt is open and the user chooses Trust, JupyterLab marks the second document trusted while leaving the clicked document untrusted. Later command buttons in the incorrectly trusted document run without a p
JupyterLab: Cross-site scripting (XSS) in JupyterLab via notebook cells pasted from the system clipboard
JupyterLab is an extensible environment for interactive and reproducible computing, based on the Jupyter Notebook Architecture. From JupyterLab 4.5.0 until 4.5.11 and 4.6.4, from Notebook 7.5.0 until 7.6.3, and from JupyterLite Core 0.7.0 until 0.8.4, the system clipboard cell-paste path accepts attacker-controlled cell JSON without clearing metadata.trusted. When useSystemClipboardForCells is active and pasteCodeCellsWithoutOutput is disabled, a pasted code cell can mark HTML output as trusted, bypass output sanitization, and execute script in the authenticated JupyterLab origin without executing the cell. Markdown and raw cells are not affe
JupyterLab: Cross-site scripting (XSS) in JupyterLab via crafted language package (jupyterlab.json)
JupyterLab is an extensible environment for interactive and reproducible computing, based on the Jupyter Notebook Architecture. From JupyterLab 3.0.0 until 4.5.11 and 4.6.4, and in JupyterLite Core 0.8.3 and earlier, the Plural-Forms header in a selected third-party language pack can append JavaScript after a valid plural rule because prefix-only regular-expression validation accepts a matching prefix without requiring the entire header to match. JupyterLab passes the accepted expression to new Function, so loading the catalogue and translating a plural string executes the appended code in the authenticated JupyterLab origin. Where Jupyter Se
HTML injection in JupyterLite leading to DOM Clobbering
### Impact
The vulnerability depends on user interaction by opening a malicious notebook with Markdown cells, or Markdown file using JupyterLab preview feature.
A malicious user can access any data accessible from JupyterLite and perform arbitrary actions in JupyterLite environment.
### Patches
JupyterLite 0.4.1 was patched.
### Workarounds
There is no workaround for the underlying DOM Clobbering susceptibility. However, select plugins can be disabled on deployments which cannot update in a timely fashion to minimise the risk. These are:
- `@jupyterlab/mathjax-extension:plugin` - users will loose ability to preview mathematical equation