libsixel before 1.8.7-r1 and 1.9.0 through 1.10.5 Heap Out-of-Bounds Write via GIF
libsixel before 1.8.7-r1 and 1.9.0 through 1.10.5 contains a heap out-of-bounds write vulnerability in gif_init_frame() in src/fromgif.c, which never checks the GIF transparent color index against the palette size. Attackers can supply a crafted GIF with a small color table and large transparent index, processed with a background color set, to write bytes past the palette buffer, causing heap corruption or crashes.
libsixel is a SIXEL encoder/decoder implementation derived from kmiya's sixel. From to 1.8.7-r1, a signed integer overflow in the SIXEL parser's image-buffer doubling loop can lead to an out-of-bounds heap write in sixel_decode_raw_impl. context->pos_x grows by repeat_count on every sixel character with no upper bound check. Once pos_x approaches INT_MAX, the expression "pos_x + repeat_count" used to size the image buffer overflows signed int. Depending on how the overflow wraps, the resize check that should reject oversized buffers can be bypassed, after which a subsequent write computes a large attacker-influenced offset into image->data a
libsixel is a SIXEL encoder/decoder implementation derived from kmiya's sixel. From to 1.8.7-r1, signed integer overflow in sixel_encode_highcolor's allocation size calculation can lead to a heap buffer overflow. The public sixel_encode entry point validates only that width and height are greater than zero, with no upper bound. width and height are multiplied as plain int when computing the allocation size for paletted_pixels and normalized_pixels. Any caller that asks libsixel to encode a pixel buffer with width times height greater than INT_MAX (about 2.15 billion) will hit a wrapped allocation size; under the right wrap, the malloc succee
libsixel is a SIXEL encoder/decoder implementation derived from kmiya's sixel. From to 1.8.7-r1, a wrong NULL check after an allocation call in sixel_decode_raw and sixel_decode causes a NULL pointer dereference whenever the allocation fails. The check tests the address of the output parameter (always non-NULL) instead of the value the malloc returned. On allocation failure, the function continues and writes through a NULL pointer, crashing the process. This is a denial of service against any caller of these public APIs that hits a low-memory condition. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.8.7-r2.
libsixel is a SIXEL encoder/decoder implementation derived from kmiya's sixel. In versions 1.8.7 and prior, when built with the --with-gdk-pixbuf2 option, a use-after-free vulnerability exists in load_with_gdkpixbuf() in loader.c. The cleanup path manually frees the sixel_frame_t object and its internal buffers without consulting the reference count, even though the object was created via the refcounted constructor sixel_frame_new() and exposed to the public callback. A callback that calls sixel_frame_ref(frame) to retain a logically valid reference will hold a dangling pointer after sixel_helper_load_image_file() returns, and any subsequent
libsixel: Use-after-free in sixel_encoder_encode_bytes()
libsixel is a SIXEL encoder/decoder implementation derived from kmiya's sixel. Versions 1.8.7 and prior contain a use-after-free vulnerability in sixel_encoder_encode_bytes() because sixel_frame_init() stores the caller-owned pixel buffer pointer directly in frame->pixels without making a defensive copy. When a resize operation is triggered, sixel_frame_convert_to_rgb888() unconditionally frees this caller-owned buffer and replaces it with a new internal allocation, leaving the caller with a dangling pointer. Any subsequent access to the original buffer by the caller constitutes a use-after-free, confirmed by AddressSanitizer. An attacker who
libsixel: Integer Overflow in write_png_to_file() leads to Heap-based Buffer Overflow
libsixel is a SIXEL encoder/decoder implementation derived from kmiya's sixel. Versions 1.8.7 and prior contain an integer overflow which leads to a heap buffer overflow via sixel_frame_convert_to_rgb888() in frame.c, where allocation size and pointer offset computations for palettised images (PAL1, PAL2, PAL4) are performed using int arithmetic before casting to size_t. For images whose pixel count exceeds INT_MAX / 4, the overflow produces an undersized heap allocation for the conversion buffer and a negative pointer offset for the normalization sub-buffer, after which sixel_helper_normalize_pixelformat() writes the full image data starting
libsixel: Integer overflow leads to Out-of-bounds Read in img2sixel
libsixel is a SIXEL encoder/decoder implementation derived from kmiya's sixel. Versions 1.8.7 and prior contain an integer overflow leading to an out-of-bounds heap read in the --crop option handling of img2sixel, where positive coordinates up to INT_MAX are accepted without overflow-safe bounds checking. In sixel_encoder_do_clip(), the expression clip_w + clip_x overflows to a large negative value when clip_x is INT_MAX, causing the bounds guard to be skipped entirely, and the unclamped coordinate is passed through sixel_frame_clip() to clip(), which computes a source pointer far beyond the image buffer and passes it to memmove(). An attacke
libsixel is a SIXEL encoder/decoder implementation derived from kmiya's sixel. Versions 1.8.7 and prior contain a Use-After-Free vulnerability via the load_gif() function in fromgif.c, where a single sixel_frame_t object is reused across all frames of an animated GIF and gif_init_frame() unconditionally frees and reallocates frame->pixels between frames without consulting the object's reference count. Because the public API explicitly provides sixel_frame_ref() to retain a frame and sixel_frame_get_pixels() to access the raw pixel buffer, a callback following this documented usage pattern will hold a dangling pointer after the second frame is
A vulnerability was found in saitoha libsixel up to 1.10.3. Affected by this issue is the function sixel_debug_print_palette of the file src/encoder.c of the component img2sixel. The manipulation results in stack-based buffer overflow. The attack must be initiated from a local position. The exploit has been made public and could be used. The patch is identified as 316c086e79d66b62c0c4bc66229ee894e4fdb7d1. Applying a patch is advised to resolve this issue.
There is a floating point exception error in sixel_encoder_do_resize, encoder.c:633 in libsixel img2sixel 1.8.6. Remote attackers could leverage this vulnerability to cause a denial-of-service via a crafted JPEG file.
There is an assertion failure error in stbi__jpeg_huff_decode, stb_image.h:1894 in libsixel img2sixel 1.8.6. Remote attackers could leverage this vulnerability to cause a denial-of-service via a crafted JPEG file.
In Libsixel prior to and including v1.10.3, a NULL pointer dereference in the stb_image.h component of libsixel allows attackers to cause a denial of service (DOS) via a crafted PICT file.