@evomap/evolver's validator sandbox allowlist permits `npm`/`npx`, yielding RCE from Hub-delivered validation tasks via lifecycle scripts
## Summary
The validator-mode sandbox executor (`src/gep/validator/sandboxExecutor.js`) places `npm` and `npx` in its hard executable allowlist. Because `npm install <pkg>` and `npx -y -p <pkg> <bin>` execute arbitrary code by design (preinstall/install/postinstall lifecycle scripts and remote-package bin entries), and because validator nodes consume `validation_commands` strings from unsigned Hub responses with no per-response signature check, an attacker who controls or MITMs the Hub achieves automatic remote code execution on every validator node within one daemon poll (default 60s).
## Details
End-to-end chain:
1. `src/gep/validator/i
@evomap/evolver has an unbounded request body in proxy /asset/submit that causes persistent disk-exhaustion DoS
## Summary
The EvoMap proxy daemon's HTTP body parser accepts requests of any size, and the `POST /asset/submit` route persists the full request body — verbatim and uncapped — as a JSONL line in `<dataDir>/messages.jsonl`. An unauthenticated local attacker (other local user, container neighbor, or malicious npm postinstall script running on the same host) can repeatedly POST large bodies to fill the disk. On restart, the daemon synchronously reads the entire file via `fs.readFileSync`, making the OOM/crash persistent.
## Details
**1. Entry — unbounded body parser** (`src/proxy/server/http.js:9-21`):
```js
function parseBody(req) {
retur
@evomap/evolver: Path Traversal in `evolver fetch` default-branch `safeId` allows Hub-controlled overwrite of project files (RCE)
## Summary
The `evolver fetch` subcommand in `index.js` writes Hub-supplied `bundled_files[]` into a directory derived from a Hub-supplied `skill_id`. When `--out` is not used, the path-sanitizing regex permits `.` characters, allowing a `skill_id` of `..` to escape the `skills/` subdirectory and resolve to the user's current working directory. Combined with the file-extension allow-list (which includes `.js`/`.json`/`.sh`/`.py`/`.md`), this lets a malicious Hub overwrite the victim's `index.js`, `package.json`, or other files in cwd, achieving remote code execution on the next invocation of the evolver.
## Details
The vulnerable code is i
Evolver: Prototype Pollution via `Object.assign()` in mailbox store operations
Evolver is a GEP-powered self-evolving engine for AI agents. Prior to version 1.69.3, a prototype pollution vulnerability in the mailbox store module allows attackers to modify the behavior of all JavaScript objects by injecting malicious properties into Object.prototype. The vulnerability exists in the _applyUpdate() and _updateRecord() functions which use Object.assign() to merge user-controlled data without filtering dangerous keys like __proto__, constructor, or prototype. This issue has been patched in version 1.69.3.
Evolver: Command Injection via `execSync` in `_extractLLM()` function allows Remote Code Execution
Evolver is a GEP-powered self-evolving engine for AI agents. Prior to version 1.69.3, a command injection vulnerability in the _extractLLM() function allows attackers to execute arbitrary shell commands on the server. The function constructs a curl command using string concatenation and passes it to execSync() without proper sanitization, enabling remote code execution when the corpus parameter contains shell metacharacters. This issue has been patched in version 1.69.3.
Evolver: Path Traversal via `--out` flag in `fetch` command allows Arbitrary File Write
Evolver is a GEP-powered self-evolving engine for AI agents. Prior to version 1.69.3, a path traversal vulnerability in the skill download (fetch) command allows attackers to write files to arbitrary locations on the filesystem. The --out= flag accepts user-provided paths without validation, enabling directory traversal attacks that can overwrite critical system files or create files in sensitive location. This issue has been patched in version 1.69.3.