justhtml before 1.10.0 Denial of Service via deeply nested HTML
justhtml through 1.9.1 (fixed in 1.10.0) is vulnerable to uncontrolled recursion leading to denial of service. During JustHTML() construction, TreeBuilder.finish() unconditionally calls _populate_selectedcontent(), which recursively traverses the DOM tree via _find_elements()/_find_element() without a depth bound. An attacker who can supply HTML for parsing can provide deeply nested elements (e.g., ~1000 nested <div> tags, roughly 11 KB) to exceed CPython's default recursion limit and trigger an unhandled RecursionError, which may abort parsing, fail requests, or terminate a worker/process depending on the host application's exception handlin
justhtml before 1.12.0 Mutation XSS via Raw Text Elements
justhtml before 1.12.0 (versions <= 1.11.0) contains a mutation cross-site scripting (mXSS) vulnerability in the serialization of raw-text elements such as <style> and <script>. When a DOM tree is processed by sanitize_dom() using a custom policy that keeps these elements, text nodes inside them are serialized literally without escaping, allowing attacker-controlled text containing the matching closing tag sequence to break out of the raw-text context and inject arbitrary HTML into the serialized output. The default sanitization policy is not affected because it drops the contents of style and script.
justhtml before 1.12.0 Sanitizer Bypass via Markdown
justhtml versions <= 1.11.0 (fixed in 1.12.0) do not sufficiently escape HTML-significant characters (angle brackets) in text nodes when converting a parsed document to Markdown via to_markdown(). While a small set of Markdown metacharacters are escaped, characters such as < and > are preserved, so untrusted input that is safe in to_html() — including entity-decoded text (e.g. <script>) or text from RCDATA/RAWTEXT-parsed elements like <title>, <textarea>, <noscript>, and <plaintext> — can be emitted as raw HTML in the Markdown output, enabling a sanitizer bypass and potential cross-site scripting when that output is rendered.
justhtml before 1.16.0 Multiple Security Issues via Sanitization
justhtml before 1.16.0 contains multiple HTML sanitization bypass issues that can allow active/dangerous content (e.g., script or style) to survive sanitization, potentially leading to cross-site scripting. The issues primarily affect advanced usage rather than the default JustHTML(..., sanitize=True) path for ordinary parsed HTML: mutating or reusing sanitization policy objects (including exported defaults) could weaken later sanitization; programmatic DOM input to sanitize()/sanitize_dom() could miss mixed-case tag names (e.g., ScRiPt, StYlE); crafted programmatic doctype names could serialize into active markup; and custom policies preserv
justhtml 0.9.0 through 1.21.0 Cross-Site Scripting via code-span
justhtml versions 0.9.0 through 1.21.0 contain a cross-site scripting vulnerability in to_markdown() where inline code spans fail to account for blank lines as block boundaries. Attackers can inject blank lines into code or pre element text to break the inline span, causing sanitized HTML to be emitted unescaped and re-parsed as live Markdown by compliant renderers.
justhtml before 1.17.0 Multiple Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerabilities
justhtml before 1.17.0 contains multiple security issues in sanitization, serialization, and programmatic DOM handling. When custom policies preserve foreign namespaces (SVG/MathML), dangerous content such as HTML integration points (SVG <foreignObject>, MathML <annotation-xml encoding="text/html">) and mutation-XSS parser-differential payloads could survive sanitization and become active HTML after reparse; SVG filter="url(...)" and preserved <style> could leave resource-loading CSS (@import, background-image:url()). Programmatic script/style/Comment nodes could serialize into active markup. Additional hardening fixes address sanitize-pipeli
justhtml before 1.14.0 Mutation XSS via custom sanitization policies
justhtml versions 1.13.0 and earlier contain a parser-differential / mutation cross-site scripting (mXSS) vulnerability when using a custom SanitizationPolicy that preserves foreign namespaces (e.g., drop_foreign_namespaces=False with allowlisted SVG/MathML elements or raw-text containers such as <style>). Specially crafted input can sanitize into markup that appears safe but becomes unsafe when re-parsed by a browser or another HTML parser, allowing markup injection. The default safe configuration (sanitize=True) is not affected. Fixed in 1.14.0.
justhtml before 1.13.0 XSS via code fence breakout
justhtml versions before 1.13.0 contain a cross-site scripting vulnerability in the to_markdown() function when serializing attacker-controlled pre content. Attackers can place backticks inside sanitized pre elements to break out of fixed-length code fences, allowing raw HTML to execute when the generated Markdown is rendered by CommonMark or GFM-style renderers.
justhtml before 1.15.0 contains multiple security issues in URL sanitization helpers (clean_url_value/clean_url_in_js_string), HTML serialization, Markdown passthrough (html_passthrough=True), and several custom sanitization-policy edge cases. Depending on configuration, an attacker can bypass sanitization to inject active HTML and JavaScript — for example via encoded javascript: URLs, backslash-based relative URLs resolved as remote hosts, markup-breaking programmatic element/attribute names or HTML comments, raw </textarea> reintroduction through Markdown passthrough, or preserved <style>/<meta http-equiv=refresh>/<base href> tags in custom
justhtml before 1.18.0 Denial of Service via CSS Selector
justhtml before 1.18.0 contains multiple low-severity denial-of-service issues in CSS selector handling and linkification. Applications that evaluate attacker-controlled selector strings (via query(), matches(), or selector-based transforms), run selector matching over very large untrusted documents, construct DOM trees from untrusted structure, or enable linkification over attacker-controlled text may consume disproportionate CPU or memory. Triggers include oversized selectors, large selector lists, oversized compound selectors, long combinator chains, deeply nested functional pseudo-classes, repeated token/positional matching, cyclic DOM gr