Python stack vulnerabilities · Page 70

Malicious code in magique (PyPI)

Part of the "Hades" wave of the Shai-Hulud supply-chain campaign. On 2026-06-08, malicious phantom releases of magique were published to PyPI using stolen credentials. The package executes a bundled JavaScript payload (via the Bun runtime) on import that harvests and exfiltrates credentials and attempts self-propagation. This entry is a summary; behavior may not be fully characterized here. See the linked references for detailed analysis and indicators of compromise.

Malicious code in funcdesc (PyPI)

Part of the "Hades" wave of the Shai-Hulud supply-chain campaign. On 2026-06-08, malicious phantom releases of funcdesc were published to PyPI using stolen credentials. The package executes a bundled JavaScript payload (via the Bun runtime) on import that harvests and exfiltrates credentials and attempts self-propagation. This entry is a summary; behavior may not be fully characterized here. See the linked references for detailed analysis and indicators of compromise.

Malicious code in executor-http (PyPI)

Part of the "Hades" wave of the Shai-Hulud supply-chain campaign. On 2026-06-08, malicious phantom releases of executor-http were published to PyPI using stolen credentials. The package executes a bundled JavaScript payload (via the Bun runtime) on import that harvests and exfiltrates credentials and attempts self-propagation. This entry is a summary; behavior may not be fully characterized here. See the linked references for detailed analysis and indicators of compromise.

Malicious code in executor-engine (PyPI)

Part of the "Hades" wave of the Shai-Hulud supply-chain campaign. On 2026-06-08, malicious phantom releases of executor-engine were published to PyPI using stolen credentials. The package executes a bundled JavaScript payload (via the Bun runtime) on import that harvests and exfiltrates credentials and attempts self-propagation. This entry is a summary; behavior may not be fully characterized here. See the linked references for detailed analysis and indicators of compromise.

Code Injection Vulnerability in Code Validation Endpoint

IBM Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.10.0 allows authenticated attackers to execute arbitrary OS commands and read sensitive files including credentials, enabling complete system compromise and lateral movement.

• Update to 1.10.1.rc0

DeepTutor < 1.4.10 - Insecure Default Grants Unrestricted MCP Tool Access to Non-Admin Users

DeepTutor before version 1.4.10 contains an authorization bypass vulnerability that allows low-privilege users to invoke unrestricted MCP tools due to the allowed_mcp_tools function returning None instead of a denied result when mcp_tools is omitted from a user's grant in deeptutor/multi_user/tool_access.py. Attackers or prompt-injected content acting within a user session can enumerate and invoke any configured MCP tool, including filesystem, shell, and browser servers, gaining unauthorized access to sensitive deployment resources.

• Update to 1.4.10

Tarfile.extract() doesn't fully respect filter parameter

In the Tarfile.extract() function, the filter parameter is not passed properly when extracting hardlinks. An affected system that extracts content from untrusted tar files could end up writing files with an unexpected uid/gid despite the user passing filter='data' to the extract() function.

• Update to 3.10.12-1~22.04.18
• Update to 3.10.21
• Update to 3.11.16
• Update to 3.12.14
• Update to 3.12.3-1ubuntu0.17
• Update to 3.13.15
• Update to 3.13.15-1
• Update to 3.13.5-2+deb13u5
• Update to 3.14.4-1ubuntu0.2
• Update to 3.14.7
• Update to 3.14.7-1
• Update to 3.15.0b4
• Update to 8.0.0+dfsg-1

UBUNTU-CVE-2026-12243

Rejected reason: This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority.

• Update to 3.10.0

Malicious code in coolbox (PyPI)

Part of the "Hades" wave of the Shai-Hulud supply-chain campaign. On 2026-06-08, malicious phantom releases of coolbox were published to PyPI using stolen credentials. The package executes a bundled JavaScript payload (via the Bun runtime) on import that harvests and exfiltrates credentials and attempts self-propagation. This entry is a summary; behavior may not be fully characterized here. See the linked references for detailed analysis and indicators of compromise.

Malicious code in cmd2func (PyPI)

Part of the "Hades" wave of the Shai-Hulud supply-chain campaign. On 2026-06-08, malicious phantom releases of cmd2func were published to PyPI using stolen credentials. The package executes a bundled JavaScript payload (via the Bun runtime) on import that harvests and exfiltrates credentials and attempts self-propagation. This entry is a summary; behavior may not be fully characterized here. See the linked references for detailed analysis and indicators of compromise.

