Dompdf: Uncontrolled resource consumption based on declared BMP dimensions
Dompdf is an HTML to PDF converter for PHP. Versions 3.15 and prior accept a BMP image and generates a PDF-compatible PNG based only on its declared header dimensions and never bounds width × height before the image is converted through GD. A 58-byte BMP whose header declares e.g. 6000×6000 is accepted and later drives imagecreatetruecolor($width, $height) (and PHP's native BMP decoder) to allocate the full pixel canvas. A payload can fit in a single HTTP request: the BMP can be inlined as a data:image/bmp;base64,… URI inside attacker-controlled HTML, so no upload, no remote fetch, and no chroot-reachable file is required. I measured a 169-by
Dompdf: Denial of Service (DoS) via Resource Exhaustion using Oversized Image Bitmaps
Dompdf is an HTML to PDF converter for PHP. Versions 3.15 and prior are vulnerable to a Denial of Service (DoS) attack via resource exhaustion. An attacker can crash the PHP process by providing a specially crafted HTML document containing a single image with massive dimensions (e.g., 30,000x30,000 pixels). While Dompdf implements internal checks to validate image dimensions, these can be bypassed by using a high-entropy image (such as random noise) encoded in Base64 and wrapped in specific CSS containers. The vulnerability exists because the dimension validation happens early, but the resource allocation for calculating the object's bounding
Dompdf: Embedded SVG images can leak existence of files and directories within the filesystem
Dompdf is an HTML to PDF converter for PHP. In versions 3.15 and prior, if a malicious actor can supply unrestricted content for rendering by Dompdf they can utilize the SVG rendering functionality to leak filesystem information when rendering PDF files using image references within a data-URI encoded SVG document. Using an <image> element inside a data-URI embedded SVG, an attacker can attempt to embed other files via the href or xlink:href attributes. When processing a file that does not exist (e.g. file:///DOESNOTEXIST), dompdf behaves differently than it does when accessing a file or directory that actually exists on the filesystem. This
Dompdf: Local file read due to improper file path validation in SVG images encoded as data-URI
Dompdf is an HTML to PDF converter for PHP. In versions 3.15 and prior, aAn attacker who controls the HTML input can bypass this restriction by embedding a target file path inside an SVG image delivered through a data: URI, because dompdf processes the SVG twice and the second pass does not enforce the same protections as the first. When rendering, dompdf hands the SVG to the separate php-svg-lib library with external references forced on, and that library has no knowledge of the chroot directory, blocks only the phar:// scheme, and ultimately reads the referenced file with no path or protocol validation. This lets an external, unauthen
Dompdf is an HTML to PDF converter for PHP. In versions 3.15 and prior, the validateLocalUri() method enforces chroot boundaries with a strpos() prefix check after normalizing paths with realpath() . Because normalization strips the trailing directory separator from $chrootPath , the check only verifies that $chrootPath is a string prefix of $realfile, so a chroot of /var/www also matches sibling directories like /var/www2 , /var/www-admin, or /var/www_backup. An attacker who controls part of the rendered HTML could exploit this to escape the chroot and read sensitive files outside the allowed directory. This issue has been fixed in ver
Dompdf: File existence oracle via font-face stylesheet declaration
Dompdf is an HTML to PDF converter for PHP. Versions 3.15 and prior are vulnerable to a File Existence Oracle attack through the manipulation of the CSS @font-face directive. By providing malicious HTML that references local files via the file:// protocol repeatedly, an attacker can trigger PHP memory exhaustion. Because Dompdf behaves differently depending on whether a referenced local file exists (an existing file is processed repeatedly until it triggers an "Allowed memory size exhausted" crash, whereas a missing file fails fast or is ignored and never hits the memory limit), an attacker can use this observable discrepancy as an oracle to
Improper Restriction of XML External Entity Reference in dompdf/dompdf
An improper restriction of external entities (XXE) vulnerability in dompdf/dompdf's SVG parser allows for Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) and deserialization attacks. This issue affects all versions prior to 2.0.0. The vulnerability can be exploited even if the isRemoteEnabled option is set to false. It allows attackers to perform SSRF, disclose internal image files, and cause PHAR deserialization attacks.
DomPDF before version 2.0.0 is vulnerable to PHAR deserialization due to a lack of checking on the protocol before passing it into the file_get_contents() function. An attacker who can upload files of any type to the server can pass in the phar:// protocol to unserialize the uploaded file and instantiate arbitrary PHP objects. This can lead to remote code execution, especially when DOMPdf is used with frameworks with documented POP chains like Laravel or vulnerable developer code.
Dompdf possible DoS caused by infinite recursion when parsing SVG images
Dompdf is an HTML to PDF converter for PHP. When parsing SVG images Dompdf performs an initial validation to ensure that paths within the SVG are allowed. One of the validations is that the SVG document does not reference itself. However, prior to version 2.0.4, a recursive chained using two or more SVG documents is not correctly validated. Depending on the system configuration and attack pattern this could exhaust the memory available to the executing process and/or to the server itself.
php-svg-lib, when run in isolation, does not support SVG references for `image` elements. However, when used in combination with Dompdf, php-svg-lib will p
URI validation failure on SVG parsing. Bypass of CVE-2023-23924
Dompdf is an HTML to PDF converter written in php. Due to the difference in the attribute parser of Dompdf and php-svg-lib, an attacker can still call arbitrary URLs with arbitrary protocols. Dompdf parses the href attribute of `image` tags and respects `xlink:href` even if `href` is specified. However, php-svg-lib, which is later used to parse the svg file, parses the href attribute. Since `href` is respected if both `xlink:href` and `href` is specified, it's possible to bypass the protection on the Dompdf side by providing an empty `xlink:href` attribute. An attacker can exploit the vulnerability to call arbitrary URLs with arbitrary protoc
dompdf.php in dompdf before 0.6.1, when DOMPDF_ENABLE_PHP is enabled, allows context-dependent attackers to bypass chroot protections and read arbitrary files via a PHP protocol and wrappers in the input_file parameter, as demonstrated by a php://filter/read=convert.base64-encode/resource in the input_file parameter.
PHP remote file inclusion vulnerability in dompdf.php in dompdf 0.6.0 beta1 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary PHP code via a URL in the input_file parameter.