Malicious code in bramin (PyPI)

Part of the "Hades" wave of the Shai-Hulud supply-chain campaign. On 2026-06-08, malicious phantom releases of bramin were published to PyPI using stolen credentials. The package executes a bundled JavaScript payload (via the Bun runtime) on import that harvests and exfiltrates credentials and attempts self-propagation. This entry is a summary; behavior may not be fully characterized here. See the linked references for detailed analysis and indicators of compromise.

Malicious code in tlask (PyPI)

Part of the "Hades" wave of the Shai-Hulud supply-chain campaign. On 2026-06-08, malicious phantom releases of tlask were published to PyPI using stolen credentials. The package executes a bundled JavaScript payload (via the Bun runtime) on import that harvests and exfiltrates credentials and attempts self-propagation. This entry is a summary; behavior may not be fully characterized here. See the linked references for detailed analysis and indicators of compromise.

Malicious code in rlask (PyPI)

Part of the "Hades" wave of the Shai-Hulud supply-chain campaign. On 2026-06-08, malicious phantom releases of rlask were published to PyPI using stolen credentials. The package executes a bundled JavaScript payload (via the Bun runtime) on import that harvests and exfiltrates credentials and attempts self-propagation. This entry is a summary; behavior may not be fully characterized here. See the linked references for detailed analysis and indicators of compromise.

Malicious code in nhmpy (PyPI)

Part of the "Hades" wave of the Shai-Hulud supply-chain campaign. On 2026-06-08, malicious phantom releases of nhmpy were published to PyPI using stolen credentials. The package executes a bundled JavaScript payload (via the Bun runtime) on import that harvests and exfiltrates credentials and attempts self-propagation. This entry is a summary; behavior may not be fully characterized here. See the linked references for detailed analysis and indicators of compromise.

Malicious code in mflux-streamlit (PyPI)

Part of the "Hades" wave of the Shai-Hulud supply-chain campaign. On 2026-06-08, malicious phantom releases of mflux-streamlit were published to PyPI using stolen credentials. The package executes a bundled JavaScript payload (via the Bun runtime) on import that harvests and exfiltrates credentials and attempts self-propagation. This entry is a summary; behavior may not be fully characterized here. See the linked references for detailed analysis and indicators of compromise.

Malicious code in spateo-release (PyPI)

Part of the "Hades" wave of the Shai-Hulud supply-chain campaign. On 2026-06-08, malicious phantom releases of spateo-release were published to PyPI using stolen credentials. The package executes a bundled JavaScript payload (via the Bun runtime) on import that harvests and exfiltrates credentials and attempts self-propagation. This entry is a summary; behavior may not be fully characterized here. See the linked references for detailed analysis and indicators of compromise.

Malicious code in dynamo-release (PyPI)

Part of the "Hades" wave of the Shai-Hulud supply-chain campaign. On 2026-06-08, malicious phantom releases of dynamo-release were published to PyPI using stolen credentials. The package executes a bundled JavaScript payload (via the Bun runtime) on import that harvests and exfiltrates credentials and attempts self-propagation. This entry is a summary; behavior may not be fully characterized here. See the linked references for detailed analysis and indicators of compromise.

Langchain SQL Injection vulnerability

In Langchain before 0.0.247, prompt injection allows execution of arbitrary code against the SQL service provided by the chain.

• Update to 0.0.247

Ray's New Token Authentication is Disabled By Default

Anyscale Ray 2.52.0 contains an insecure default configuration in which token-based authentication for Ray management interfaces (including the dashboard and Jobs API) is disabled unless explicitly enabled by setting RAY_AUTH_MODE=token. In the default unauthenticated state, a remote attacker with network access to these interfaces can submit jobs and execute arbitrary code on the Ray cluster. NOTE: The vendor plans to enable token authentication by default in a future release. They recommend enabling token authentication to protect your cluster from unauthorized access.

vLLM deserialization vulnerability in vllm.distributed.GroupCoordinator.recv_object

vllm-project vllm version 0.6.0 contains a vulnerability in the distributed training API. The function vllm.distributed.GroupCoordinator.recv_object() deserializes received object bytes using pickle.loads() without sanitization, leading to a remote code execution vulnerability. ### Maintainer perspective Note that vLLM does NOT use the code as described in the report on huntr. The problem only exists if you use these internal APIs in a way that exposes them to a network as described. The vllm team was not involved in the analysis of this report and the decision to assign it a CVE.